Szollosy v. Hyatt Corp.
Decision Date | 26 September 2005 |
Docket Number | No. CIV.A.3:99 CV 870CFD.,CIV.A.3:99 CV 870CFD. |
Citation | 396 F.Supp.2d 147 |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of Connecticut |
Parties | Linda SZOLLOSY, on behalf of herself and as parent and next friend of Charles Dean Szollosy, Plaintiff v. HYATT CORPORATION, Hyatt Britannia Corporation Ltd., Watersports Administration Inc., and Red Sail Cayman Ltd., Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs v. Charles Szollosy, Third-Party Defendant |
Angelo A. Ziotas, Silver, Golub & Teitell, Robert W. Chesson, Steven M. Frederick, William M. Davoren, Wofsey, Rosen, Kweskin & Kuriansky, Stamford, CT, for Plaintiff.
Dan E. Labelle, Halloran & Sage, Westport, CT, Frederick A. Lovejoy, Lovejoy & Associates, Easton, CT, Ben M. Krowicki, Brent L. Hoffman, Bingham McCutchen, Hartford, CT, Jeffrey L. Williams, Jorden Burt, Simsbury, CT, Peter M. Nolin, Sandak Hennessey & Greco, Stamford, CT, for Defendants.
RULING ON MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Plaintiff Linda Szollosy brought this action as parent and next friend of her minor son Charles "Dean" Szollosy, seeking damages for injuries suffered by Dean Szollosy during a September 1998 vacation in the Cayman Islands. Linda Szollosy's complaint contains five counts, alleging the common law torts of negligence and breach of warranty by defendants Hyatt Corporation ("Hyatt") and Hyatt Britannia Corporation Ltd. ("Hyatt Britannia"), and alleging negligence, breach of warranty, and strict products liability under Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-572m et seq. against defendants Watersports Administration, Inc. ("WAI"), and Red Sail Cayman Ltd. ("Red Sail").1 The defendants then brought a third-party action against Charles Szollosy for contribution, common law indemnification, and apportionment, alleging that Charles Szollosy was liable for all or part of Dean's injuries due to negligence.2
Charles Szollosy has now filed a motion for summary judgment on the defendants' third-party complaint, arguing that Connecticut law governs the defendants' action and affords Charles Szollosy parental immunity. Defendants Hyatt, Hyatt Britannia, and WAI have filed a separate motion for summary judgment as to Linda Szollosy's complaint, arguing that they are distinct legal entities that cannot be held responsible for any liability of Red Sail. Finally, Linda Szollosy has filed a motion for summary judgment on the defendants' nineteenth affirmative defense, in which the defendants claim limitation of liability under the federal admiralty statutes at 46 U.S. § 183 et seq.
In September 1998, Linda, Charles, and Dean Szollosy spent a family vacation at the Hyatt Regency Grand Cayman Resort and Villas in the Cayman Islands. During their vacation, on September 7, 1998, the Szollosys took a day trip to the nearby Rum Point recreation area. Rum Point offered a swimming beach, as well as several restaurants and snack bars. Defendant Red Sail also operated a concession stand at Rum Point, where sailboats, paddleboats, windsurfers, and wave runners and other equipment were available for rental.4
Shortly after arriving at Rum Point, Charles Szollosy waded in the water with then-four-year-old Dean over to the area where Red Sail's wave runners were moored. The two sat on one wave runner for about ten minutes without incident. Charles Szollosy then placed Dean atop a second wave runner. The parties dispute whether Charles Szollosy boarded the second wave runner or played any part in operating it. In any case, the second wave runner's engine started and the watercraft began to move with only Dean Szollosy aboard. The wave runner carried Dean across the Rum Point harbor and crashed directly into a stone jetty or break wall. Dean Szollosy was thrown over the handlebars of the wave runner as a result of the crash; he suffered injuries including coma and brain hemorrhage.
In a summary judgment motion, the burden is on the moving party to establish that there are no genuine issues of material fact in dispute and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56; Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 256, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A court must grant summary judgment "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)). A dispute regarding a material fact is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. After discovery, if the nonmoving party "has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of [his] case with respect to which [he] has the burden of proof," then summary judgment is appropriate. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
The Court resolves "all ambiguities and draw[s] all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party in order to determine how a reasonable jury would decide." Aldrich v. Randolph Cent. Sch. Dist., 963 F.2d 520, 523 (2d Cir.1992). Thus, "[o]nly when reasonable minds could not differ as to the import of the evidence is summary judgment proper." Bryant v. Maffucci, 923 F.2d 979, 982 (2d Cir.1991).
Each party's summary judgment motion will be evaluated in turn.
The defendants' third-party complaint alleges that Charles Szollosy was negligent for failing to adequately supervise Dean Szollosy immediately preceding the accident, failing properly to examine the wave runners before placing Dean on them, failing to exercise due care to protect Dean Szollosy, using the wave runners without proper authorization, and for either causing the second wave runner to start or contributing to its start. Charles Szollosy has moved for summary judgment on the third-party complaint. He argues that Connecticut's parental immunity doctrine shields him from the defendants'/third-party plaintiffs' claims of contribution, indemnification, and apportionment for Dean's injuries, because those claims first require a finding of liability against Charles Szollosy as parent and such a finding specifically is precluded by Connecticut's immunity doctrine.
Charles Szollosy first made this argument in his motion to dismiss the defendants' third-party complaint [Doc. # 57]. At that time, the defendants/third-party plaintiffs responded that the court should exercise its admiralty jurisdiction and apply maritime law, which has no parental immunity doctrine, to this action. Alternatively, the defendants argued that maritime choice of law principles would compel the application of Cayman Islands substantive law, which also does not recognize parental immunity. In its ruling, the Court first evaluated the action under the criteria set forth in Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358, 110 S.Ct. 2892, 111 L.Ed.2d 292 (1990), and determined that it possessed and would exercise admiralty jurisdiction over the case.5 See Szollosy v. Hyatt, 208 F.Supp.2d 205 (D.Conn.2002) (Ruling on Third-Party Defendant's Motion to Dismiss).
The Court then denied the motion to dismiss without resolving the choice of law issue, on the ground that there was no conflict among the laws of the various pertinent jurisdictions. Id. at 213-14. Neither federal maritime law nor Cayman Islands substantive law appeared to provide parental immunity. Further, the third-party complaint alleged that Charles Szollosy had operated the wave runner. Connecticut has abrogated parental immunity when the parent's negligence occurs "in the operation of a ... vessel." See Conn. Gen.Stat. § 52-572c. Therefore, accepting the allegations of the third-party complaint as true for the purpose of the motion to dismiss, the Court found that the outcome of the choice of law determination would not affect Charles Szollosy's inability to prevail at this stage. See Szollosy, 208 F.Supp.2d at 214.
Both Charles Szollosy and the defendants/third-party plaintiffs now agree that, with the fuller factual record available at the summary judgment stage, the Court should decide whether Connecticut, federal maritime, or Cayman Island law applies to the action.6 Charles Szollosy maintains that the Court should undertake a choice-of-law analysis as established by Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 73 S.Ct. 921, 97 L.Ed. 1254 (1953), and apply Connecticut law to the third-party complaint. The defendants/third-party plaintiffs again argue that the Court should apply federal maritime law and consider the Connecticut rule of parental immunity preempted, or alternatively apply Cayman Islands law.
Lauritzen, the case which established choice-of-law principles for maritime tort claims, involved a Danish sailor's injuries in the course of his employment aboard a Danish ship. The Lauritzen Court evaluated whether United States law or Danish law should be applied to the tort, and established seven factors to be considered in resolving such questions: 1) the location of the wrongful act; 2) the law of the flag of the vessel involved; 3) the domicile of the injured party; 4) the national allegiance of the defendant shipowner; 5) the place of contract; 6) the relative accessibility of a foreign forum; and 7) the law of the forum chosen. See Lauritzen, 345 U.S. at 583-92, 73 S.Ct. 921.7
As evidenced by the international flavor of the Lauritzen case, the factors "are most often applied to determine whether the admiralty law of the United States or that of a foreign state should be applied to a particular dispute." Calhoun v. Yamaha Motor Corp., 216 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir.2000). The laws of the individual United States rarely are implicated in a Lauritzen analysis, save in purely domestic maritime torts. See, e.g., Scott v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 399 F.2d 14 (3d Cir.1967) (...
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