T.B.P. v. State
Decision Date | 28 April 2017 |
Docket Number | CR–16–0270 |
Citation | 245 So.3d 633 |
Parties | T.B.P. v. STATE of Alabama |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
Justin Keith Forrester, Birmingham, for appellant.
Luther Strange, atty. gen., and J. Thomas Leverette, asst. atty. gen., for appellee.
T.B.P. appeals from his adjudication as a delinquent based on the offense of indecent exposure.
On December 29, 2014, a petition was filed in the juvenile court charging T.B.P. with delinquency based on the underlying offense of indecent exposure. A trial before a referee was conducted on July 23, 2015. The testimony at the hearing, though contested by T.B.P., was that T.B.P. exposed his genitals to his math teacher at his school during an after-school tutoring session. The trial ended with the referee pronouncing: "The charge is found true." (R. 50.) Also, on July 23, 2015, the referee entered a posttrial written order stating: (C. 14.) On July 30, 2015, the referee entered his final order disposing of the case that stated: 1 (C. 15.) On August 10, 2015, T.B.P. filed a postjudgment written "motion to alter, amend or vacate," alleging that the charging instrument was void because it did not assert what T.B.P. contends was a necessary element of the offense—the element of the victim's lack of consent. (C. 19.) On August 14, 2015, the referee denied that motion. Also, on August 14, 2015, T.B.P. filed a motion for a rehearing. The case was assigned to a juvenile judge. On October 25, 2016, the juvenile court, having listened to the July 23, 2015, recording from the trial, affirmed the referee's finding of delinquency in a written order, stating: "The Judgment of Referee is hereby affirmed." (C. 35.) On November 7, 2016, T.B.P. filed a written "motion for acquittal or for a new trial." (C. 31.) In this motion T.B.P. alleged that the charging instrument did not charge the element of the victim's lack of consent; that T.B.P. "[w]as not found to be in need of services of rehabilitation, and therefore, the court should dismiss the proceedings," see § 12–15–215(a), Ala. Code 1975; and, the court failed to consider the lesser-included offense of public lewdness, § 13A–12–130, Ala. Code 1975. (C. 33.) T.B.P. filed notice of appeal on November 29, 2016. On December 7, 2016, the circuit court entered a written denial of the November 7, 2016, motion.
At the conclusion of the State's case and again at the conclusion of the defense case, T.B.P. moved for a judgment of acquittal on the ground that T.B.P.'s charging instrument was void because it did not assert what T.B.P. contends was a necessary element of the offense—the element of the victim's lack of consent. The State disputed the allegation and asserted that the claim should have been raised before the hearing started.
Section 13A–6–68, Ala. Code 1975, defines the crime of indecent exposure:
(C. 6.)
Initially, we note that pursuant to Rule 12, Ala. R. Juv. P., delinquency proceedings are commenced by the filing of a complaint followed by, where appropriate, the filing of a petition, i.e., the charging instrument, in the juvenile court. See generally, State v. Thomas, 550 So.2d 1067, 1072 (Ala. 1989) . However, in Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d 536 (Ala. 2006), the Alabama Supreme Court held that the validity of a formal charging instrument is irrelevant to a court's subject-matter jurisdiction:
D.H. v. State, 24 So.3d 1166, 1169 (Ala. Crim. App. 2009).
Gargis v. State, 998 So.2d 1092, 1099 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007). Although the charging instrument here is a juvenile petition, the rationale in Seymour applies because the juvenile court had statutory authority to try the offense. See § 12–15–114(a), Ala. Code 1975 (); Ex parte Seymour, 946 So.2d at 538 () ; see also Patton v. State, 964 So.2d 1247 (Ala. Crim. App. 2007) ( ).
Therefore, T.B.P.'s challenge to the charging instrument is not a jurisdictional challenge and, thus, could be waived.
The Rules of Juvenile Procedure do not address defects in the commencement of the proceedings. If no procedure is specifically provided in the Alabama Rules of Juvenile Procedure or by statute, the Alabama Rules of Criminal Procedure shall be applicable to those matters that are considered criminal in nature. Rule 1, Ala. R. Juv. P. Rule 15.2(a), Ala. R. Crim. P., provides that "[o]bjections based on defects in the commencement of the proceeding or in the charge, other than lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to charge an offense, may be raised only by pretrial motions as provided in Rule 15.3." Pursuant to Rule 15.3(a)(1), Ala. R. Crim. P., a motion to dismiss an indictment must be filed "at or before arraignment or by such later date as may be set by the court" in circuit court or "at the time of or before entering a plea" in district court. T.B.P. did not raise this issue until after the State rested its case. Thus, because T.B.P. did not timely object, this issue was waived and, thus, is not properly before this Court for appellate review.
T.B.P. contends that the juvenile court violated § 12–15–215(a), Ala. Code 1975, by "closing" his case instead of "dismissing" when the court did not determine that T.B.P. was in need of care or rehabilitation.
Section 12–15–215(a), Ala. Code 1975, states:
"If the juvenile court finds that the child is not in need of care or rehabilitation, it shall dismiss the proceedings and discharge the child from any detention or other temporary care theretofore ordered."
The record reflects that, after T.B.P.'s dispositional hearing, the referee found: "Child is exempt from registering and notification; Case is closed." (C. 15.) Thus, the referee's order clearly reflects that there was no finding that T.B.P. was in need of care or rehabilitation.
The State responded on appeal that this claim was waived for lack of preservation in the lower court. However, the referee's findings and recommendations became the final order of the juvenile court when ratified by the juvenile court judge on October 25, 2015. Following the order ratifying the referee's order, T.B.P. filed a postjudgment "motion for acquittal or new trial" in which he asserted that:
(C. 33.) This Court finds that T.B.P.'s challenge to the final disposition was timely raised at T.B.P.'s first opportunity—in his postjudgment motion.
This Court notes that the difference between "closing" a case and "dismissing" is one of semantics. To "close" a case is to bring it to an end in the sense that it is concluded. See Black's Law Dictionary 310 (10th ed. 2014). To "dismiss" a case is to terminate a case without further proceedings. See Black's Law Dictionary 569 (10th ed. 2014).
On appeal, T.B.P. asserts that there is no Alabama caselaw on this issue. T.B.P. cites as persuasive authority a case from the Supreme Court of North Dakota— In re M.H.P., 830 N.W.2d 216, 220 (N.D. 2013). M.H.P. was charged with being a delinquent based on his alleged commission of a felony sexual offense. The judicial referee found the charge to be true....
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...24 (D).51. Ala. Code § 12-15-2212(d) (1975).52. Id. at § 12-15-212(c) (1975).53. Id. at § 12-15-212(c) (1975).54. See T.P.B. v. State, 245 So. 3d 633 (Ala. Crim. App. 2017); In the Interest of M.H.P., 830 N.W. 2d 216 (N.D. 2013).55. Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll (1865). __......