Syrie v. Knoll Intern.

• Decision Date: 10 December 1984
• Docket Number: No. 84-2120,84-2120
• Citation: 748 F.2d 304
• Parties: Josey P. SYRIE, et vir., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KNOLL INTERNATIONAL, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 304

748 F.2d 304

Josey P. SYRIE, et vir., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. KNOLL INTERNATIONAL, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 84-2120.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

Dec. 10, 1984.

Law Offices of Gilbert T. Adams, Gilbert T. Adams, Jr., Richard J. Clarkson, Beaumont, Tex., for plaintiffs-appellants.

Mehaffy, Weber, Keith & Gonsoulin, James L. Weber, Beaumont, Tex., Brian R. Davis, Austin, Tex., for defendant-appellee.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas.

Before RUBIN, RANDALL and TATE, Circuit Judges.

RANDALL, Circuit Judge:

In this appeal we address the question whether the district court erred in refusing to allow the plaintiff to introduce evidence in support of her negligence theory and in refusing to issue a negligence instruction to the jury. Because evidence of negligence was both adduced and proffered at trial and justified a negligence instruction, we hold that the district court erred. We vacate and remand the case for consideration of whether these errors were harmless.

I.

In 1980, Josey P. Syrie, a teller at the Beaumont State Bank (now InterFirst Bank of Beaumont), was injured when the back of the teller stool on which she was sitting fell off and the chair rolled out from underneath her. The bank had purchased the chair from a local office supply store. Syrie and her husband brought the instant products liability action against Knoll International, Inc. ("Knoll"), the manufacturer of the chair, in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. The Syries alleged that Knoll was strictly liable under Texas law for any defects in the design, manufacture, or marketing of the teller stool. They also alleged that Knoll was negligent in designing and marketing the chair, failing to warn of the hazard presented by the chair after it had been sold, and failing to recall and correct the defect in the chair. Knoll answered that Syrie's own negligence caused the accident or, alternatively, Syrie's injuries resulted from the negligence of her employer, the bank, in maintaining the chairs. The Standard Fire Insurance Company intervened, claiming a right of subrogation to any amounts recovered by Syrie to the extent of worker's compensation benefits and medical payments it made to Syrie.

Before trial, Knoll stipulated to the feasibility of alternative designs that would have prevented the backrest from coming loose. At trial, the district court did not permit Syrie to present evidence in support of her negligence claims. The court refused to instruct the jury regarding any of the negligence claims, ruling as a matter of law that negligence was not an issue in the case. The district court did instruct the jury on the strict liability claim and submitted the issue to the jury on a general verdict. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Knoll and the district court entered judgment accordingly. The Syries appeal.

II.

The Syries contend that the district court erred in refusing to allow evidence regarding the negligence claims and in refusing to instruct the jury on negligence. In this diversity action, we look to Texas law governing the substantive issues in this case. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 58 S.Ct. 817, 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). "In Texas, a plaintiff can predicate a products liability action on one or more of at least three theories of recovery: (1) strict liability under [Restatement (Second) of Torts] Sec. 402A, (2) breach of warranty under the U.C.C., and (3) negligence." Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414, 423 (Tex.1984). "The alternative pleading of actions asserting liability for product defects and negligent conduct is a customary and proper method of trial pleading." Fleishman v. Guadiano, 651 S.W.2d 730, 731 (Tex.1983) (citing Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.1978)). There are many cases involving Texas law in which the manufacturer of a product was sued in both strict liability and negligence. E.g., Foster v. Ford Motor Co., 616 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir.1980); Gonzales v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 571 S.W.2d 867 (Tex.1978), on remand 599 S.W.2d 633 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.).

To make out a strict liability cause of action, a party must establish that: (1) a product is defective; (2) the defect rendered the product unreasonably dangerous; (3) the product reached the consumer without substantial change in its condition from the time of original sale; and (4) the defective product was the producing cause of the injury to the user. ¹ A defective product is one that is unreasonably dangerous, i.e., dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary user of the product, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to the product's characteristics. See Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.1979); Signal Oil & Gas Co. v. Universal Oil Products, 572 S.W.2d 320 (Tex.1978); see also 3 State Bar of Texas, Texas Pattern Jury Charges PJC 71.01, 71.02 (1982); Restatement (Second) of Torts Sec. 402A comment i (1965). In assessing whether a product is unreasonably dangerous as designed, a jury may take into account the utility of the product and the risk involved in its use. Turner, 584 S.W.2d at 847 n. 1. "A manufacturer is not an insurer of the product he designs, and it is not required that the design adopted be perfect, or render the product accident proof, or incapable of causing injury, nor is it necessary to incorporate the ultimate safety features in the product." Acord v. General Motors Corp., 669 S.W.2d 111, 113 (Tex.1984); see Shamrock Fuel & Oil Sales Co. v. Tunks, 416 S.W.2d 779 (Tex.1967); Keeton, Torts, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 34 Sw.L.J. 1, 9-10 (1980).

A negligence cause of action requires a different showing from a strict liability claim, even when the action is against the manufacturer. Gonzales, 571 S.W.2d at 871. Although a negligence claim and a strict liability claim may share certain similar or common elements, they involve two separate theories of recovery. Rourke v. Garza, 530 S.W.2d 794, 800 (Tex.1975). The Texas Supreme Court has explained the distinction:

The care taken by the supplier of a product in its preparation, manufacture, or sale, is not a consideration in strict liability; this is, however, the ultimate question in a negligence action. Strict liability looks at the product itself and determines if it is defective. Negligence looks at the act of the manufacturer and determines if it exercised ordinary care in design and production.

Gonzales, 571 S.W.2d at 871; see also Keeton, supra, at 11-12. The district court recognized this distinction in instructing the jury on strict liability. Record Vol. II at 293.

Texas has adopted Sections 395 and 398 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts as the standard of care required of a manufacturer in the design and manufacture of its products. Gonzales, 571 S.W.2d at 871-72; Otis Elevator Co. v. Wood, 436 S.W.2d 324, 327 (Tex.1968). Section 395 provides:

A manufacturer who fails to exercise reasonable care in the manufacture of a chattel which, unless carefully made, he should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing physical harm to those who use it for a purpose for which the manufacturer should expect it to be used and to those whom he should expect to be endangered by its probable use, is subject to liability for physical harm caused to them by its lawful use in a manner and for a purpose for which it is supplied.

Section 398, a special application of the rule in Section 395, provides:

A manufacturer of a chattel made under a plan or design which makes it dangerous for the uses for which it is manufactured is subject to liability to others whom he should expect to use the chattel or to be endangered by its probable use for physical harm caused by his failure to exercise reasonable care in the adoption of a safe plan or design.

A plaintiff must establish the following elements to sustain a negligence claim against a manufacturer: (1) the manufacturer owed a duty to the plaintiff; (2) the manufacturer breached that duty; (3) the plaintiff was injured; and (4) the breach of duty was a proximate cause of the injury.

Generally, a person who manufactures or supplies a product owes a duty of reasonable care to users of the product and to those in the foreseeable zone of danger. These suppliers must exercise reasonable care to prevent physical harm that can reasonably be foreseen to result from the use of the product for its intended purpose, and they must take reasonable care to discover the dangerous propensities of the product and to warn those who might be endangered by it.

W. Dorsaneo, Texas Litigation Guide Sec. 320.03 (1984). "[I]t is a negligence concept that permits the introduction of evidence on the care exercised in the manufacturer's selection of the design." Special Project, Texas Tort Law in Transition, 57 Tex.L.Rev. 381, 477 (1979).

The Syries argue that the district court erred in refusing to allow evidence of negligence and in refusing to instruct the jury on negligence. They contend that certain evidence that was admitted and their offer of proof would provide a sufficient basis from which the jury could conclude that the chair was negligently designed or marketed by Knoll.

Knoll responds that, negligence having not been raised, the district court could not err by excluding irrelevant testimony and suppressing inapplicable legal theories. But this contention ignores the Syries' incorporation of a negligence claim into the pre-trial order, an incorporation that amends the previous pleadings to state a negligence claim. Fed.R.Civ.P. 16; 6 C. Wright, A. Miller & M. Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure Sec. 1526 (1971 & Supp.1984). Thus, Knoll is incorrect in ignoring the pre-trial order's amendment of the pleadings to include a negligence claim.

Knoll also...