Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp Minikani

• Decision Date: 20 June 1994
• Docket Number: No. 92-0089,92-0089
• Citation: 184 Wis.2d 875,517 N.W.2d 135
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court
• Parties: Tracy SZARZYNSKI and Cindy Belanger, Plaintiffs-Joint-Appellants, v. YMCA, CAMP MINIKANI, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, ABC Insurance Company and DEF Insurance Company, Defendants, Manpower Temporary Services and Harnischfeger Corporation, Defendants-Joint-Appellants.

Page 135

517 N.W.2d 135

184 Wis.2d 875

Tracy SZARZYNSKI and Cindy Belanger, Plaintiffs-Joint-Appellants, v. YMCA, CAMP MINIKANI, Defendant-Respondent-Petitioner, ABC Insurance Company and DEF Insurance Company, Defendants,

Manpower Temporary Services and Harnischfeger Corporation,

Defendants-Joint-Appellants.

No. 92-0089.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

Argued March 1, 1994.

Decided June 20, 1994.

Amicus curiae brief was filed by Charles D. Hoornstra, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom on the brief was James E. Doyle, Atty. Gen.

GESKE, Justice.

This is a review of a published decision of the court of appeals, Szarzynski v. YMCA, Camp Minikani, 176 Wis.2d 365, 500 N.W.2d 391 (Ct.App.1993), reversing a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Patricia D. McMahon, Circuit Judge. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the defendant, YMCA, Camp Minikani (YMCA). The court dismissed an action brought by Tracy Szarzynski and her mother, Cindy Belanger (hereinafter collectively referred to as Szarzynski) to recover compensation for personal injuries suffered by Szarzynski at age twelve, while attending the YMCA's Camp Minikani. In its decision, the circuit court concluded that the YMCA is a "nonprofit organization," as the term is defined under sec. 895.52(1)(c), Stats., and, as such, is immune from suit, pursuant to sec. 895.52(2), Stats.

A majority of the court of appeals (Wedemeyer, P.J., dissenting) reversed the circuit court and held that the grant of immunity under sec. 895.52(2) for injuries suffered on property owned by a nonprofit organization such as the YMCA is a violation of Szarzynski's right to equal protection of the law and is, therefore, unconstitutional. The court of appeals reached that conclusion because the objective of the statute--to provide immunity to those property owners who derive only a minimal pecuniary benefit from opening their lands to the public for recreational use--was not met.

We now reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold the following:

(1) Inclusion of nonprofit organizations in the recreational immunity statute, sec. 895.52, Stats., ¹ is not a violation of the equal (2) The term "nonprofit organization," as defined in the statute, is not ambiguous. Rather, it means "an organization or association not organized or conducted for pecuniary profit." Section 895.52(1)(c), Stats. Accordingly, the YMCA, as a nonprofit organization, is immune from suit.

protection clauses of the United States and Wisconsin Constitutions and does not deny due process of law. Section 895.52 is, therefore, constitutional.

The facts of this case are as follows. In July, 1988, Szarzynski attended Camp Minikani for a 14-day stay. The camp was at that time, and still is, owned by the YMCA of Metropolitan Milwaukee, Inc. In the early evening of July 13, 1988, Szarzynski and another female camper walked toward the girls' washhouse on the grounds of the camp. The washhouse had two entry doors. As Szarzynski's fellow camper made her way through the first door and was opening the second, the first door slammed shut as Szarzynski was reaching for the door knob. The force of the first door's closing broke a pane of glass in the door window and propelled pieces of the broken glass toward Szarzynski, injuring her.

Szarzynski filed an action against the YMCA/Camp Minikani in October, 1990, alleging negligence and safe place violations regarding the washhouse door. In August, 1991, the YMCA filed a motion for summary judgment, claiming that it was entitled to dismissal as a matter of law resulting from the immunity provided by sec. 895.52(2), Stats. The circuit court agreed and dismissed the suit.

On appeal, Szarzynski raised two arguments: (1) the classification scheme in sec. 895.52 denies her equal protection of the law and violates her right to due process; and (2) the statute's definition of "nonprofit organization" is ambiguous.

The court of appeals addressed only the first argument. In its decision, the court stated that there were five factors relevant to an equal protection analysis. ² It held that Szarzynski challenges the constitutionality of sec. 895.52. The constitutionality of a statute is a question of law and is reviewable without deference to the decisions of the courts below. Guertin v. Harbour Assur. Co., 141 Wis.2d 622, 633, 415 N.W.2d 831 (1987).

                sec. 895.52(2) violated equal protection because even though "[l]imiting the liability of property owners who do 'not derive more than a minimal pecuniary benefit' from the recreational use of that property is a valid and worthy public-policy goal in keeping with the general purpose of section 895.52, Stats.," 3 discrimination existed in the statute between "those injured on property owned by nonprofit organizations like the YMCA that is being used for recreational purposes, and those injured on property ... not owned by nonprofit organizations...."  Szarzynski, 176 Wis.2d at 376, 500 N.W.2d 391.   That is, the classification had the effect of benefitting those nonprofit organizations which in fact made a corporate profit from the recreational use of their lands.  According to the court of appeals, the classification was not "germane to the purpose of the law."   See State ex rel. Baer v. Milwaukee, 33 Wis.2d 624, 633, 148 N.W.2d 21 (1967)
                

EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS

Wisconsin's first recreational use statute was enacted in 1963, ⁴ leading many other states in an attempt to promote the public recreational use of privately owned land. See Stuart J. Ford, Comment, Wisconsin's Recreational Use Statute: Toward Sharpening the Picture at the Edges, 1991 Wis.L.Rev 491. With the implementation of sec. 895.52 twenty years later, the legislature articulated the following intent:

Legislative intent. The legislature intends by this act to limit the liability of property owners toward others who use their property for recreational activities under circumstances in which the owner does not derive more than a minimal pecuniary benefit....

1983 Wis. Act 418, sec. 1. This legislative intent is reflected in four basic statutory elements. First, the statute defines who is considered a landowner within the scope of the statute. A nonprofit organization can be such an owner. Section 895.52(1)(d). Second the statute defines what type of land falls within the scope of the statute. Section 895.52(1)(f) describes the "property" to be affected by the statute as "real property and buildings, structures and improvements thereon, and the waters of the state, as defined under s. 144.01(19)." The washhouse Szarzynski was entering at the time of her injury is such property. Third, the statute defines what activity, use or purpose will receive the label "recreational" and, therefore, falls within the scope of the statute. Section 895.52(1)(g) lists a series of activities undertaken for the purpose of exercise, relaxation or pleasure, many of which are provided for at Camp Minikani. Fourth, the extent of statutory immunity accorded to nonprofit organizations is described in sec. 895.52(5).

However, Szarzynski argues that the statutory classification scheme regarding liability in sec. 895.52 is unconstitutional because it discriminates between those injured on property owned by nonprofit organizations and those injured on property which is not owned by nonprofit organizations. As such, the classification scheme is not rationally related to the underlying purpose of the legislation.

"Unless the challenged statute affects a 'fundamental right' or creates a classification based on a 'suspect class,' the standard this court uses in reviewing the constitutionality of the statutory classification is the 'rational basis' test." Matter of Care & Maintenance of K.C., 142 Wis.2d 906, 916, 420 N.W.2d 37 (1988) (citation omitted). "Where a 'fundamental right' or 'suspect class' is involved, the challenged statute must pass strict scrutiny." Id. Neither a fundamental right nor a suspect class is implicated in this case. Therefore, in order to withstand an equal protection challenge, the statutory classification must be rationally related to a legitimate government purpose. See San Antonio School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 17, 93 S.Ct. 1278, 1288, 36 L.Ed.2d 16 (1973); Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, ----, 112 S.Ct. 2326, 2331, 120 L.Ed.2d 1 (1992) (the equal protection clause requires that a classificationrationally further a legitimate state interest). ⁵

Further, " '[e]very presumption must be indulged to sustain the law if at all possible and, wherever doubt exists as to a legislative enactment's constitutionality, it must be resolved in favor of constitutionality....' " Racine Steel Castings v. Hardy, 144 Wis.2d 553, 559, 426 N.W.2d 33 (1988) (quoting State ex rel. Jones v. Gerhardstein, 141 Wis.2d 710, 733, 416 N.W.2d 883 (1987), and Chappy v. Labor & Industry Review Commission, 136 Wis.2d 172, 185, 401 N.W.2d 568 (1987)). Therefore, the party challenging a statutory classification bears the burden of proving abuse of legislative discretion beyond a reasonable doubt. Racine Steel Castings, 144 Wis.2d at 560, 426 N.W.2d 33 (citing Matter of Care & Maintenance of K.C., 142 Wis.2d at 914-15, 420 N.W.2d 37, and Sambs v. City of Brookfield, 97 Wis.2d 356, 370, 293 N.W.2d 504, cert. denied 449 U.S. 1035, 101 S.Ct. 611, 66 L.Ed.2d 497 (1980)).

Here, Szarzynski bears the burden of demonstrating that the incorporation of the YMCA and other nonprofit organizations within the parameters of sec. 895.52, Stats., is not rationally related to the underlying objective of the legislation. See Goodson v. Racine, 61 Wis.2d 554, 561, 213 N.W.2d 16 (1973). That classification would be violative of equal protection only if it rested "on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective." McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425, 81 S.Ct. 1101, 1104, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961).

The circuit court correctly found a rational basis for the...