Swyers v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office
| Decision Date | 27 May 2016 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 1:16-cv-15 |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | MATTHEW H. SWYERS, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, et al., Defendants. |
Hon. Liam O'Grady
Matthew Swyers filed this action to enjoin the United States Patent and Trademark Office ("PTO") from pursuing disciplinary proceedings against him stemming from the Office of Enrollment and Discipline's ("OED") purportedly unconstitutional investigation into his patent practice. In addition to injunctive relief, Swyers seeks damages from three individual PTO employees pursuant to Bivens.1 During the pendency of the complaint, the PTO initiated a formal disciplinary proceeding against Swyers that is now pending before an administrative law judge.
The PTO moves to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the statutory scheme put in place by Congress precludes judicial review of Swyers' claims at this stage or, alternatively, for failure to state a claim. (Dkt. No. 14). The individual defendants have separately moved to dismiss for failure to state a Bivens cause of action or, alternatively, on the basis of qualified immunity. (Dkt. No. 17). The motions are fully briefed, and the Court heard argument on May6, 2016. For substantially the same reasons identified in the defendants' briefing, the Court will grant the motions and dismiss the complaint.
This section first sets out the relevant statutory and regulatory framework and then turns to the facts as alleged in the complaint.
Congress vested the PTO with "broad authority to govern the conduct of proceedings before it and to govern the recognition and conduct of attorneys." Lacavera v. Dudas, 441 F.3d 1380, 1383 (Fed. Cir. 2006); see also Kroll v. Finnerty, 242 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Halvonik v. Dudas, 398 F. Supp. 2d 115, 121 n.12 (D.D.C. 2005) (). Among other things, 35 U.S.C. § 2 provides that the PTO may establish regulations "govern[ing] the recognition and conduct of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties before the Office, and may require them, before being recognized as representatives of applicants or other persons, to show that they are of good moral character and reputation and are possessed of the necessary qualifications to render to applicants or other persons valuable service, advice, and assistance in the presentation or prosecution of their applications or other business before the Office." Id. § 2(b)(2)(D). Section 32, titled "Suspension or Exclusion from Practice," provides that "[t]he Director may, after notice and opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further practice before the [PTO], any person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or who does not comply with the regulations established under section 2(b)(2)(D)." Id. § 32. A grieving practitioner may seek review in this Court.
Pursuant to this authority, the PTO promulgated rules of professional conduct and subjects attorneys to discipline for failure to comply. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 10.20-112 (Code of Professional Responsibility); id. §§ 11.101-901 (Rules of Professional Conduct). The PTO's disciplinary process proceeds in two phases: the investigation of possible grounds for discipline and the institution of formal disciplinary proceedings. See id. §§ 11.2, 11.19-11.60. Disciplinary investigations are the province of the Office of Enrollment and Discipline and its Director. Id. §§ 11.2(b)(3), 11.22(a). "An investigation may be initiated when the OED Director receives a grievance, information or evidence from any source suggesting possible grounds for discipline." Id. § 11.22(a). When an investigation is initiated, the Director must provide the practitioner written notice. Id. § 11.22(e).
The OED conducts investigations by issuing requests for information and evidence (a "RFI") to either "(i) [t]he grievant, (ii) [t]he practitioner, or (iii) [a]ny person who may reasonably be expected to provide information and evidence needed in connection with the grievance or investigation." Id. § 11.22(f)(1). The Director may also "request information and evidence . . . from a non-grieving client" if one of two conditions is met. Either the practitioner consents to the contact or a member of the Committee on Discipline—an independent panel2—finds "that good cause exists to believe that the possible ground for discipline alleged has occurred with respect to non-grieving clients." Id. § 11.22(f)(2).
PTO rules require practitioners to respond to "lawful demand[s] or request[s] for information from an admissions or disciplinary authority," except to the extent that doing sowould "require disclosure of information otherwise protected by [privilege]." Id. § 11.801(b). A practitioner who "knowingly fail[s] to respond" may be subject to discipline. Id.
PTO regulations contain a mechanism by which any "dissatisfied" party may challenge "any action or notice of any employee of the [OED] during or at the conclusion of a disciplinary investigation." Id. § 11.2(e). In full, that section provides:
The PTO's regulations governing disciplinary investigations were not always so extensive. In 2004, the lack of procedural safeguards within PTO investigations resulted in a rebuke by the Fourth Circuit. See Goldstein v. Moatz, 364 F.3d 204 (4th Cir. 2004). In Goldstein, a practitioner sued several PTO employees for damages and declaratory relief arising out of "the violation of his constitutional rights to free speech and due process through issuanceof the RFIs." Id. at 210. In denying the individual defendants absolute immunity, the court reasoned that "[t]he importance of denying absolute immunity . . . is underscored by the utter lack of procedural safeguards protecting Goldstein's rights and his clients' secrets." Id. at 217. At that time, the regulations contained no mechanism through which a practitioner could challenge an RFI, absent the PTO formally initiating disciplinary proceedings. Thus, the Fourth Circuit noted that Goldstein "had no option but to answer the RFIs because failure to comply would itself constitute a violation of the disciplinary rules." Id.
In the wake of Goldstein, the PTO made some changes.3 The section of the Code addressing investigations now explicitly provides authorization to the OED Director to issue RFIs. See 37 C.F.R. § 11.22(f). Before that, the authorization was contained somewhat ambiguously elsewhere. See Goldstein, 364 F.3d at 217-18. Section 11.2(e) was added, giving all parties the ability to petition for relief from an RFI through administrative channels and ultimately to an Article III court. Thus, a practitioner "can [now] challenge the RFIs as unduly burdensome or as protected by attorney-client privilege or attorney work-product privilege," as the Goldstein court envisioned. Id. at 218. Finally, as noted above, a practitioner can only be subject to discipline for failing to response to "a lawful demand or request for information" and discipline cannot stem from refusal to disclose information otherwise protected by privilege. 37 C.F.R. § 11.801(b) (emphasis added).
If the OED Director believes an investigation has uncovered grounds for discipline, he may institute disciplinary proceedings only if the Committee on Discipline makes a finding of probable cause. Id. §§ 11.22(b), 11.32. If probable cause is found, the OED Director may file a complaint. Id. § 11.32. The practitioner, who may be represented by counsel, then has thirtydays to file an answer. Id. §§ 11.36, 11.40. From that point, the proceedings bear many of the same hallmarks as traditional litigation. See id. § 11.43 (Motions); § 11.44 (Hearings); § 11.45 (Amendment of Pleadings); § 11.50 (Evidence); § 11.51 (Depositions); § 11.52 (Discovery). An independent hearing officer presides over the proceedings, id. § 11.39, and the OED Director...
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