Symdon v. Symdon

• Decision Date: 15 November 2012
• Docket Number: Nos. 2011AP623,2011AP2617.,s. 2011AP623
• Citation: 2013 WI App 1,345 Wis.2d 396,824 N.W.2d 927
• Parties: In re the marriage of Ronald A. SYMDON, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Peggy S. SYMDON, Respondent–Respondent.
• Court: Wisconsin Court of Appeals

345 Wis.2d 396

824 N.W.2d 927

2013 WI App 1

In re the marriage of Ronald A. SYMDON, Petitioner–Appellant,

v.Peggy S. SYMDON, Respondent–Respondent.

Nos. 2011AP623, 2011AP2617.

Court of Appeals of Wisconsin.

Nov. 15, 2012.

OPINION TEXT STARTS HEREAppeals from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for Dane County: John W. Markson, Judge. Affirmed.

Before LUNDSTEN, P.J., HIGGINBOTHAM and BLANCHARD, JJ.¶ 1BLANCHARD, J.

Ron Symdon appeals the circuit court judgment divorcing him from Peggy Symdon.¹ The judgment incorporated an arbitration award that addressed all contested issues, including property division, family support, and attorney's fees. Ron separately appeals a post-divorce order in which the circuit court denied Ron's motion to modify family support and found Ron in contempt for failing to pay additional attorney's fees that the court had ordered.² Ron purports to present arguments on eight issues relating to the divorce judgment and three issues relating to the post-divorce order. However, we conclude that many of these arguments are undeveloped or underdeveloped, and that none of the arguments that are sufficiently developed for consideration are persuasive. Therefore, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶ 2 The parties were married for approximately fifteen years and have three minor children. The primary source of income to the Symdons during the marriage was generated by Ron's ownership interests in entities associated with automobile dealerships and from Ron's salary as an employee of the dealerships.

¶ 3 The net value of the parties' divisible assets was approximately $2.3 million. Much of the value consisted of Ron's ownership interests in dealership entities, including more than $830,000 in dealership real estate for one of the dealerships.

¶ 4 Ron and Peggy entered into a stipulation and order under which they agreed to binding arbitration. The arbitrator issued a series of written decisions pertaining to property division, support, and custody and placement. We sometimes refer to these decisions collectively as the arbitrator's or arbitration “award.”

¶ 5 The assets assigned to Ron under the arbitrator's award included Ron's interests in the dealership entities. The assets assigned to Peggy included the marital residence. The award required Ron to pay Peggy $3,055 per month in family support for an unlimited term, although the rate would initially be $4,500 per month, until Peggy was able to sell the residence.³ In addition, the award required Ron to contribute $70,000 toward Peggy's attorney's fees.

¶ 6 Over Ron's objection, the circuit court “confirmed” the arbitrator's award pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 802.12(3) (2009–10),⁴ and incorporated it into the final divorce judgment. Ron appealed the judgment. He also moved to modify the support award, approximately six weeks after the judgment was entered, based on a substantial change in circumstances.

¶ 7 Separately, Peggy sought $25,000 in additional attorney's fees for the cost of defending against Ron's appeal from the judgment. The circuit court ordered Ron to pay the $25,000 in appellate attorney's fees. Ron failed to pay the $25,000 in attorney's fees, prompting Peggy to move for contempt.

¶ 8 The circuit court denied Ron's motion to modify support and found Ron in contempt for failure to pay the $25,000 in fees. Ron appealed the resulting order.

¶ 9 We reference additional facts as needed below in reference to particular issues.

DISCUSSION

¶ 10 We first address the eight issues Ron raises in connection with his appeal from the divorce judgment. We then turn to the three issues Ron raises in connection with the post-divorce order.

A. Appeal from Divorce Judgment

¶ 11 Before proceeding with our analysis of the eight issues Ron presents in his first appeal, we make two observations regarding Ron's arguments in that appeal. The point of these observations is to explain why Ron cannot reasonably complain if this court fails to discern or fully address one or more of his intended arguments.

¶ 12 First, Ron's arguments are generally disorganized and difficult to follow, as we note in some of the discussion below. Second, with limited exceptions, Ron fails to frame his arguments in terms of Wis. Stat. § 802.12(3), which contains standards for judicial review of an arbitration award in the divorce context.⁵ This is highly counterproductive, because the statute contains specific direction regarding judicial review standards that are elemental to our review of the type of issues that Ron seems to be raising. Ron's failure to frame the bulk of his arguments in terms of § 802.12 makes it difficult in many instances to determine whether and on what basis Ron is challenging the circuit court decision or the arbitrator's decision (or both) on a given point, and whether Ron's arguments contemplate proper standards of review.

¶ 13 We recognize that Wis. Stat. § 802.12, when considered with statutes providing for judicial review of arbitration awards more generally (Wis. Stat. §§ 788.10 and 788.11), and with the standards of review that apply to non-arbitration divorce cases, may create questions as to what standard of review applies to certain issues in an arbitrated divorce such as this one. This is all the more reason, however, that it is incumbent on the parties, in particular on the appellant, to provide meaningful assistance to this court in applying the correct standards.

¶ 14 In short, Ron's lack of organization and his inattention to Wis. Stat. § 802.12(3) have made it difficult in many instances to determine precisely, and in some instances to determine at all, what issues Ron intends to present and whether, if he had argued them in terms of the proper standards of review, they would have any merit. Nonetheless, we have made considerable efforts to understand and address what we perceive to be Ron's intended arguments.

1. Agreement to Arbitrate Under Alleged Threat of Contempt

¶ 15 Ron first argues that the entire arbitration process was invalid because, while Ron was trying to change attorneys, the circuit court “forced” Ron to sign what Ron refers to as “the arbitration agreement” under threat of contempt. Peggy responds that the record shows that Ron freely entered into a stipulation and order to arbitrate, and that the circuit court cautioned Ron that he was in peril of a contempt finding only after Ron subsequently indicated that he might refuse to move forward with arbitration as planned.

¶ 16 Our review of the record shows that Peggy is correct. The “arbitration agreement” that Ron asserts he was coerced to sign under threat of contempt was not the stipulation to arbitrate but instead a subsequent agreement with the arbitrator that the parties needed to sign for arbitration to proceed. In his reply brief, Ron concedes as much, asserting that he “changed his mind” after agreeing to the stipulation and order. The record and Ron's concession make clear that the circuit court did not force Ron to agree to arbitration.

¶ 17 If Ron means to argue that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion in refusing to delay arbitration proceedings so that Ron had more time to change attorneys, Ron's argument is insufficiently developed and we address it no further. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis.2d 627, 646–47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct.App.1992) (court of appeals need not address inadequately developed arguments). The circuit court provided thorough reasoning on this topic, and Ron fails to address that reasoning.

2. Ron's “Rejection” of Arbitration Award

¶ 18 Ron argues that, under Franke v. Franke, 2004 WI 8, 268 Wis.2d 360, 674 N.W.2d 832, the circuit court could not incorporate the arbitration award into the divorce judgment because Ron “rejected” the award. More specifically, Ron argues as follows:

Franke holds that an arbitration award is an agreement of the parties and may be rejected by a party (or the court) prior to the entry of judgment. The arbitration award may only be enforced as an agreement of the parties, and absent agreement, may not be made the judgment of the court.

It is unclear to what extent Ron intends this “rejection” argument to be separate from his meritless argument above that the court coerced him into arbitration. To the extent Ron is making a separate argument, we will address what we understand that argument to be.

¶ 19 Ron seems to be arguing that, under Franke, a divorce litigant is not bound by an arbitrator's award if the litigant objects to the award before the court incorporates the award into the divorce judgment. This argument misconstrues Franke.

¶ 20 As an initial matter, we note that Franke does not apply to all categories of arbitration awards in the divorce context. Rather, Franke is limited to arbitration awards for property division. See Franke, 268 Wis.2d 360, ¶ 50, 674 N.W.2d 832 (“We limit our holding to property divisions in divorce judgments incorporating a confirmed arbitral award.”). Thus, we consider Ron's arguments under Franke as relevant only to the property division portions of the arbitration award here.

¶ 21 The pertinent issue in Franke is whether a circuit court may open the property division provisions of a divorce judgment under Wis. Stat. § 806.07, the relief from judgments statute, when property division has been arbitrated. See Franke, 268 Wis.2d 360, ¶ 17, 674 N.W.2d 832.Franke establishes that it may. Id., ¶ 50. In reaching this decision, the court examined the interplay of several statutes, including § 806.07, Wis. Stat.§ 802.12(3)(c) (addressing binding arbitration of property division issues in divorce actions), Wis. Stat. ch. 788 (governing arbitration more generally), and Wis. Stat. § 767.61(3)(L) (making any agreement between the parties concerning property division binding on the court, except where the agreement is inequitable, and requiring that the court presume such agreements are equitable). See Franke, 268 Wis.2d 360, ¶¶ 17–18, 51, 674 N.W.2d 832.⁶

¶ 22 In addressing the interplay of ...