Syed v. Hercules Inc., CIV.A.01-713-JJF.
| Decision Date | 04 February 2002 |
| Docket Number | No. CIV.A.01-713-JJF.,CIV.A.01-713-JJF. |
| Citation | 184 F.Supp.2d 395 |
| Parties | Sajid L. SYED, Plaintiff, v. HERCULES INCORPORATED, a Delaware Corporation, Hercules Incorporated Income Protection Plan, an Employee welfare benefit plan, and Hercules Incorporated, Plan Administrator of Disability Plan, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Delaware |
Sajid L. Syed, Wilmington, DE, Pro Se Plaintiff.
W. Harding Drane, Jr., Kevin R. Shannon, and Brian C. Ralston, Esquires of Potter Anderson & Corroon LLP, Wilmington, DE, for Defendants.
Presently pending before the Court is a Motion To Dismiss (D.I.6) and a Motion For Sanctions Pursuant To Rule 11 (D.I.20) filed by Defendants.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court will grant Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (D.I.6) and deny Defendants' Motion For Sanctions Pursuant To Rule 11 (D.I.20).
Plaintiff was employed by Hercules as a chemical operator. (D.I. 7 at 2). His employment involved moving, lifting and pushing heavy objects. (D.I. 7 at 2). On or about January 31, 1992, Plaintiff allegedly injured his back as a result of a fall while working at a Hercules facility. (D.I. 7 at 2). Shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed a workers compensation claim. On March 31, 1992, Plaintiff was terminated as part of a reduction in force. (D.I. 7 at 2). After his termination, Plaintiff submitted a claim for long-term total disability benefits under the Plan, which was approved. (D.I. 7 at 2). Plaintiff received long-term disability benefits from March 4, 1992 through March 31, 1994 and, on April 15, 1993, Plaintiff settled his workers compensation claim. (D.I. 7 at 2).
At the request of Provident Life and Accident Insurance Company ("Provident"), the Claims Fiduciary under the Plan, Plaintiff underwent an independent medical examination in March 1994. (D.I.7, Ex. 2). Because it was determined that Plaintiff was not "totally disabled," Provident terminated Plaintiff's disability benefits as of March 31, 1994. (D.I.7, Ex. 2). Plaintiff repeatedly appealed Provident's decision to discontinue his long-term disability benefits, but was unsuccessful. (D.I.7, Ex. 2).
On February 6, 1996, Plaintiff, by and through his then attorney John M. Stull, Esquire, instituted a civil action against Defendants in this Court to recover disability benefits allegedly due under the Plan (hereinafter "the First Action"). See Syed v. Hercules Incorporated, et al., Civil Action No. 96-62-JJF. By his Complaint, Plaintiff sought recovery of benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (hereinafter "ERISA") § 502(a)(1)(B), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B), and sought the imposition of sanctions against Defendants for failure to comply with ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c).2 (D.I.7, Ex.1). On May 27, 1999, the Court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants. (D.I.7, Ex. 2). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit subsequently affirmed the Court's decision and the United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. (D.I.7, Ex. 4, Ex. 8). Shortly after the Court's decision was affirmed, Plaintiff filed a Rule 60(b) Motion requesting relief from the judgment entered. (D.I.7, Ex. 6). On January 19, 2001, the Court denied Plaintiff's Rule 60(b) Motion and, on October 22, 2001, the Third Circuit affirmed the Court's decision. (D.I.7, Ex. 6, Ex. 9).
On October 25, 2001, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, instituted this second action against Defendants. (D.I.1). Although Plaintiff's Complaint is a bit unclear, the Court construes Plaintiff's Complaint to allege five causes of action, two arising under federal law and three arising under state law. (See D.I. 1). Plaintiff's federal claims seek the imposition of sanctions against Defendants for failure to comply with ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), and allege a breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). Plaintiff's state law claims allege fraud, misrepresentation, and emotional distress.
A review of Plaintiff's Complaint reveals that two allegations form the basis for all five causes of action. (See D.I. 1). First, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants knowingly provided him with a copy of an ineffective Plan document which limited his ability to both effectively litigate the First Action and intelligently settle his workers compensation claim (hereinafter "Plan Document Allegation"). (See D.I. 1). Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that, in response to numerous oral and written requests for the effective disability Plan document, Defendants repeatedly provided him with a benefit booklet entitled "Your Hercules Benefits Portfolio, Income Protection, Short Term Disability — Long Term Disability" (hereinafter "Portfolio").3 (See D.I. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants continued to represent that the Portfolio was the effective Plan document until December 12, 1998, when J. Douglass Hill, Hercules' Director of Employee Benefits, filed an affidavit in the First Action advising the Court that the "Summary Plan Description for the Hercules Short Term Disability and Long-Term Disability Plans" (hereinafter "SPD") was the effective Plan document at the time of each of Plaintiff's requests. (See D.I. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Hill's affidavit illustrates that Defendants knowingly and repeatedly misrepresented to Plaintiff that the Portfolio was the Plan document. (See D.I. 1). Because the SPD, unlike the Portfolio, contains a partial disability provision, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' misrepresentation deprived Plaintiff of the opportunity to both pursue a partial disability claim and intelligently settle his workers compensation claim. (See D.I. 1).
Additionally, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants intentionally misrepresented the applicable statute of limitations for pursuing a legal action to recover disability benefits (hereinafter "Limitations Allegation"). (See D.I. 1). Plaintiff alleges that the both the Portfolio he was provided, as well as the SPD, indicate that a beneficiary has three years to pursue legal action. (See D.I. 1). Despite these provisions, Plaintiff alleges that Defendants, in their Answer to Plaintiff's Complaint in the First Action, asserted that a one year statute of limitations was applicable. (See D.I. 1). Plaintiff alleges that Defendants' affirmative defense in the First Action, in light of the Plan documentation provided to Plaintiff, illustrates that Defendants intended to deprive Plaintiff of the opportunity to pursue legal action. (See D.I. 1).
By their Motion, Defendants have moved to dismiss all of Plaintiff's claims. (D.I. 7 at 6). Defendants assert several arguments in support of their motion, including that the present action is barred by the application of the doctrine of res judicata, otherwise known as claim preclusion. (D.I. 7 at 7). Specifically, Defendants contend that Plaintiff's Complaint should be dismissed because Plaintiff either asserted or could have asserted each claim in this matter during the First Action. (D.I. 7 at 7).
To establish that a claim is precluded under the doctrine of res judicata, a defendant must demonstrate that: (1) there has been a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit; (2) the same parties or their privies are involved; and (3) the subsequent suit is based on the same cause of action. Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3rd Cir.1991). Res judicata not only prevents a party from prevailing on claims that were litigated in a prior action, but also on claims that a party could have but did not assert in a prior action. Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3rd Cir.1988). Res judicata requires "that a plaintiff present in one suit all of the claims for relief that he may have arising out of the same transaction or occurrence." Lubrizol, 929 F.2d at 963. Plaintiff does not dispute that the parties in this action and the First Action are identical. (D.I. 14 at 22). Additionally, Plaintiff raises no serious contention with regard to whether the claims and issues in the First Action were fully litigated.4 Accordingly the Court will turn to the third element of the res judicata analysis and determine if Plaintiff's claims in this action should be precluded.
Defendants contend that all of Plaintiff's current claims arise out of the same transaction or occurrence as Plaintiff's claims in the First Action. (D.I. 7 at 10-12). In opposition, Plaintiff contends that res judicata should not apply because his claims are based upon additional facts which Defendants fraudulently concealed during the course of the First Action. (D.I.15).
After reviewing the arguments of the parties, the Complaint, and the prior record, the Court concludes that the doctrine of res judicata precludes Plaintiff from litigating all of the claims asserted in the instant Complaint. First, the record is clear that Plaintiff claim under ERISA § 502(c), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(c), which seeks the imposition of sanctions against Defendant for failure to provide Plaintiff with a copy of the Plan document within thirty (30) days of Plaintiff's written request, is the identical claim that was asserted by Plaintiff in Count II of his Complaint in the First Action. (See D.I. 7, Ex. 1; D.I. 1). Because the Court previously entered a final judgment on this claim in favor of the Defendants, the Court concludes that this claim must be precluded. (See D.I. 7, Ex. 1-9).
As for the remainder of Plaintiff's Complaint, Plaintiff advances claims that he did not specifically assert in the First Action. (See D.I. 1; D.I. 7, Ex. 1). For example, Plaintiff raises state claims of fraud, misrepresentation and emotional distress, and the federal claim of breach of fiduciary duty under ERISA § 404(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1). (D.I.1). Although these claims were not asserted previously, the allegations which form the basis for these claims (i.e. the Plan Document...
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