Szerensci v. Shimshock
| Decision Date | 30 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 20-1296 |
| Parties | JARED SZERENSCI and SCOTT A. FURLONG, JR., Plaintiffs, v. MAGISTRATE DANIEL C. SHIMSHOCK, COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA MAGISTERIAL DISTRICT COURT 14-3-02, individually; MASONTOWN BOROUGH, and ROY A. DOWDELL, Administrator of the Estate of Patrick Sean Dowdell, deceased, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania |
W Scott Hardy, United States District Judge
Plaintiffs Jared Szerensci and Scott A. Furlong, Jr. allege claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violations against Defendants Magisterial District Judge Daniel C. Shimshock and Commonwealth of Pennsylvania Magisterial District Court 14-3-02 (the “Court Defendants”) and Defendant Masontown Borough (“Defendant Borough”). (See Docket No 20). Plaintiffs also assert a negligence claim against Defendant Roy A. Dowdell, Administrator of the Estate of Patrick Sean Dowdell, who is deceased.[1] Presently before the Court are Defendant Borough's Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the Court Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, both of which are opposed by Plaintiff. (Docket Nos. 22-29). After careful consideration of the parties' arguments in light of the prevailing legal standards, Defendants' Motion will be granted. The claims in the Amended Complaint asserted against Magisterial District Court 14-3-02 will be dismissed with prejudice, and the claims asserted against Judge Shimshock and Defendant Borough will be dismissed without prejudice to amendment by Plaintiffs to the extent they are able to state a plausible claim for relief as more specifically discussed herein.
As alleged in Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint, [2] on September 19, 2018, Plaintiff Szerensci was in Judge Shimshock's office in the municipal building of Defendant Borough, and Plaintiff Furlong was present with his son who was scheduled to appear before Judge Shimshock, when Patrick Sean Dowell, who also was present for a scheduled hearing, opened fire and injured several individuals, including Plaintiffs. (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 16-17, 19, 25-28). Plaintiff Szerensci sustained a gunshot wound to his left calf, and Plaintiff Furlong suffered a gunshot wound to his left wrist. (Id., ¶¶ 26-27, 29(a), 30(a)).
According to Plaintiffs, Dowdell was appearing for a hearing in connection with an incident involving charges of aggravated assault, terroristic threats, strangulation, simple assault and harassment against his wife. (Docket No. 20, ¶ 20). Dowdell's wife supposedly reported to the police that he threatened to kill her and anyone else he had to in order to prevent a divorce.
(Id., ¶ 21). Plaintiffs allege that the Court Defendants and Defendant Borough “either knew or should have known” of Dowdell's propensity for violence and the threats he made against his wife and others. (Id., ¶ 22). Plaintiffs further allege that, despite this knowledge, the Court Defendants and Defendant Borough “affirmatively adopted a practice, custom or policy of allowing visitors access to the municipal building without being adequately screened for weapons.” (Id., ¶¶ 23, 36, 54). In so doing, Plaintiffs aver that Defendants failed to train their employees “to handle the usual and recurring situations with which they must deal, such as visitors attempting to enter the municipal building with weapons.” (Id., ¶¶ 37, 55).
Plaintiffs assert claims against the Court Defendants and Defendant Borough under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Fourteenth Amendment Due Process as a result of an adopted practice, custom or policy (Counts I and III, respectively) and as a result of a state created danger/special relationship (Counts II and Count IV, respectively). (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 32-67). Plaintiffs also assert a state law negligence claim against Defendant Dowdell (Count V). (Id., ¶¶ 68-70). Finally, Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to an award of punitive damages because Defendants supposedly “acted with deliberate indifference and in a conscience shocking manner at all relevant times.” (Id., ¶ 71).
The Court Defendants and Defendant Borough each have moved to dismiss Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint. (Docket Nos. 22, 24). The Court Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' Fourteenth Amendment claims against them are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and they are not “persons” subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (Docket No. 25 at 2-4). Defendant Borough contends that dismissal is warranted because Count III of the Amended Complaint fails to state a “practice, custom or policy” claim under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and Count IV fails to state a “state created danger/special relationship” claim. (Docket No. 23 at 5-14). Plaintiffs filed Responses opposing Defendants' Motions. (Docket Nos. 28, 29). The matter is now ripe for disposition.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), “a court must grant a motion to dismiss if it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear a claim.” In re Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). Jurisdictional challenges may be treated as either “facial” or as “factual.” See Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 357 (3d Cir. 2014). A facial attack asserts that a claim “is insufficient to invoke the subject matter jurisdiction of the court because, for example, it does not present a question of federal law, or because there is no indication of a diversity of citizenship among the parties, or because some other jurisdictional defect is present.” Id. at 358. A facial attack “can occur before the moving party has filed an answer or otherwise contested the factual allegations of the complaint.” Id. (citation omitted). Conversely, a factual challenge “attacks the factual allegations underlying the complaint's assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer or ‘otherwise present[ing] competing facts.'” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Constitution Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 358).
Here, the Court Defendants make a facial challenge, arguing that Eleventh Amendment immunity bars Plaintiffs' claims.[3] When analyzing a facial attack on subject-matter jurisdiction, “the court must only consider the allegations of the complaint and documents referenced therein and attached thereto, in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.” Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 176 (3d Cir. 2000). “Thus, a facial attack calls for a district court to apply the same standard of review it would use in considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), i.e., construing the alleged facts in favor of the nonmoving party.” Constitution Party of Pa., 757 F.3d at 358 (citing In re Schering Plough, 678 F.3d at 243).
To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, the well-pleaded factual content in the complaint must allow “the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged, ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009), and also “raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citation omitted). When analyzing a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations should be separated from allegations that merely recite the legal elements of the claim. Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). The well-pleaded facts are accepted as true, but legal conclusions may be disregarded. Id. at 210-11. Next, a determination is made as to “whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a ‘plausible claim for relief.' ” Id. at 211 (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679). This “plausibility” determination is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
As an initial matter, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not create any substantive rights, but rather provides a remedy for deprivations of rights created by the Constitution or federal law. See City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816 (1985). “To state a claim for relief in an action brought under § 1983, [a plaintiff] must establish that [he was] deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States, and that the alleged deprivation was committed under color of state law.” American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 49-50 (1999). In this case, Plaintiffs assert that the Court Defendants and Defendant Borough deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment Due Process rights “to be free from State occasioned and/or created harm to their bodily integrity and human dignity” as a result of an adopted practice, custom or policy and as a result of a state created danger/special relationship. (Docket No. 20, ¶¶ 34, 43, 52, 61).
The Court Defendants argue that Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims asserting Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violations against them are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, and the Court Defendants are not “persons” subject to suit under § 1983. (Docket No. 25 at 2-4). Plaintiffs disagree, asserting that the Court Defendants are not protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity because they were both sued in their individual capacity, and therefore they should be considered “persons” under § 1983. (Docket No. 28 at 3-5). For reasons that follow, the Amended Complaint, as pled, indicates Plaintiffs' intention to sue the Court Defendants in their official capacity, not their...
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