Sykes v. Superior Court

• Court: California Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: WRIGHT
• Citation: Sykes v. Superior Court, 106 Cal.Rptr. 786, 9 Cal.3d 83, 507 P.2d 90 (Cal. 1973)
• Decision Date: 16 March 1973
• Parties: , 507 P.2d 90 James Roger SYKES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent; The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest. L.A. 30063. In Bank

Page 786

106 Cal.Rptr. 786

9 Cal.3d 83, 507 P.2d 90

James Roger SYKES, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT OF ORANGE COUNTY, Respondent The PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest.

L.A. 30063.

Supreme Court of California,

In Bank.

March 16, 1973.

Rehearing Denied May 9, 1973.

Frank L. Williams, Jr., Public Defender, and James R. Goff, Deputy Public Defender, for petitioner.

No appearance for respondent.

Cecil Hicks, Dist. Atty., Michael R. Capizzi, Asst. Dist. Atty., and Alicemarie Stotler, Deputy Dist. Atty., for real party in interest.

WRIGHT, Chief Justice.

Petitioner seeks a writ of mandate to compel the respondent court to dismiss a felony information pending against him or, in the alternative, a writ of prohibition staying the criminal proceedings. Petitioner contends that he was denied his constitutional right to a speedy trial when, after a period of 228 days following an order in collateral proceedings directing the superi or court to set aside the judgment of conviction and the guilty plea on which it was based and requiring that he be rearraigned for plea in the criminal proceedings, the People had not proceeded. At that time his motion to dismiss the information was denied. (Pen.Code, § 1382.) ¹ We conclude that petitioner has been denied a speedy trial and that the motion should have been granted.

In May 1969 petitioner was charged in respondent court with armed robbery (§§ 211, 211a) and kidnaping for the purpose of robbery (§ 209), both offenses alleged to have been committed in April 1969. Petitioner entered a guilty plea to the robbery charge and the kidnaping charge was dismissed on motion by the People. He waived probation and in June 1969 was sentenced to prison for the term prescribed by law.

In February 1971 petitioner, then a prison inmate, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On October 22, 1971, the writ issued from the Court of Appeal on the ground that the guilty plea had been accepted and entered by the respondent court without an affirmative showing appearing on the record that petitioner freely and voluntarily waived his privilege against self-incrimination, his right to confront his accusers or his right to trial by jury as required by Boykin v. Alabama (1969) 395 U.S. 238, 89 S.Ct. 1709, 23 L.Ed.2d 274 and In re Tahl (1969) 1 Cal.3d 122, 81 Cal.Rptr. 577, 460 P.2d 449.

On November 5, 1971, a copy of the writ was served on the respondent court; on November 15 a copy was served on a prison official where petitioner was incarcerated; and on November 17 a copy was served on the Attorney General, who had represented the People in the habeas corpus proceeding. ²

Approximately a month after the writ had issued petitioner requested from prison officials information as to when his case would be reset for trial. He was informed that he would have to wait for a court order directing the sheriff to deliver petitioner to the trial court. Petitioner's prison counselor refused to make inquiry on petitioner's behalf and advised him that 'the authorities would come and get him when they wanted him.'

In late November or early December 1971 a relative of petitioner, at his request, telephoned the respondent court and inquired about petitioner's retrial. The same individual also made inquiry to the court by telephone in February 1972, again at petitioner's request. On both occasions the relative was informed that the court had no information on the retrial.

Petitioner was released from prison on parole on December 17, 1971. Near the end of February 1972 he telephoned the respondent court concerning his retrial and was advised by court personnel that they could give him no information relating to a new trial and that he should contact his attorney.

On February 29 petitioner wrote to his attorney in the habeas corpus proceedings and advised him of the substance of petitioner's and his relative's conversations with court personnel. On March 6 the attorney replied advising petitioner that the writ of habeas corpus had indeed been granted and issued almost six months earlier. He enclosed a copy of the writ and the affidavit of service on the presiding judge of respondent court and advised petitioner to contact the public defender.

On May 18 petitioner met by appointment with a deputy public defender and presented to him the pertinent documents. On May 31 the deputy filed notice of motions for petitioner's rearraignment and for dismissal of the charges on the ground of a denial of a speedy trial. (§ 1382.)

The district attorney received no actual or constructive notice of the writ ordering petitioner's rearraignment until June 1, 1972, when a deputy district attorney became aware of the pleadings filed by the deputy public defender. Upon inquiry the presiding judge of the respondent court stated that he had no recollection of having been served and did not know what had become of the court's copy of the writ. The Attorney General replied that the deputy who had been served with the writ in November 1971 was 'long-gone.'

Respondent court took testimony and heard argument on the motion to dismiss. No explanation was offered for the delay except that the officials charged with reinstituting proceedings lacked timely knowledge of the order requiring rearraignment. As previously stated, the motion was denied.

The right to a speedy trial is a fundamental right secured by the Sixth Amendment to the federal Constitution ³ and is made applicable to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment. (Klopfer v. North Carolina (1966) 386 U.S. 213, 223, 87 S.Ct. 988, 18 L.Ed.2d 1.) Article I, section 13, of the California Constitution independently guarantees the right to a speedy trial. ⁴ In addition, our Legislature has made provision for 'a speedy and public trial' as one of the fundamental rights preserved to a defendant in a criminal action. (§ 686, subd. 1.) The policy behind the right to a speedy trial is expressed in section 1050 which states, 'The welfare of the people of the State of California requires that all proceedings in criminal cases shall be set for trial and heard and determined at the earliest possible time, and it shall be the duty of all court and judicial officers and of all prosecuting attorneys to expedite such proceedings to the greatest degree that is consistent with the ends of justice.'

Section 1382, subdivision 2, implements the foregoing constitutional and statutory guarantees by providing that, absent a showing of 'good cause,' a defendant accused of a felony is entitled to have the charges against him dismissed if he is not brought to trial within 60 days after the filing of criminal charges or after particular events necessitating a retrial thereof. ⁵ A dismissal is thus mandated in those situations covered by the statute if, at the time a defendant moves therefor, the 60-day period has elapsed and good cause for the delay is not shown by the prosecution. In these circumstances the defendant is not required to make any further showing, and in particular he is not required to make an affirmative showing that he has been prejudiced by the delay. (People v. Wilson (1963) 60 Cal.2d 139, 151, 32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452; Harris v. Municipal Court (1930) 209 Cal. 55, 64.)

Statutory rights notwithstanding, the provision of our Constitution which guarantees a criminal defendant a speedy trial is self-executing and not dependent on statutory implementation. (Harris v. Municipal Court, supra, 209 Cal. 55, 60, 285 P. 699.) "'(I)t is not necessary to have specific legislation to carry into effect section 13 of article I. . . .' (Rost v. Municipal Court (1960) 184 Cal.App.2d 507, 511, 7 Cal.Rptr. 869. . . .) The provisions of the Penal Code are merely " supplementary to and a construction of' the Constitution.' (People v. Wilson,supra, 60 Cal.2d 139, 145, 32 Cal.Rptr. 44, 383 P.2d 452; People v. Godlewski, 22 Cal.2d 677, 682, 140 P.2d 381. . . .)' It is thus unnecessary for petitioner, in asserting his constitutional right to a speedy trial, to rely on specific statutory provisions . . ..' (Jones v. Superior Court (1970)3 Cal.3d 734, 738--739, 91 Cal.Rptr. 578, 581, 478 P.2d 10, 13.)

Although it is true that the 60-day provision of section 1382, subdivision 2, does not on its face apply where, as here, a once-convicted person is released from prison on a writ of habeas corpus ordering that he be rearraigned for plea, the self-executing provision of the Constitution may under a proper showing compel dismissal of the charges. We deem it appropriate to treat petitioner's motion to dismiss, although styled as a motion pursuant to section 1382, as a motion invoking petitioner's constitutional right to a speedy trial. In our view section 1382 constitutes a legislative endorsement of dismissal as a proper judicial sanction for violation of the constitutional guarantee of a speedy trial and as a legislative determination that a trial delayed more than 60 days is prima facie in violation of a defendant's constitutional right. ⁶ The Legislature 'by necessary inference had said that a trial delayed more than sixty days without good cause is not a speedy trial, and the courts have not hesitated to adopt and enforce the legislative interpretation of the constitutional provision.' (Harris v. Municipal Court, supra, 209 Cal. 55, 61, 285 P. 699, 701.) ⁷

The People argue that in the absence of an express statutory provision the question of a denial of a speedy trial is now controlled by principles announced in Barker v. Wingo (1971) 407 U.S. 514, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101. In Barker the Supreme Court set forth an ad hoc balancing test for determining whether a speedy trial has been denied. ⁸ Nothing in the court's opinion even suggests, however, that we must revise our interpretation of the right to a speedy trial as guaranteed by our Constitution. The Supreme Court stated in Barker that it does not 'establish procedural rules for the States, except when mandated by the...