Synagro-Wwt, Inc. v. Rush Tp., Penn.
Decision Date | 07 June 2002 |
Docket Number | No. 4:CV-00-1625.,4:CV-00-1625. |
Citation | 204 F.Supp.2d 827 |
Parties | SYNAGRO-WWT, INC., Plaintiff, v. RUSH TOWNSHIP, PENNSYLVANIA, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
BACKGROUND:
This case involves numerous federal and state challenges to the validity of a municipal ordinance. Plaintiff Synagro-WWT, Inc. (Synagro) is a company that applies sewage sludge to land sites that were formerly used for surface mining. Defendant Rush Township, Pennsylvania has enacted an ordinance (the Ordinance) that requires companies that apply sewage sludge to comply with certain procedural requirements if they wish to apply sewage sludge in Rush Township. The Ordinance also places a partial ban on the transportation of sewage sludge within the township.
Synagro filed a complaint seeking a declaratory judgment that the Ordinance is invalid, an injunction against the enforcement of the ordinance, and damages. The complaint raises the following claims: (1) the Ordinance is preempted by the federal Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act (Count I); (2) the Ordinance is preempted by the Pennsylvania Surface Mining Conservation and Reclamation Act (Count II); (3) the Ordinance violates the Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution (Count III); (4) the Ordinance violates the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution (Count IV); (5) the Ordinance violates the Equal Protection Clause of the United States Constitution (Count V); (6) the Ordinance violates the Uniformity Clause of the Pennsylvania Constitution (Count VI); (7) the Ordinance is preempted by three other Pennsylvania statutes: the Nutrient Management Act, the Solid Waste Management Act, and the Sewage Facilities Act (Count VII); (8) the Ordinance violates the Contract Clauses of the United States and Pennsylvania Constitutions (Count VIII); and (9) the enactment of the Ordinance was an ultra vires action (Count IX). We have both federal question and diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1332.
Before the court is a motion filed by Rush Township. Rush Township requests relief in three forms. First, it seeks dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) of every count of the complaint. Second, it asks the court to abstain from deciding the case, as the case presents unsettled issues of state law that may moot the need for federal constitutional analysis. Third, it requests the court to compel Synagro under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(e) to provide a more definite statement.
We will not abstain from the case. Rush Township's motion to dismiss will be granted in part and denied in part; we will dismiss all counts of the complaint except Counts IV, VII, and IX. Rush Township's motion for more definite statement will be denied.
DISCUSSION:
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) admits the well-pleaded allegations of the complaint but denies their legal sufficiency. Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of the Rex Hospital, 425 U.S. 738, 740, 96 S.Ct. 1848, 48 L.Ed.2d 338 (1976). In reviewing a motion to dismiss under 12(b)(6), the court must accept as true all factual allegations of the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Board of Trustees of Bricklayers and Allied Craftsmen Local 6 of New Jersey v. Wettlin Assoc., Inc., 237 F.3d 270, 272 (3d Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). But "[c]onclusory allegations or legal conclusions masquerading as factual conclusions will not suffice to prevent a motion to dismiss." General Motors Corp. v. New A.C. Chevrolet, 263 F.3d 296, 333 (3d Cir.2001) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
"A court may dismiss a complaint only if it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proven consistent with the allegations." Ramadan v. Chase Manhattan Corp., 229 F.3d 194, 195-96 (3d Cir.2000) (citing Alexander v. Whitman, 114 F.3d 1392, 1398 (3d Cir. 1997)). "The issue [under Rule 12(b)(6)] is not whether a plaintiff will ultimately prevail but whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Maio v. Aetna, Inc., 221 F.3d 472, 482 (3d Cir.2000) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Synagro challenges the validity of a municipal ordinance. Virtually each of Synagro's allegations — i.e. preemption, equal protection, substantive due process, etc. — involve almost exclusively questions of law and present little or no need for factfinding. Synagro asserts that regardless of the merit of its legal arguments, its claims should be sustained at this stage as long as they properly allege the legal theory that forms the basis for the claims. For example, it argues that its federal preemption claim should be sustained because it alleges that the Ordinance is preempted. This contention suggests that Synagro misapprehends the nature of a motion to dismiss.
"Rule 12(b)(6) authorizes a court to dismiss a claim on the basis of a dispositive issue of law." Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 326, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989). "This procedure, operating on the assumption that the factual allegations in the complaint are true, streamlines litigation by dispensing with needless discovery and factfinding." Id. at 326-27, 109 S.Ct. 1827. "[I]f, as a matter of law it is clear that no relief could be granted under any set of facts that could be proved consistent with the allegations, a claim must be dismissed, without regard to whether it is based on an outlandish legal theory or on a close but ultimately unavailing one." Id. at 327, 109 S.Ct. 1827 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). Keeping this in mind, we will dismiss any of Synagro's claims that lack merit, but we will sustain the ones that may succeed.
We must stress that the instant motion was filed by Rush Township and seeks only dismissal of the complaint. While Synagro has filed a motion for summary judgment and has requested us to rule immediately on that motion, we believe that the most logical course of action is to rule first on Rush Township's 12(b)(6) motion. Thus, we do not have before us at this time a request to enter judgment in favor of Synagro. Accordingly, even though we have the ultimate responsibility to decide the issues before us, the only two possible results with respect to each claim are either a dismissal of the claim or a sustaining of the claim. In the event that we sustain any of Synagro's claims, we express no opinion at to whether Synagro will ultimately succeed. Other courts in similar situations have proceeded similarly. See, e.g., Qwest Communications Corp. v. The City of Berkeley, 146 F.Supp.2d 1081, 1090 (N.D.Ca.2001) ( ).
II. SYNAGRO'S COMPLAINT
Synagro provides professional management of treated municipal sewage sludge for municipal treatment plants throughout the United States. Included in Synagro's services is the application of sewage sludge for the reclamation of sites formerly used for surface mining. Synagro refers to the municipal sewage sludge as "biosolids"; we will use the terms interchangeably.
An entity that wishes to apply biosolids to land sites must obtain the consent of the landowner and register the site with the Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection (DEP). Synagro has 5 sites in Rush Township that are permitted for mine reclamation with biosolids. Synagro received from the DEP all of the necessary permits and approvals required for it to apply biosolids to the sites. At the time Synagro filed its complaint, certain sites had yet to be reclaimed.
After Synagro began biosolids application in one of its land sites, Rush Township enacted the Land Application of Sewage Sludge Ordinance. The Ordinance's stated purpose is "[t]o protect the health, safety and general welfare of all township citizens and other persons by seeking to prevent exposure to any toxic or other harmful material contained in sewage sludge...." (Ordinance, Attached to Complaint, Rec. Doc. No. 1, at § 1.1(A).) The Ordinance applies to "all current existing permits issued or authorized by PA DEP for the land application of sewage sludge in Rush Township." (Id. at § 10.)
The Ordinance claims to be consistent with federal and state regulation of sewage sludge, but it sets forth additional preliminary procedural requirements of any entity that wishes to apply sewage sludge in Rush Township. Before sewage sludge may be applied in Rush Township, two documents must be obtained. First, the wastewater treatment facility that generates the sewage sludge must obtain a "Site Registration," which is a document that confirms that the proposed site meets all federal, state, and local regulations pertaining to the application of sewage sludge. Second, the entity applying the sewage sludge must obtain a "Land Application Registration," which is an authorization by Rush Township to apply sewage sludge on agricultural lands within the township.
The Ordinance mandates a considerable number of procedural requirements for obtaining a Site Registration and a Land Application Registration. An applicant must submit all DEP application material to Rush Township for review and...
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