Sykes v. Finch, 18814.
| Decision Date | 27 May 1971 |
| Docket Number | No. 18814.,18814. |
| Citation | 443 F.2d 192 |
| Parties | Hazel G. SYKES, Plaintiff-Appellant v. Robert E. FINCH, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Jerry T. Stafford, Peoria, Ill., for plaintiff-appellant.
Donald B. Mackay, U. S. Atty., Springfield, Ill., Max J. Lipkin, Asst. U. S. Atty., Peoria, Ill., L. Patrick Gray, III, Asst. Atty. Gen., Frank J. Violanti, U. S. Atty., Kathryn H. Baldwin, Ronald R. Glancz, Attys., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for defendant-appellee.
Before CASTLE, Senior Circuit Judge, and KILEY and PELL, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff-appellant, Hazel G. Sykes, brought this action in the District Court to review the decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare that plaintiff was not entitled to disability insurance benefits under the Social Security Act. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court found that the Secretary's final decision was supported by substantial evidence, and entered judgment for the Secretary and against the claimant plaintiff. The court also denied the plaintiff's motion for a remand. The plaintiff appealed.
The plaintiff predicates the existence of error requiring a reversal of the judgment of the District Court, and a remand of the proceeding to the Secretary for a rehearing, on her contentions that (1) the hearing examiner who reviewed her claim de novo, after initial denial of her application by the Social Security Administration, applied an impermissible standard in reaching the conclusion that plaintiff was not under a "disability" as defined under the pertinent section of the Social Security Act,1 and (2) plaintiff's lack of representation by counsel in the administrative proceeding deprived her of a full hearing and resulted in such unfairness as to constitute lack of due process.
Plaintiff's contention that the hearing examiner employed an incorrect standard in reaching his ultimate conclusion that plaintiff was not under a "disability" which qualified her to receive benefits is premised on the fact that the record discloses that at one place in the opinion filed by the hearing examiner he made an observation that:
"* * * there is substantial evidence to support a conclusion that the claimant does not have a disease or impairment of such severity as to preclude her from engaging in her regular work as a printing inspector, or comparable sedentary or semi-sedentary light factory visual inspection work of small manufactured products."
Plaintiff correctly points out that the "substantial evidence" test is not the proper criterion for determining disability in the first instance.2 But, when the observation above quoted is considered in its context it is clear that the hearing examiner did not employ the "substantial evidence" test as the determinative criterion in his finding of lack of qualifying disability. The observation was made only after the examiner had already concluded, on the basis of a detailed exposition and consideration of the medical findings and evidence (which consisted of the medical reports of six doctors and two hospitals) that the "weight of the evidence" did not establish the requisite inability to work. The observation with respect to "substantial evidence" was made in connection with a recapitulation of the objective medical evidence which had earlier been considered in detail and, in the context of the record herein, may logically be viewed as an expression, perhaps inapt, designed and intended to distinguish the diagnostically substantiated views expressed by five of the six doctors from the statement of one of the plaintiff's treating physicians, in conflict with those views, and to the effect that:
which statement is not supported by any medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic data or findings. This statement was therefore properly discountable as insubstantial. 42 U.S.C.A. § 423(d) (3); Steimer v. Gardner, 9 Cir., 395 F.2d 197, 198. And it was properly distinguishable from the diagnostically substantiated views expressed by all of the other doctors. But, more...
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Spicer v. Califano
...as to the existence of a disability, after weighing this conclusion in balance with other evidence in the record. Sykes v. Finch, 443 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1971); Grates v. Califano, 448 F.Supp. 674, 677-78 (N.D.N.Y.1978); Teschner v. Weinberger, 389 F.Supp. 1293, 1294-95 (E.D.Wis. 1975).......
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Lackey v. North Carolina Dept. of Human Resources, Div. of Medical Assistance
...Kirkland v. Weinberger, 480 F.2d 46, 49 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 913, 94 S.Ct. 255, 38 L.Ed.2d 155 (1973); Sykes v. Finch, 443 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1971). See also, Valentine v. Richardson, 468 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. A beneficial illustration of our holding is found in Laffoon v. Calif......
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Davila v. Weinberger, Civ. A. No. 74-1831.
...by Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Hess v. Secretary of HEW, 497 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1974); Sykes v. Finch, 443 F.2d 192 (7th Cir. 1971); Kreider v. Weinberger, Civil Action No. 73-2739 (E.D.Pa., filed January 9, 1975); Reardon v. Weinberger, 387 F.Supp. 1210 (E......
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Prill v. Schweiker
...given a physician's statement on a claimant's disability is determined by the support of medical and clinical findings. Sykes v. Finch, 443 F.2d 192, 194 (7th Cir. 1971); Allen v. Weinberger, 552 F.2d at 785. It is possible that a claimant's personal physician might "lean over backward" to ......