A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp
| Decision Date | 14 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 94-1024,94-1024 |
| Citation | 904 S.W.2d 668 |
| Parties | 23 Media L. Rep. 2281, 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1071 A & T CONSULTANTS, INC., Relator, v. John SHARP, Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, Respondent. |
| Court | Texas Supreme Court |
Troy L. Voelker, Round Rock, for relator.
John Sharp, Sandra Conditt Joseph, Christopher Johnsen, Austin, for respondent.
In this original proceeding, the relator, A & T Consultants, Inc., seeks a writ of mandamus directing John Sharp, the Comptroller of Public Accounts of the State of Texas, to disclose certain information in his possession regarding the state's franchise taxpayers. We conditionally grant mandamus relief compelling disclosure of some of the requested information because it is public information under the Texas Open Records Act.
In June 1990, pursuant to the Texas Open Records Act (TORA), TEX.GOV'T CODE §§ 552.001-.353 (1994 & Supp.1995), A & T requested the comptroller to furnish a list of all franchise taxpayers in the state subjected to an audit resulting in a final determination of a tax deficiency assessment or refund since September 1, 1983. A & T asked for the list to include not only the taxpayers' names, but also their taxpayer numbers, full mailing addresses, the amount of tax deficiency assessed against them or the amount of tax refunded to them, and the relevant periods or dates involved in their audits. The comptroller agreed to provide some of the information that A & T requested, but not the actual amount of tax assessments or refunds or the names of taxpayers who received refunds.
The comptroller later declined to provide the information A & T sought because he believed that some of it was exempt from disclosure, either as exceptions to TORA, see id. §§ 552.101-.123, or under the Tax Code's confidentiality provisions. See TEX.TAX CODE §§ 111.006, 151.027, 171.206. In this circumstance, TORA required the comptroller to seek an opinion from the attorney general regarding whether A & T's request for public information included information made confidential by statute. See TEX.GOV'T CODE § 552.301. In June 1990, the comptroller asked the attorney general to render an open records decision regarding A & T's request and similar requests from other parties not involved in this suit.
The attorney general issued his decision regarding A & T's request for tax information in June 1994, but withdrew the opinion pending the present litigation in October 1994. The attorney general concluded, among other things, that the confidentiality provisions of the Tax Code protected the amounts of any tax deficiency from disclosure under TORA, but not the amounts of refunds or the identity of taxpayers who received refunds. The comptroller apparently disagreed with the attorney general's opinion, because he requested the attorney general to reconsider its opinion in July 1994. 1 Also in July, A & T filed two additional requests with the comptroller. It expanded the scope of its request to include taxpayer and audit records since 1979. It also requested additional categories of information, including franchise taxpayers' standard industrial classification (SIC) codes, the reason for their audits, the taxpayers' primary and secondary errors, taxpayers' responses to audits, the audit method, the "assignment code" (the basis for the comptroller's decision to assign an audit), the audit office, and the auditor's number and group. The comptroller again offered to comply partially with A & T's request. In a letter to A & T in August 1994, the comptroller stated that he would provide the following information: franchise taxpayers' names, taxpayer numbers, full mailing addresses, SIC codes, the audit office, audit period, auditor number, and the audit periods and starting dates.
Because A & T had not obtained all the information it sought despite four years of effort, it filed a motion for leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus with this Court, asking us to direct the comptroller to release all the information it had requested. The comptroller urges us not to exercise jurisdiction, arguing both that A & T's petition presents unresolvable fact issues and that a district court is the proper forum for TORA-based mandamus actions. We disagree on both points.
District courts are always the courts of exclusive original jurisdiction for mandamus proceedings unless the constitution or a law confers such jurisdiction on another tribunal. See TEX. CONST. art. V, § 8; TEX.GOV'T CODE § 24.011 (). TORA does not specify which courts have jurisdiction over mandamus proceedings initiated to enforce the Act. See TEX.GOV'T CODE § 552.321. Neither the constitution nor any other statute outside TORA discusses what courts have jurisdiction over mandamus actions to compel disclosure of public information under TORA. Consequently, district courts ordinarily will have jurisdiction over TORA-based mandamus actions. See, e.g., Texas Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Gilbreath, 842 S.W.2d 408 (Tex.App.--Austin 1992, no writ) (involving a TORA-based mandamus action against a state department); Johnson v. Lynaugh, 789 S.W.2d 704, 706 (Tex.App.--Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, orig. proceeding) (involving a TORA-based mandamus action against the director of the department of criminal justice, an official who is not an executive officer within the constitution).
The problem with jurisdiction arises when the respondent is an executive officer named by the constitution. Among the heads of state departments and agencies, the constitution identifies seven officials as executive officers. See TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 1. These are the governor, the lieutenant governor, the secretary of state, the comptroller of public accounts, the treasurer, the commissioner of the general land office, and the attorney general. Id. For mandamus proceedings against executive officers, sections 3 and 8 in article V of the constitution allowed the legislature to create an exception to district courts' ordinary exclusive original jurisdiction. See id. art. V, § 8 (); see id. art. V, § 3 (). Under the authority of these two sections in article V, the legislature conferred exclusive original jurisdiction on this Court over mandamus proceedings against executive officers, except for the governor, in section 22.002(c) of the Government Code. That section states:
Only the supreme court has the authority to issue a writ of mandamus or injunction ... against any of the officers of the executive departments of the government of this state to order or compel the performance of a judicial, ministerial, or discretionary act or duty that, by state law, the officer or officers are authorized to perform.
TEX.GOV'T CODE § 22.002(c). Thus, district courts generally have no jurisdiction over executive officer respondents. Any exception to this rule would require express statutory authorization by the legislature naming district courts as the proper fora. See id. § 552.353(b)(3).
Under the current statutory scheme, when a relator seeks to compel an executive officer to perform duties imposed by law, generally this Court alone is the proper forum. We have long followed the dictates of section 22.002(c) of the Government Code by exercising our jurisdiction in mandamus proceedings in which an executive officer has allegedly failed to perform his legal duties. E.g., Houston Chronicle Pub. Co. v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 695 (Tex.1989) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to compel the attorney general to render an open records opinion); Jessen Assocs., Inc. v. Bullock, 531 S.W.2d 593 (Tex.1975) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to compel the comptroller to issue a warrant for payment of architects' services); Bullock v. Calvert, 480 S.W.2d 367 (Tex.1972) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to require the comptroller to pay the costs of a party primary election); Trinity River Auth. v. Carr, 386 S.W.2d 790 (Tex.1965) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to force the attorney general to approve a river authority's revenue bonds); Gordon v. Lake, 163 Tex. 392, 356 S.W.2d 138 (1962) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to compel the secretary of state to file a corporate charter); County of Cameron v. Wilson, 160 Tex. 25, 326 S.W.2d 162 (1959) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to require the attorney general to approve the issuance of county revenue bonds); Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Mann, 138 Tex. 242, 158 S.W.2d 477 (1941) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to force the attorney general and comptroller to refund illegally-assessed taxes the petitioner had paid on policy premiums it received); Manion v. Lockhart, 131 Tex. 175, 114 S.W.2d 216 (1938) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to compel the treasurer to pay escheated funds to an heir); Corsicana Cotton Mills, Inc. v. Sheppard, 123 Tex. 352, 71 S.W.2d 247 (1934) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to compel the comptroller and treasurer to refund erroneously paid franchise taxes); Jernigan v. Finley, 90 Tex. 205, 38 S.W. 24 (1896) (orig. proceeding) (seeking to force the comptroller to issue a warrant for county school funds). If A & T had petitioned for mandamus relief against the comptroller in district court, that court would have had little difficulty in determining that it should dismiss the petition for want of jurisdiction over the comptroller pursuant to section 22.002(c) of the Government Code.
In this case, we alone have jurisdiction to hear A &...
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