T.J., In re

• Decision Date: 19 August 1997
• Citation: 699 A.2d 1311
• Parties: In re T.J. Appeal of CITY OF PHILADELPHIA. The County Office of Mental Health/Mental Retardation.
• Court: Pennsylvania Superior Court

Page 1311

699 A.2d 1311

In re T.J. Appeal of CITY OF PHILADELPHIA. The County Office of Mental Health/Mental Retardation.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 14, 1997.

Filed Aug. 19, 1997.

William S. Braveman, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Karl Baker, Assistant Public Defender, Philadelphia, for appellee.

Before CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus, and TAMILIA and SAYLOR, JJ.

CIRILLO, President Judge Emeritus:

This motion to quash is in response to an appeal from a February 5, 1997 order denying appellant's, the City of Philadelphia, County Office of Mental Health/ Mental Retardation (MH/MR), petition for review pursuant to 50 P.S. §§ 7102, 7109, 7301-7303. Appellant's petition sought review of the October 22, 1996 order, issued by the Mental Health Review Officer (MHRO), that denied appellant's petition to extend the commitment of the appellee, T.J., and, instead, discharged T.J. from involuntary treatment.

T.J. has filed this motion to quash based upon two grounds. First, T.J. argues that the issue on appeal is moot. ¹ Second, she contends that section 7109 of the Mental Health Procedures Act (MHPA), 50 P.S. § 7109, "creates no right of review by the government from a decision of a MHRO discharging a petition for involuntary treatment." We disagree with T.J. on the issue of mootness. We find, however, that appellant lacks standing to petition for review. We, therefore, grant the motion to quash.

On October 18, 1996, T.J. was involuntarily committed to Misercordia Hospital for a period not to exceed 120 hours, pursuant to section 7302 of the MHPA. See 50 P.S. § 7302. On October 22, 1996, Misercordia Hospital, with the support of T.J.'s husband and sister, filed a 303 petition ² requesting that the MHRO extend T.J.'s involuntary commitment for a period not to exceed 20 days. ³ T.J. moved to have the petition discharged, claiming that there was insufficient evidence to prove she should be involuntarily committed according to a clear and present danger standard. ⁴

At the hearing, counsel for Petitioner requested an opportunity to offer into evidence additional facts of T.J.'s conduct. These facts were not set forth in the original 303 petition, but would allegedly establish that T.J. was a clear and present danger to herself and/or others. The MHRO denied the request and rendered a decision to discharge T.J. based exclusively on the information presented in the 303 petition.

Appellant filed a petition for review in the court of common pleas alleging that the MHRO erred in excluding evidence and further erred in granting the motion for discharge. T.J. then filed a motion to quash the appeal in the court of common pleas and asserted that the issue was moot and that MH/MR Office did not have the right to petition for review of the decision. The common pleas court denied both appellee's motion to quash and appellant's petition for review. Appellant subsequently filed an appeal in the Superior Court. It is from this appeal that T.J. has filed a motion to quash, again asserting that the MH/MR Office's appeal is a moot issue and unauthorized by law.

Initially, we find that the appeal before this court is not moot. A case is "moot" when a determination is sought on a matter which, when rendered, cannot have any practical effect on the existing controversy. Sonder v. Sonder, 378 Pa.Super. 474, 520-22, 549 A.2d 155, 179 (1988)(citing Leonhart v. McCormick, 395 F.Supp. 1073, 1077 (W.D.Pa.1975)). Appeals presenting questions capable of repetition, however, are apt to elude appellate review and will be decided even if they are technically moot. Jersey Shore Area Sch. Dist. v. Jersey Shore Educ. Ass'n, 519 Pa. 398, 400, 548 A.2d 1202, 1204 (1988).

The doctrine of mootness is implicated in this case because T.J. has already been discharged from Misercordia Hospital. Nevertheless, this case is properly subject to appellate review because the procedure at issue, which is of great public concern due to implications of liberty interests, is likely to recur and equally likely to continually evade appellate review. See In re Chiumento, 455 Pa.Super. 376, 688 A.2d 217 (1997) (noting that although the commitment period authorized by a section 7303 hearing in question had expired, a live controversy still existed); In re J.S., 387 Pa.Super. 432, 564 A.2d 468 (1989)(explaining that courts normally review MHPA commitment procedures even if the patient is discharged because the procedures, which are of great public concern, are capable of repetition and may otherwise evade appellate review); In re Condry, 304 Pa.Super. 131, 450 A.2d 136 (1982)(appeals from involuntary commitment orders which have expired are not moot because involuntary commitment affects an important liberty interest, and because by their nature most involuntary commitment orders expire before appellate review is possible). See also Western Pa. Socialist Workers 1982 Campaign v. Connecticut General Life Ins. Co., 335 Pa.Super. 493, 485 A.2d 1 (1984)(a case that is technically moot may be decided on its merits if it involves a question that is capable of repetition but likely to evade review if normal rules on mootness were applied).

In the alternative, T.J. asserts that the MH/MR Office lacks standing to bring this appeal. In essence, the question of standing concerns whether a litigant is entitled to have the court decide the merits of a particular issue. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 2204-05, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). A litigant may obtain standing based upon explicit statutory language or by demonstrating a close relationship or personal stake in the claim made. See J. Barron, C. Dienes, W. McCormack & M. Redish, Constitutional Law, 1287 (3rd ed.1987).

T.J. contends that the MH/MR Office lacks standing because the MHPA is devoid of any language which would permit a government or agency a right to appeal a discharge petition. We find the legislature's omission of such a right significant and determinative of our decision to grant this motion to quash. We further justify our decision on the fact that the MH/MR Office has no close or personal relationship with the outcome of the litigation.

The MHPA establishes the rights of parties in mental health proceedings and sets forth the procedures employed therein. The legislature's purpose in enacting the MHPA was "to assure the availability of adequate treatment to persons who are mentally ill" and "to make voluntary and involuntary treatment available where the need is great and its absence could result in serious harm to the mentally ill person or to others." 50 P.S. § 7102; In re McMullins, 315 Pa.Super. 531, 537-38, 462 A.2d 718, 722 (1983). The purpose behind the language of the statute is to "provide treatment with the least restriction on liberty and freedom consistent with protection of patient and society." In re S.O., 342 Pa.Super. 215, 230, 492 A.2d 727, 735 (1985)(emphasis added). The MPHA, therefore, must be strictly construed in favor of the patient's liberty interest since involuntary commitment under the MHPA represents a substantial deprivation of a person's freedom. See In Interest of Roy, 423 Pa.Super. 183, 620 A.2d 1172 (1993); In re S.C., 280 Pa.Super. 539, 421 A.2d 853 (1980).

It is a well settled principle of statutory construction that "when the words [of a statute] are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of it is not to be disregarded under the pretext of pursuing its spirit." 46 P.S § 551; Pane v. Commonwealth, Dept. of Hwys, 422 Pa. 489, 222 A.2d 913 (1966). Furthermore, the mention of a specific matter in a general statute implies the exclusion of other matters not specifically mentioned. Id. (citing Cali v. City of Philadelphia, 406 Pa. 290, 305, 177 A.2d 824, 831-32 (1962)); see also Ken R. v. Arthur Z., 546 Pa. 49, 53-55, 682 A.2d 1267, 1270 (1996)(same).

Sections 7109(b) and 7303(g) of the MHPA expressly establish procedures by which a person subject to a petition for involuntary treatment can appeal a MHRO's ruling to the court of common pleas. Section 7109(b), which addresses the role of a MHRO, states in relevant part:

In all cases in which a hearing is conducted by a mental health review officer, a person made subject to treatment shall have the right to petition the court of common pleas for review of the certification.

50 P.S. 7109(b) (emphasis added). Furthermore, Section 7303(g), which addresses court petitions for involuntary treatment, indicates:

In all cases in which the hearing was conducted by a mental health review officer, a person made subject to treatment pursuant to this section shall have the right to petition the court of common pleas for review of certification.

50 P.S. § 7303(g) (emphasis added). Nowhere does the Act create a concomitant right in a government agency to petition for review of a MHRO's order. In the absence of express statutory authority, we cannot read such a right into the Act. ⁵ To do so would conflict with a strict interpretation of the statute's plain language, as well as contradict the rules of statutory construction precluding creation of such a right in light of the statute's silence on the matter. We are bound by the clear language of the Act, and, while the MH/MR Office considers this unilateral right to appeal unjust, we suggest that only the Pennsylvania General Assembly can amend this right.

Strict statutory interpretation alone does not end our standing analysis. Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 501, ⁶ and extensive common law, establish that a party may have standing to challenge an official order or action so long as the party is "aggrieved" thereby. Beers v. Commonwealth Unemployment Compensation Board of Review, 534 Pa. 605, 633 A.2d 1158 (1993); South Whitehall Twp. Police Service v. South Whitehall Township, 521 Pa. 82, 555 A.2d 793 (1989). As this court has previously explained, "the core concept [of standing] ... is that a person who is not adversely affected in any...