Sylvan Glens Homeowners Ass'n v. McFadden, Docket No. 50916
| Decision Date | 22 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | Docket No. 50916 |
| Citation | 302 N.W.2d 615,103 Mich.App. 118 |
| Parties | SYLVAN GLENS HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, a Michigan non-profit corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Ralph McFADDEN, Defendant-Appellant. 103 Mich.App. 118, 302 N.W.2d 615 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US |
[103 MICHAPP 120] Kenneth R. McAlpine, Center Line, for defendant-appellant.
Marvin S. Shwedel, William G. Wolfram, Farmington Hills, for plaintiff-appellee.
Before KAUFMAN, P. J., and R. B. BURNS and WARREN, * JJ.
Defendant appeals from the trial court's order entering summary judgment on behalf of plaintiff and granting plaintiff permanent injunctive relief.
Defendant is a resident of the Sylvan Glens subdivision in Troy, Michigan. It is undisputed that he is subject to the deed restrictions limiting the use of property within that subdivision. On January 4, 1978, plaintiff Homeowners Association brought suit to enjoin defendant from parking his Winnebago motor home in his driveway in open view of other subdivision residents. Plaintiff alleged that this was a violation of a restrictive covenant covering the Sylvan Glens subdivision as well as a violation of a municipal zoning ordinance. The restrictive covenant provided:
[103 MICHAPP 121] (Emphasis added.)
It should be noted that in plaintiff's complaint, defendant's vehicle is referred to as a "Winnebago trailer".
Defendant sought dismissal of the action in motions for summary and accelerated judgment. The court denied these motions. Thereafter, plaintiff moved for entry of summary judgment on its behalf and also sought injunctive relief. A hearing was held on this matter and the parties agreed that defendant would not be in violation of the zoning ordinance if he parked his vehicle behind his residence. By an order dated March 18, 1980, the court granted plaintiff's summary judgment motion and also permanently enjoined defendant from parking or storing his vehicle on his property. The court specifically found that the terms of the restrictive covenant embraced defendant's motor home.
Defendant argues that the court erred in holding that defendant's motor home was included within the terms of the restrictive covenant. We agree.
Generally, restrictive covenants are strictly construed against those claiming the right of enforcement, and all doubts are resolved in favor of the free use of property. Sampson v. Kaufman, 345 [103 MICHAPP 122] Mich. 48, 50, 75 N.W.2d 64 (1956), Bastendorf v. Arndt, 290 Mich. 423, 287 N.W. 579 (1939). Words used in such covenants must be given their ordinary meaning, and, where clear and unambiguous, they must control. North Cherokee Village Membership v. Murphy, 71 Mich.App. 592, 248 N.W.2d 629 (1976).
Applying these principles to the instant case we conclude that defendant's motor home was not embraced within the terms of the covenant. While the restriction includes "trailers" within its terms, it does not include motor homes. The two types of vehicles are distinct. Webster's Third New International Dictionary, Unabridged (1965), p. 2424, defines "trailer", in pertinent part, as "an automobile-drawn highway vehicle designed to serve wherever it is parked as a dwelling or as a place of business (as an office, laboratory, or field headquarters)". On the other hand, Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary (1975), p. 752, defines "motor home" as "an automotive vehicle built on a truck or bus chassis and equipped as a self-contained traveling home". Thus, a trailer and a motor home are different kinds of vehicles. A trailer is not self-propelled but is designed to be drawn by another vehicle. Contrariwise, a motor home is a self-propelled independent vehicle. Therefore, since the term "trailer" cannot be interpreted as embracing a motor home, unless that term is expanded beyond its ordinary meaning, we conclude that the restrictive covenant does not embrace defendant's vehicle. Moreover, defendant's motor home could not reasonably be included within the restrictions against temporary buildings, equipment, material or boats.
[103 MICHAPP 123] Accordingly, the cause is reversed and remanded with instructions to the trial court to rescind its injunctive order and dismiss the action.
Reversed. Costs to defendant.
I respectfully dissent from the well-written opinion of the majority. Although I do acknowledge that the general rule is to afford restrictive covenants strict construction, I do not believe that this rule is immutable.
As the Supreme Court of this State declared almost a century ago:
"While the rule in construing covenants is to construe them most strictly against the covenantor, and most favorably to the covenantee, yet the rule should be carefully observed as nearly as possible by the obvious intention of the parties, which must be gathered from the whole context of the instrument, interpreted according to the reasonable sense of the words." Redding v. Lamb, 81 Mich. 318, 328, 45 N.W. 997 (1890).
Thus, I do not think this case should turn on the question of whether a "Winnebago" is a motor home or a trailer but, rather, upon two issues:
1. Is there a restrictive covenant;
2. Has the covenant been violated?
[103...
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