Sykes v. O'Hearne

• Decision Date: 25 February 1960
• Docket Number: Adm. No. 4065.
• Citation: 181 F. Supp. 368
• Parties: Henry SYKES v. Stephen O'HEARNE, Deputy Commissioner, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Employees' Compensation, Fourth Compensation District, and Baltimore Stevedoring Company, Inc., Employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Insurer.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

181 F. Supp. 368

Henry SYKES v. Stephen O'HEARNE, Deputy Commissioner, United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Employees' Compensation, Fourth Compensation District, and Baltimore Stevedoring Company, Inc., Employer, and Liberty Mutual Insurance Company, Insurer.

Adm. No. 4065.

United States District Court D. Maryland.

February 25, 1960.

Ellis M. Fell and Herbert H. Silverman, Baltimore, Md., for plaintiff.

Leon H. A. Pierson, U. S. Atty., and H. Russell Smouse, Asst. U. S. Atty., Baltimore, Md., for Deputy Commissioner.

R. Roger Drechsler and David M. Buffington, Baltimore, Md., for Baltimore Stevedoring and Liberty Mutual.

THOMSEN, Chief Judge.

This is a proceeding filed by a longshoreman under 33 U.S.C.A. § 921 to review an order which had rejected his claim for compensation on the ground that he did not sustain an accidental injury arising out of and in the course of his employment on 11 July 1958. At the hearing counsel for claimant moved that the case be remanded so that the Deputy Commissioner may indicate whether he considered the signed statement of James Bates, which was admitted in evidence over claimant's objection, as substantive evidence, or only as impeaching the testimony given by Bates on the stand.

Claimant testified that he had injured his back at a specified time and place and in a particular manner. His testimony was contradicted by that of several other witnesses. The employer and insurer also attempted to show that claimant had hurt his back several days before 11 July 1958, while loading junk onto a truck near Glen Burnie, which had nothing to do with his employment by the employer herein. To that end they called James Bates, who had given a signed statement to that effect to Leroy Rector, an investigator for the insurance carrier, but had repudiated the statement several days later. On the stand Bates denied that the stated accident had ever occurred and denied that he told Rector the facts which appeared in the statement, although Bates admitted having signed the statement in the belief that it would help claimant collect some sort of accident insurance. He persisted in his denial that any such accident had ever occurred or that he and claimant had ever picked up junk together. After Bates had been questioned by counsel for both sides and by the Deputy Commissioner, counsel for employer and insurer offered the signed statement in evidence, counsel for claimant objected, and the Deputy Commissioner, noting that the witness had "identified" it, ruled that he would "let it go in". In his findings of fact the Deputy Commissioner did not refer to the statement nor to the incident mentioned in the statement; he merely found that claimant did not sustain an accidental injury at the time or in the manner alleged in his claim. The Deputy Commissioner filed no memorandum amplifying his findings or giving the reasons therefor. In the brief filed on his behalf in this court, however, his counsel argues that the statement given by Bates to the investigator was "the most damaging testimony to claimant's case".

Under common law rules of evidence the statement was admissible to impeach the statements made by Bates on the stand and to show why he was called, but was not admissible to prove the fact of a previous injury. Wigmore on Evidence, 3d ed., vol. 3, sec. 1018; McCormick on Evidence, 1954 ed., sec. 39; United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 2 Cir., 241 F.2d 925; West v. Belle Isle Cab Co., 203 Md. 244, 100 A.2d 17; McCracken v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R. R. Co., 4 Cir., 240 F.2d 484.

In a trial before a judge without a jury it will not be presumed that the judge made improper use of such evidence. Weinberg v. Northern Pacific Ry. Co., 8 Cir., 150 F.2d 645; United States v. Morris, 2 Cir., 269 F.2d 100. In the instant case, however, the brief filed on behalf of the Deputy Commissioner indicates that he may have considered the statement as tending to prove the fact of the previous accident, which was not proper unless the evidence was admissible for all purposes under 33 U.S.C.A. § 923, which provides: "(a) In making an investigation or inquiry or conducting a hearing the deputy commissioner shall not be bound by common law or statutory rules of evidence or by technical or formal rules of procedure, except as provided by this...