Sykes v. Columbus & Greenville Ry.

• Decision Date: 21 July 1997
• Docket Number: No. 96-60374,96-60374
• Parties: 155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2848, 134 Lab.Cas. P 10,041 Alvin G. SYKES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLUMBUS & GREENVILLE RAILWAY, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 287

117 F.3d 287

155 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2848, 134 Lab.Cas. P 10,041

Alvin G. SYKES, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. COLUMBUS & GREENVILLE RAILWAY, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 96-60374.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 21, 1997.

Michael Jay Singer, Department of Justice, Civil Division, Appellate Staff, Washington, DC, William H. Berger, U.S. Department of Labor, Atlanta, GA, Mark Christopher Niles, Department of Justice, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff-Appellant.

Taylor B. Smith, Jeffrey Johnson Turnage, Mitchell, McNutt, Threadgill, Smith & Sams, Columbus, MS, for Defendant-Appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Mississippi.

Before REAVLEY, GARWOOD and BENAVIDES, Circuit Judges.

GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:

The issue presented in this appeal is whether pre-employment military service should be counted toward the four-year service limitation for eligibility under the Veterans' Reemployment Rights Act (VRRA). 38 U.S.C. former § 2024(a). Plaintiff-appellant Alvin G. Sykes (Sykes) brought this action under the VRRA seeking reinstatement to his position with defendant-appellee Columbus & Greenville Railway (C&G) together with recovery of lost wages and benefits. The parties submitted cross-motions for summary judgment. The district court entered judgment in favor of C&G on the grounds that Sykes' combined military service in excess of four years made him ineligible for reemployment rights. We reverse the district court and remand for further proceedings.

Facts and Proceedings Below

Sykes first entered military service with the United States Marine Corps on June 2, 1982. He served two successive enlistments and received an honorable discharge on July 1, 1988. Sykes then returned to Columbus, Mississippi, and was hired as a conductor- trainee on July 25, 1988, by C&G. Sykes remained with C&G (ultimately qualifying as a conductor) for approximately nine months. After informing C&G that he intended to reenlist in the Marine Corps, Sykes signed a letter furnished to him by C&G on April 24, 1989, stating that he was resigning his position with C&G "[e]ffective April 14, 1989" and purporting to "give up [his] contractual rights." Sykes remained on active duty from April 26, 1989, to April 25, 1993. Sykes was again honorably discharged.

On May 5, 1993, Sykes submitted an application for reemployment with C&G. His application was denied by C&G on May 9, 1993. Later that same month, Sykes attempted to assert reemployment rights under the VRRA, but C&G again refused to employ Sykes. Sykes subsequently accepted employment with the Soo Line Railroad in March 1994.

On March 29, 1995, Sykes filed this action under the VRRA in the district court below. C&G defended the suit, asserting that the cumulative total of Sykes' years in the Marine Corps made him ineligible for reemployment rights because the four-year military service limitation found in the VRRA does not distinguish between pre- and post-employment service. Additionally, C&G contended that, in any event, Sykes' execution of the resignation letter waived any rights that he may have had under the VRRA. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted C&G's motion. Finding the "plain language" of the VRRA dispositive, the district court held that Sykes' cumulative military service in excess of ten years exceeded the four-year limitation period provided in 38 U.S.C. § 2024(a). At the time Sykes attempted to assert reemployment rights with C&G, his post-C&G military service was precisely four years. The district court did not address the merits of C&G's waiver argument.

Sykes appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of C&G. We reverse.

Discussion

The case below was decided on cross-motions for summary judgment on the basis of undisputed material facts. This Court reviews a grant of summary judgment de novo, using the same standards as the district court. Duffy v. Leading Edge Prods., Inc., 44 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir.1995). Summary judgment is appropriate if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and "the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). This Court's review of a district court's interpretations of law, whether federal or state, is plenary. Gardes Directional Drilling v. U.S. Turnkey Exploration Co., 98 F.3d 860, 864 (5th Cir.1996).

I. Pre-Employment Service

The district court determined that the language of the relevant section of the VRRA clearly and unambiguously provided reemployment rights only "if the total of any service performed by that person after August 1, 1961, does not exceed four years." (emphasis added). The court recognized that the two cases to address the issue reached contrary conclusions. Finding the discussion of the issue in White v. Frank, 718 F.Supp. 592 (W.D.Tex.1989), aff'd, 895 F.2d 243 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 890, 111 S.Ct. 232, 112 L.Ed.2d 192 (1990), controlling, the district court found unpersuasive the contrary holding in Hall v. Chicago & E. Ill. R.R., 240 F.Supp. 797 (N.D.Ill.1964).

Sykes and C&G each contend that the language of 38 U.S.C. § 2024(a) is clear and unambiguous, albeit with different results. Section 2024(a) provides, in full:

"(a) Any person who, after entering the employment on the basis of which such person claims restoration or reemployment, enlists in the Armed Forces of the United States (other than in a Reserve component) shall be entitled upon release from service under honorable conditions to all of the reemployment rights and other benefits provided for by this chapter in the case of persons inducted under the provisions of the Military Selective Service Act (or prior or subsequent legislation providing for the involuntary induction of persons into the Armed Forces), if the total of such person's service performed between June 24, 1948, and August 1, 1961, did not exceed four years, and the total of any service, additional or otherwise, performed by such person after August 1, 1961, does not exceed five years, and if the service in excess of four years after August 1, 1961, is at the request and for the convenience of the Federal Government (plus in each case any period of additional service imposed pursuant to law)." 38 U.S.C. § 2024(a). ¹

Sykes contends that the plain language of section 2024(a) makes clear that only military service performed subsequent to the employment to which VRRA rights are asserted should count towards the limitation period. Under Sykes' reading of section 2024(a), the introductory phrase "after entering employment" limits the relevant military service to that performed post-employment; thus, the "total of any service" language at the end of the section simply refers to this post-employment military service. In support of his position, Sykes relies on Hall.

C&G contends that the phrase "total of any service, additional or otherwise" qualifies the reemployment rights set forth at the beginning of section 2024(a) and operates to bar the assertion of VRRA rights by veterans whose combined pre- and post-employment military service exceeds the four-year period. C&G argues that the "after entering employment" language merely requires that the private employment to which reinstatement is sought precede the military service. The district court followed this interpretation, finding the statute "clear and unambiguous." Language in White supports this interpretation.

At least two district courts, the Department of Labor (DOL), and the parties to each case have disagreed as to the proper construction of section 2024(a). The Hall court relied on the "history and purposes of the [VRRA]" and the White court found its position supported by the "face [of] the Act." We cannot say that the district court's interpretation is unreasonable. Indeed, its interpretation may well be the most reasonable construction of the wording of section 2024(a). But although we always hesitate to go beyond the plain language of a federal statute, we believe that this case presents us with an extremely rare situation where to apply the statute as construed by the district court--even assuming the language of section 2024(a), parsed with the utmost grammatical propriety, to be virtually unambiguous--would lead to an absurd result. See United States v. A Female Juvenile, 103 F.3d 14, 16-17 (5th Cir.1996) ("Axiomatic in statutory interpretation is the principle that laws should be construed to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result"); United States v. Mathena, 23 F.3d 87, 92-93 (5th Cir.1994) (same); Carpenters Dist. Council v. Dillard Dep't Stores, 15 F.3d 1275, 1285 (5th Cir.1994) (same), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1126, 115 S.Ct. 933, 130 L.Ed.2d 879 (1995); Birdwell v. Skeen, 983 F.2d 1332, 1337 (5th Cir.1993) (same). We therefore conclude that section 2024(a)'s service limitation applies to post-employment service only, notwithstanding the risk that such a result may not flow from "[t]he most natural grammatical reading" of the section. See United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68, 115 S.Ct. 464, 467, 130 L.Ed.2d 372 (1994). See also McCarthy v. Bronson, 500 U.S. 136, 139, 111 S.Ct. 1737, 1740, 114 L.Ed.2d 194 (1991) ("[S]tatutory language must always be read in its proper context."); Crandon v. United States, 494 U.S. 152, 156-58, 110 S.Ct. 997, 1001, 108 L.Ed.2d 132 (1990) ("In determining the meaning of the statute, we look not only to the particular statutory language, but to the design of the statute as a whole and to its object and policy."); INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 433 n. 12, 107 S.Ct. 1207, 1213 n. 12, 94 L.Ed.2d 434 (1987) (stating that resort to legislative history is appropriate to determine "whether there is 'clearly expressed legislative intention' contrary to that language"); Offshore Logistics, Inc. v Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207, 219-21, 106 S.Ct. 2485, 2493, 91 L.Ed.2d 174 (1986) (stating that a statute should...