Sydleman v. Beckwith

• Decision Date: 31 October 1875
• Citation: 43 Conn. 9
• Parties: HENRY D. SYDLEMAN v. ELIPHALET BECKWITH.
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court

43 Conn. 9

HENRY D. SYDLEMAN v. ELIPHALET BECKWITH.

SUPREME COURT OF ERRORS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT

OCTOBER TERM, 1875

October 31, 1875

CASES ARGUED AND DETERMINED

COUNTIES OF NEW LONDON AND WINDHAM.

Present, CARPENTER, PARDEE, AND LOOMIS, JS.

A witness who testifies from personal knowledge of the facts upon which his opinion is founded, may he asked (the disposition of a horse being the matter in question)—"From your knowledge of the horse was he in your opinion a safe and kind horse ?"

To render opinions of common witnesses admissible it is indispensable that they be founded on their own personal observation and not on the testimony of others or any hypothetical statement of facts, as is permitted in the case of experts.

It is important in all cases that the witness, with a view to confirm his opinion, should be able to state such facts as will show presumptively that the opinion is well founded.

But the consideration to which the opinion is entitled is not necessarily limited to the degree of support which it seems to receive from the particular facts stated by the witness. The basis of the rule which admits the opinions of witnesses in such cases is, the difficulty of stating the facts in detail to the jury in such a manner that they shall produce the same impression upon their minds that they have legitimately produced upon the minds of the witnesses.

TRESPASS ON THE CASE for fraud in the sale of a horse ; brought to the Superior Court in New London County, and tried to the jury on the general issue before Foster, J.

On the trial the plaintiff offered evidence to prove, and claimed that he had proved, that the horse sold by the defendant was not safe, kind, and gentle. In the course of this evidence the counsel for the plaintiff asked the plaintiff and certain other witnesses the following question, after the witnesses had testified particularly to their knowledge of facts, and of the conduct of the horse on various occasions: "From your knowledge of the horse, was he in your opinion a safe, kind horse ?" To the admission of this evidence the counsel for the defendant objected, but the court overruled the objection and admitted the evidence; the court at the same time instructing the jury that such evidence was admissible only in connection with the facts sworn to by each witness, and was entitled to consideration only so far as those facts sustained the opinion. Other evidence in support of the various allegations in the declaration was offered by the plaintiff, which, with the testimony offered by the defendant, was submitted to the jury, who returned a verdict for the plaintiff.

The defendant moved for a new trial for error in the admission of the evidence objected to.

J. T. Wait and S. T. Holbrook, in support of the motion.

1. The only cases in which the opinions of witnesses are admitted in evidence, are those where the nature of the question at issue is such that the jury are incompetent to draw their own conclusions from the facts without the aid of persons whose skill and knowledge are superior to their own. Note to Carter v. Boehm, 1 Smith Lead. Cas. (H. & W. ed.), 644; 1 Stark. Ev., 172; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 440, note 2; Jefferson Ins. Co. v. Cotheal, 7 Wend., 72; Lamoure v. Caryl, 4 Dcnio, 373; De Witt v. Barly, 17 N. York, 342; N. Eng. Glass Co. v. Lovell, 7 Cush., 321; Bochester v. Chester, 3 N. Hamp., 364; Porter v. Pequonnoc Manf. Co., 17 Conn., 257.

2. The jury are as competent as the witnesses to draw their own conclusions from the facts given in evidence that a horse is in the habit of shying, halting, dodging and running away.

3. The Supreme Court of this state has repeatedly recognized the well established rule that the opinions of witnesses are not evidence. It is true that to this general rule there are several exceptions, but the case at bar is not embraced among them.

S. Lucas, with whom was S. S. Thresher, contra, cited Grant v. Thompson, 4 Conn., 203; Morse v. The State, 6 id., 13; Porter v. Pequonnoc Manvf. Co., 17 id., 255, 257; Kearney v. Farrell, 28 id., 319; Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 103 Mass., 419, 420.

Loomis, J. On the trial of this case the plaintiff, to prove that the horse sold him by the defendant was not safe, kind and gentle, as it was warranted to be, offered certain witnesses, who, after they had testified particularly to their knowledge of facts and of the conduct of the horse on various occasions, were asked this question :—" Prom your knowledge of the horse was he in your opinion a safe, kind horse ?" The counsel for the defendant objected to this question, but the court admitted the evidence in connection with the facts. Was this ruling correct ?

The general rule is that witnesses must state facts and not their individual opinions, but there are exceptions to this rule as well established as the rule itself. Besides the case of experts where the subject matter requires special study, skill and experience, the opinions of common observers in regard to common appearances, facts and conditions have been received as evidence in a great variety of cases.

Thus, such opinions have been received in questions of identity as applied to persons, animals, handwriting, and sounds, and in estimating the size, weight, distance and color of objects. State v. Shinborn, 46 N. Hamp., 497. Also to show the direction of force as evidenced by its effects. Steamboat Clipper v. Logan, 18 Ohio, 375. That certain blood stains came from below upward. Commonwealth v. Sturtivant, 117 Mass., 122. That certain foot-prints corresponded with certain boots. Commonwealth v. Pope, 103 Mass., 440. That certain hairs were human. Commonwealth v. Dorsey, 103 Mass., 412. That a place in a highway was bad and dangerous. Lund & wife v. Inhabitants of Tyngsborough, 9 Cush., 36. That a highway or bridge is safe. ELLSWORTH, J., in Dunham's Appeal from Probate, 27 Conn., 198. That a heap of stones in a highway was an object calculated to frighten horses of ordinary gentleness. Clinton v. Howard, 42 Conn., 294. That effluvia from a certain privy and pig-sty necessarily rendered the plaintiff's house uncomfortable as a place of abode. Kearney v. Farrell, 28 Conn., 319. That a certain dam was sufficient to withstand the force of a certain stream of water. Porter v. Pequonoc Manufacturing Co., 17 Conn., 253. That a person was intoxicated. People v. Eastwood, 14 N. York,...