T.G. v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cnty. of Rio Arriba
| Decision Date | 15 October 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 19-1116 JFR/JHR |
| Parties | T.G., Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF COUNTY OF RIO ARRIBA, RIO ARRIBA COUNTY SHERIFF JAMES LUJAN and RIO ARRIBA COUNTY SHERIFF DEPUTY LEON GALLEGOS, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Mexico |
THIS MATTER is before the Court on Defendants' Joint Motion for Summary Judgment (Qualified Immunity Raised), filed May 1, 2020. Doc. 21. The Court, having considered counsel's arguments, the record, and the relevant law, FINDS that the motion is well taken in part and is GRANTED IN PART.
On June 3, 2019, Plaintiff, a corrections officer at the Rio Arriba County Adult Detention Facility ("Detention Facility"), opened the secured gate at the Detention Facility to Rio Arriba County Sheriff Deputy Leon Gallegos ("Defendant Gallegos"), who was there to transport detainees to court. After entering the Detention Center and following a brief verbal exchange with Plaintiff, Defendant Gallegos reached for his X-2 Taser, pointed it at Plaintiff's groin, and pulled the trigger deploying darts into Plaintiff's groin. On October 22, 2019, Plaintiff filed suitagainst Defendants in state court alleging (1) violations of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from excessive force and unreasonable seizure and Fourteenth Amendment right to bodily integrity against Defendant Gallegos; (2) battery against Defendant Gallegos and Defendant Rio Arriba County; (3) supervisory liability and deliberate indifference under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments against Defendant Sheriff James Lujan ("Defendant Lujan"); (4) violation of Plaintiff's right to equal protection of the law under the Fourteenth Amendment against Defendant Gallegos; (5) municipal liability against Defendant Rio Arriba County and Defendant Lujan in his Official Capacity; and (6) loss of consortium. Doc. 1-1. Defendants removed the case to this Court on December 2, 2019, based on original jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3) and (4) and supplemental jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Doc. 1 at 2-3.
Defendants filed the summary judgment motion presently before the Court on May 1, 2020. Defendant seeks summary judgment based on qualified immunity and/or on the merits of all claims asserted in the lawsuit. Plaintiff filed a response on June 8, 2020 (Doc. 31), and Defendants filed a reply on June 25, 2020 (Doc. 38).
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 2552 (1986); Jones v. Kodak Med. Assistance Plan, 169 F.3d 1287, 1291 (10th Cir. 1999); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "[A] party seeking summary judgment always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of [the record] ... which it believesdemonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Catrett, 106 S. Ct. at 2552 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 670-71 (10th Cir. 1998). Once the movant meets this burden, the non-moving party is required to put in the record facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2505, 2511 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). Adamson v. Multi Cmty. Diversified Servs., Inc., 514 F.3d 1136, 1145 (10th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted); Bird v. W. Valley City, 832 F.3d 1188, 1199 (10th Cir. 2016). Only material factual disputes preclude the entry of summary judgment. Atl. Richfield Co. v. Farm Credit Bank of Wichita, 226 F.3d 1138, 1148 (10th Cir. 2000).
The trial judge is not to weigh the evidence to determine the truth of the matter, but instead must ask "whether a fair-minded jury could return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented." Anderson, 106 S. Ct. at 2512. "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Id. at 2510. To carry its initial burden, the moving party need not negate the nonmoving party's claim. See Allen v. Muskogee, Okla., 119 F.3d 837, 840 (10th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub nom. Smith v. Allen, 522 U.S. 1148 (1998). "'Instead, the movant only bears the initial burden of 'showing'—that is, pointing out to the district court—that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.'" Id. (quoting Catrett). Once the moving party meets its burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by [its] own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific factsshowing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Catrett, 106 S. Ct. at 2552 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). A plaintiff cannot rely upon conclusory allegations or contentions of counsel to defeat summary judgment but rather must produce some specific factual support of its claim. See Pueblo Neighborhood Health Centers, Inc. v. Losavio, 847 F.2d 642, 649 (10th Cir. 1988); Fritzcshe v. Albuquerque Mun. Sch. Dist., 194 F. Supp. 2d 1194, 1206 (D.N.M. 2002). "Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no 'genuine issue for trial.'" Matsushita Elec. Indus. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356 (1986) (citation omitted). Upon a motion for summary judgment, a court "must view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and allow the nonmovant the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn from the evidence." Kaus v. Standard Ins. Co., 985 F. Supp. 1277, 1281 (D. Kan. 1997). If there is no genuine issue of material fact in dispute, then a court must next determine whether the movant is entitled to judgment in its favor as a matter of law. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Wood, 81 F.3d 988, 990 (10th Cir. 1996).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides in relevant part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and the laws shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983. In any § 1983 action the initial inquiry must focus on whether the two essential elements to a § 1983 action are present: (1) whether the conduct complained of was committed by a person acting under color of state law; and (2) whether this conduct deprived a person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. Parratt v. Taylor, 101 S. Ct. 1908, 1913 (1981), overruled on other grounds by Danielsv. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986). "[B]efore a defendant may be held liable under [42 U.S.C. § 1983], that defendant must first possess power by virtue of state law, then misuse that power in a way that violates federal constitutional rights." Christian v. Belcher, 888 F.2d 410, 414 (6th Cir. 1989) (emphasis in original). The "under color of state law" requirement is a jurisdictional requisite for a § 1983 action. Polk County v. Dodson, 102 S. Ct. 445 (1981). A defendant in a § 1983 suit acts under color of state law when he abuses the position given him by the state while exercising responsibilities pursuant to state law. West v. Atkins,108 S. Ct. 2250, 2255 (1988) (citation omitted); Beedle v. Wilson, 422 F.3d 1059, 1074 (10th Cir. 2005).
The ultimate issue in determining whether a person is subject to suit under § 1983 is whether the alleged infringement of federal rights is fairly attributable to the State. Rendell-Baker, 457 U.S. 830, 838, 102 S.Ct. 2764 (quoting Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744 (1982))). The "fair attribution" question, in turn, has two components.
First, the deprivation must be caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State or by a rule of conduct imposed by the state or by a person for whom the State is responsible . . . . Second, the party charged with the deprivation must be a person who may fairly be said to be a state actor. This may be because he is a state official, because he has acted together with or has obtained significant aid from state officials, or because his conduct is otherwise chargeable to the State. Without a limit such as this, private parties could face constitutional litigation whenever they seek to rely on some state rule governing their interactions with the community surrounding them.
Lugar, 457 U.S. at 937, 102 S.Ct. 2744. These two questions, which at times may "collapse into each other when the claim of a constitutional deprivation is directed against a party whose official character is such as to lend the weight of the State to his decisions," are not the same. Id. When an actor is a law enforcement official, the second element is satisfied, and so whether his action is fairly attributable to the state depends on the answer to the first question - whether his actions are "caused by the exercise of some right or privilege created by the State," id., orwhether, in undertaking them, he "exercised power 'possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because the wrongdoer [was] clothed with the authority of state law,'" West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 49,...
To continue reading
Request your trial