Swiss Nat. Ins. Co. v. Miller

• Decision Date: 07 May 1923
• Docket Number: 3842.
• Citation: 289 F. 571
• Parties: SWISS NAT. INS. CO., Limited, v. MILLER, Alien Property Custodian, et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

289 F. 571

SWISS NAT. INS. CO., Limited, v. MILLER, Alien Property Custodian, et al.

No. 3842.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia.

May 7, 1923

Submitted February 8, 1923.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

Thomas Ruffin and Hoke Smith, both of Washington, D.C., for appellant.

Peyton Gordon and Dean Hill Stanley, both of Washington, D.C., for appellees.

Before SMYTH, Chief Justice, ROBB, Associate Justice, and MARTIN Judge of the United States Court of Customs Appeals.

MARTIN Acting Associate Justice.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia. This case arises under the Trading with the Enemy Act, approved October 6, 1917 (40 Stat. 411), as amended June 5, 1920 (41 Stat 977).

The suit was brought by the Swiss National Insurance Company Limited, a Swiss corporation doing business in this country, against the Alien Property Custodian and the Treasurer of the United States, to recover possession of certain of its assets, consisting of securities which it had deposited in this country as required by law, and which had been seized by the Custodian in November, 1918; the ground of the seizure being that the company, although incorporated in Switzerland, was also doing business within German territory, and therefore was an enemy, as defined by the act. The plaintiff admitted that it had been engaged in business in Germany at the time of the seizure, but alleged that it had since withdrawn from that country and was no longer doing business therein. The plaintiff claimed that because of that fact, and also because the war had been officially declared at an end, there remained no justification for the retention of its property by the Custodian, and that in equity and under the law as amended it was entitled to recover the possession thereof, and it prayed for suitable relief.

A motion to dismiss the bill was filed by the defendants upon the ground that the bill failed to aver that the corporation, at the time of the seizure and at present, was entirely owned by subjects or citizens of neutral countries. The defendants contended that the omission of that averment was fatal to the bill. The court sustained the motion and dismissed the bill, from which decision the plaintiff appealed.

The plaintiff based its right to a recovery upon three grounds, to wit: First, that no reason existed for the retention of the property by the Custodian, in view of the fact that the war with Germany had been officially declared at an end; second, that the enemy status of the plaintiff had ceased when it discontinued its business within enemy territory, and accordingly that it was entitled to recover as a nonenemy under section 9(a) of the act as amended; and, third, that it was entitled to recover as a citizen of a neutral country under the provisions of section 9(b) of the act as amended.

We answer these claims as follows: It is certain that the sequestration of the property in question was authorized by the act. Under section 2 (Comp. St. 1918, Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1919, Sec. 3115 1/2aa) the plaintiff was an enemy, since it was doing business within enemy territory, and under section 7c (section 3115 1/2d) enemy-owned property was made liable to seizure by the Custodian. It is equally certain that no subsequent change in the situation of the plaintiff could relieve the sequestered property from its status as enemy-owned property. Otherwise the law could not have been administered effectively. It would have been useless to seize enemy-owned property, if the owner could recover it immediately by the simple expedient of changing his residence or his place of business. It is also certain that Congress did not intend that the official termination of the war should ipso facto entitle the owners of sequestered property to recover the same from the Custodian. Section 12 of the act (section 3115 1/2ff) reads in part as follows:

'After the end of the war any claim of an enemy or of an ally of enemy to any money or other property received and held by the Alien Property Custodian or deposited in the United States Treasury, shall be settled as Congress shall direct.'

The act unmistakably discloses that Congress intended the Custodian to retain possession of the sequestered property after the end of the war, until the final disposition thereof should be determined by future legislation. These conclusions negative all of the claims presented by the plaintiff, except that made under section 9(b) of the amendment of June 5, 1920. That enactment provided that the owners of property thus sequestered should be entitled to recover possession thereof from the Custodian, if at the time of the sequestration and also of the demand therefor, they answered to certain descriptions, among which were the following, to wit:

'(1) A citizen or subject of any nation or State or free city other than Germany or Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary, and is at the time of the return of such money or other property hereunder a citizen or subject of any such nation or state or free city; or

'(6) A partnership, association, or other unincorporated body of individuals outside the United States, or a corporation incorporated within any country other than the United States, and was entirely owned at such time by subjects or citizens of nations, states, or free cities other than Germany or Austria or Hungary or Austria-Hungary and is so owned at the time of the return of its money or other property hereunder. * * * '

The plaintiff claims the right to a recovery herein under subsection (1), supra, upon the ground that it always was and still is a 'citizen' of a neutral country, to wit, Switzerland. The defendants, however, contend that the word 'citizen,' as used in the subsection, was not intended by Congress to include corporations, but only natural persons. We think that the word 'citizen' would ordinarily include corporations as well as natural persons, but in subsection (6), supra, Congress deals specifically with corporations for the purposes of the amendment, and thereby indicates that the first subsection was not intended to apply to them.

The two subsections in question are cognate provisions of the same enactment, and should be construed together. It is elementary that, where there is in an act a specific provision relating to a particular subject, that provision must govern in respect to the subject as against general provisions in other parts of the act, although the latter, standing alone, would be broad enough to include the subject to which the more particular provision relates. Endlich, Interpretation of Statutes, Sec. 216. This rule sustains the foregoing conclusions, since subsection (6) treats of corporations in particular, whereas subsection (1) treats of citizens in general.

Another rule of statutory construction, which tends to sustain this interpretation, is to be found in the maxim, 'Expressio unius est exclusio alterius,' for according to that rule the provision in subsection (6) for a restricted class of corporations would impliedly exclude therefrom all corporations of an opposite character. Furthermore, under the plaintiff's interpretation, subsection (6) would be denied any force or effect as part of the act, for, if...