Systran Financial Services v. Giant Cement Holding

• Decision Date: 03 March 2003
• Docket Number: No. 3:02CV7449.,3:02CV7449.
• Parties: SYSTRAN FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP. Plaintiff v. GIANT CEMENT HOLDING, INC., et al., Defendants In Re: Metropolitan Environmental, Inc., Debtor
• Court: U.S. District Court — Northern District of Ohio

252 F.Supp.2d 500

SYSTRAN FINANCIAL SERVICES CORP. Plaintiff v. GIANT CEMENT HOLDING, INC., et al., Defendants

In Re: Metropolitan Environmental, Inc., Debtor

No. 3:02CV7449.

United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Western Division.

March 3, 2003.

Jack R. Pitman, Porter, Wright, Morris & Arthur, Columbus, OH, for Systran Financial Services Corp, Plaintiff.

H. Buswell Roberts, Jr., Shumaker, Loop & Kendrick, Toledo, OH, Paul D. Harrill, McNair Law Firm, P.A., Columbia, SC, Anne M. Frayne, Dayton, OH, Michael Bragg, Fifth Third Center, Toledo, OH, for Giant Cement Holding, Inc., Metropolitan Environmental, Inc., Giant Resource Recovery, Inc., M and M Chemical and Equipment Co., Keystone Cement Co., Oldover Corp, Omni Southeast Chemical Inc., Bruce Comly French, Defendants.

ORDER

CARR, District Judge.

This is an adversary proceeding in which defendant Giant Cement Holding, Inc. ("Giant") seeks an order, pursuant to the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq., to stay and compel arbitration of the claims by plaintiff Systran Financial Services Corporation ("Systran").This court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). For the following reasons the defendant's motion to compel arbitration shall be granted.

BACKGROUND

On or about August 28, 1998, plaintiff Systran entered into a factoring agreement with Metropolitan Environmental, Inc. ("Metropolitan"), whereby Metropolitan sold and assigned its accounts receivable to plaintiff in exchange for plaintiffs financing of Metropolitan's operations.

On September 1, 1998, Metropolitan signed a transportation services agreement with defendant Giant. Defendant transferred equipment that it leased or owned to Metropolitan. In exchange, Metropolitan provided exclusive transportation services to Giant. Included in this agreement was an addendum that provided that the parties agreed to submit "[a]ny claim or controversy arising out of or relating to [the] Transportation Services Agreement" to "final and binding arbitration." Pl.'s Ex. 3.

Prior to execution of the Metropolitan/Giant transportation agreement, Systran notified Giant that all of Metropolitan's accounts had been sold and assigned to Systran, and, as a result, all payments due to Metropolitan from Giant should be made to Systran.

On September 17, 2001, Metropolitan filed for protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of Ohio.

At the time of the filing, Giant refused to make payments on the accounts sold and assigned by Metropolitan to Systran. Giant argues that it has not paid Metropolitan or Systran for outstanding invoices because Metropolitan breached the transportation services agreement by failing to make lease payments and failing to complete services for which Giant had made advanced payments. According to Giant, it therefore has valid rights of recoupment and setoff in amounts which exceed the total amount of the outstanding invoices from Metropolitan.

On November 13, 2001, Systran filed a complaint in the bankruptcy court to recover the payments due under Giant's account with Metropolitan. In January, 2002, Giant filed an answer to Systran's complaint and a cross-claim against Metropolitan. Metropolitan subsequently crossclaimed against Giant. On January 25, 2002, Giant filed a motion to dismiss Metropolitan's cross-claim. In its answer to plaintiffs complaint and its motion to dismiss Metropolitan's cross-claims, Giant did not assert its right to arbitration.

In March, 2002, the bankruptcy court, finding that Systran's claim would have no effect on the bankruptcy proceeding, ordered the parties to submit briefs as to where the bankruptcy court should remand litigation of Systran's claim. Giant asserted that the litigation should be remanded for arbitration pursuant to the Metropolitan/Giant transportation services agreement. The bankruptcy court rejected Giant's assertion and, in August, 2002, ordered reference to this court. In September, 2002—ten months after Systran filed its complaint in the bankruptcy court—Giant filed the present motion to compel arbitration.

DISCUSSION

Through the FAA, Congress has declared a national policy favoring arbitration. See Ferro Corp. v. Garrison Indus., Inc., 142 F.3d 926, 932 (6th Cir.1998) (citing Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 10, 104 S.Ct. 852, 79 L.Ed.2d 1 (1984)). Accordingly, "the [FAA] establishes that, as a matter of Federal law, any doubts concerning the scope of arbitrable issues should be resolved in favor of arbitration ...." Moses H. Cone Memorial Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25, 103 S.Ct. 927, 74 L.Ed.2d 765 (1983). Notwithstanding this policy, "arbitration is a matter of contract and a party cannot be required to submit to arbitration [in] any dispute which he has not agreed so to submit." AT & T Techs, v. Communications Workers of America, 475 U.S. 643, 648, 106 S.Ct. 1415, 89 L.Ed.2d 648 (1986).

Systran has three main arguments in opposition to Giant's motion to compel arbitration. First, Systran claims that it is not bound by the Metropolitan/Giant contract terms because its rights arise under a factoring agreement, not by the assignment of or as a party to the Metropolitan/Giant contract. Second, Systran argues Giant, having delayed making a demand for arbitration, waived its right to do so. Third, Systran argues that it would be inequitable to compel arbitration.

I. Systran, as Assignee, is Bound by the Metropolitan/Giant Agreement to Arbitrate

Because it is not a party to the Metropolitan/Giant arbitration agreement, Systran argues that it cannot be required to submit its claims to arbitration. According to Systran, it did not receive an assignment of the transportation services agreement. Rather, Systran argues that under its factoring agreement with Metropolitan, it only received the right to payment of Metropolitan's accounts.

Because Systran only received an assignment of the right to collect Metropolitan's accounts receivables, Systran argues that it received a finance assignment,¹ as defined by the Uniform Commercial Code ("UCC").² Systran argues that the UCC distinguishes between finance assignments and contract assignments. UCC § 2-210(4) states that under a finance assignment, only the assignor's rights are transferred. Therefore, unlike traditional contract assignment principles, the finance assignee is not substituted in for the assignor. Systran therefore argues that, as a finance assignee, it is not bound by any of the terms in the contract between Metropolitan and Giant.

Systran rightly points out that the Ohio Revised Code adoption of the UCC distinguishes between finance assignments and general contract assignments. Revised Code § 1302.13(D) (UCC § 2-210(4)) provides:

An assignment of "the contract" or of "all my rights under the contract" or an assignment in similar general terms is an assignment of rights and unless the language or the circumstances (as in an assignment for security) indicate the contrary, it is a delegation of performance of the duties of the assignor and its acceptance by the assignee constitutes a promise by him to perform those duties. This promise is enforceable by either the assignor or the other party to the original contract.

Official comment 5 to UCC § 2-210 provides:

Subsection (4) lays down a general rule of construction distinguishing between a normal commercial assignment, which substitutes the assignee for the assignor both as to rights and duties, and a financing assignment in which only the assignor's rights are transferred.

Thus, Article 2 of the UCC recognizes that general assignments confer both the assignor's rights and obligations to the assignee whereas a finance assignment confers only the assignor's rights.

Article 9 of the UCC, however, provides otherwise. Revised Code § 1309.404 (UCC 9-404) states:

(a) Unless an account debtor has made an enforceable agreement not to assert defenses or claims, and subject to subsections (b) through (e), the rights of an assignee are subject to:

(1) all terms of the agreement between the account debtor and assignor and any defense or claim in recoupment arising from the transaction that gave rise to the contract; and

As the official comments to UCC § 904³ explain, if the transaction is governed by Article 9, "an assignee generally takes an assignment subject to defenses and claims of an account debtor." UCC § 9-104 cmt. 2. Therefore, the assignee secured creditor stands in the shoes of the assignor debtor. See White & Summers, Uniform Commercial Code §§ 34-6 (5th ed.); see also Nat'l City Bank NW v. Columbian Mutual Life Ins. Co., 282 F.3d 407, 409 (6th Cir.2002) ("[UCC § 9-404] clearly limits the rights of National City, as the assignee, to those of the assignor ... and makes its right to accounts receivable subject to the provisions of [account debtor's] contract with [the assignor], including [account debtor's] right of recoupment.") (citations omitted).

The question in this case therefore becomes whether Systran's factoring agreement⁴ with Metropolitan is governed by Article 9.

Ohio Rev.Code § 1309.109(A)(3) (UCC § 9-102(1)(b)) provides that Article 9 applies to "any sale of accounts or chattel paper." As explained by the official comments to UCC § 9-102, "sales of accounts, contract rights and chattel paper are brought within this Article to avoid difficult problems of distinguishing between transactions intended for security and those not so intended." UCC § 9-102 cmt. 2. The comments also provide:

An assignment of accounts, contract rights or chattel paper as security for an obligation is covered by subsection (1)(a). Commercial financing on the basis of accounts, contract rights and chattel paper is often so conducted that the distinction between a security transfer and a sale is blurred, and a sale of such property is therefore covered by Section 9-103 or Section 9-104.

Id.

The factoring...