T.J. v. Bell
| Decision Date | 10 April 2015 |
| Docket Number | NO. 2013-CA-001664-ME,2013-CA-001664-ME |
| Parties | T.J., A CHILD UNDER 18 APPELLANT v. THE HONORABLE T. BRUCE BELL, FAYETTE DISTRICT JUDGE, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY AND THE COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY APPELLEES |
| Court | Kentucky Court of Appeals |
TO BE PUBLISHED
APPEAL FROM FAYETTE CIRCUIT COURT
Although we do not have the record from T.J.'s criminal case before us, according to filings contained in the record for the present case T.J. was charged with murder and first-degree robbery. It was alleged these offenses occurred on or about August 21, 2012, when T.J. was sixteen years old.2 T.J. moved for a competency evaluation and a competency hearing in district court. It appears the circuit court ordered Timothy M. Houchin, M.D. to complete a competency evaluation. Dr. Houchin's report concerning his competency evaluation of T.J. was dated August 19, 2013, and in it, he stated that in his opinion "within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, [T.J.] is presently incompetent to stand trial in the adult court system."
A hearing was held in juvenile court concerning the Commonwealth's objection to the motion for a competency hearing. At the conclusion of that hearing, the court agreed with the Commonwealth that the juvenile court could not hold a competency hearing until it was determined if T.J.'s case should be transferred to circuit court. The juvenile court stated that following that determination, T.J.'s competency could be addressed in the court that would try him.
T.J. then filed his petition for a writ of mandamus in the circuit court asking it to direct the juvenile court to hold a competency hearing before conducting a hearing to determine if T.J. should be tried as an adult. The Commonwealth opposed the petition for a writ of mandamus. The circuit courtdenied T.J.'s petition, reasoning that "[b]ecause the Commonwealth intends to proceed [treating T.J.] as [a] youthful offender pursuant to KRS 635.020(4), the [juvenile court] has no discretion whatsoever to retain the case should it determine that probable cause of the Juvenile's age and commission of a felony involving a firearm exists." The court continued, explaining that if the juvenile court finds "probable cause, it is mandatory that the case then be transferred to Circuit Court." The circuit court also found that T.J.
did not sufficiently demonstrate that there is no adequate remedy on appeal or that he will suffer irreparable harm should [the circuit court] not grant the writ. He will be afforded a competency hearing at the appropriate time by the court that has jurisdiction to try the case and make final determinations in the matter subsequent to the probable cause proceeding.
T.J. now appeals, contending that: (a) the juvenile court erred in denying him a competency hearing prior to holding a transfer hearing and transferring him to circuit court to be tried as an adult;5 and (b) the circuit court erred in denying his petition for a writ of mandamus.
"[T]he function of a writ of mandamus is to compel an official to perform duties of that official where an element of discretion does not occur." County of Harlan v. Appalachian Regional Healthcare, Inc., 85 S.W.3d 607, 612 (Ky. 2002).
A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy which compels the performance of a ministerial act or mandatory duty where there is a clear legal right or no adequate remedy at law. . . . A writ of mandamus is granted for only two purposes: (1) when the lower court is acting beyond its jurisdiction; and (2) when the lower court is acting or is about to act erroneously, and there exists no adequate remedy by appeal or otherwise and great injustice and irreparable injury will result if the petition is not granted.
Sowders v. Lewis, 241 S.W.3d 319, 321-22 (Ky. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
We are faced herein with an issue of first impression on the narrow issue presented by T.J. of whether he is entitled to a competency hearing in the district court before a transfer hearing pursuant to KRS 635.020(4) can be held.
To begin, we set forth KRS 635.020(4), which provides:
Any other provision of KRS Chapters 610 to 645 to the contrary notwithstanding, if a child charged with a felony in which a firearm, whether functional or not, was used in the commission of the offense had attained the age of fourteen (14) years at the time of the commission of the alleged offense, he shall be transferred to the Circuit Court for trial as an adult if, following a preliminary hearing, the District Court finds probable cause to believe that the child committed a felony, that a firearm was used in the commission of that felony, and that the child was fourteen (14) years of age or older at the time of the commission of the alleged felony. If convicted in the Circuit Court, he shall be subject to the same penalties as an adult offender, except that until he reaches the age of eighteen (18) years, he shall be confined in a facility or program for juveniles or for youthful offenders, unless the provisions of KRS 635.025 apply or unless he is released pursuant to expiration of sentence or parole, andat age eighteen (18) he shall be returned to the sentencing Circuit Court for proceedings consistent with KRS 640.030(2).
With that statute as the backdrop for our review, we begin by examining Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 86 S.Ct. 1045, 16 L.Ed.2d 84 (1966), on which T.J. relies for the following statement in his brief: "[in Kent the Court found] that juveniles were entitled to due process of law and fundamental fairness during the critically important hearing to determine if their case would be transferred to adult criminal court." However, the issue with relying on Kent to make T.J.'s case is that Kent involved interpretation of the District of Columbia Juvenile Act wherein waiver of juvenile jurisdiction must be based on a "full investigation." Id. at 547, 86 S.Ct. 1045. In other words, the trial court had discretion over whether to waive jurisdiction after a statutorily required in-depth review of the matter.
In Kent, the trial court did not comply with the requirement of a "full investigation." Rather, no hearing was held and no findings as required by the statute were made by the trial court supporting waiver of jurisdiction. Under these circumstances and under a statutory scheme mandating certain procedural due process be afforded to the juvenile prior to transfer into the realm of adult proceedings, the United States Supreme Court held that:
In T.J.'s case, as compared to the Kent case, transfer was sought under what is termed an "automatic transfer" mechanism, i.e., KRS 635.020(4). This is a significant difference. The Kentucky Supreme Court has spoken several times regarding the difference between a discretionary transfer proceeding and an automatic transfer proceeding. In Caldwell v. Commonwealth, 133 S.W.3d 445 (Ky. 2004), the Court specifically noted the difference between the nature of KRS 635.020(4) and the discretionary transfer proceeding reviewed in Kent. In no uncertain terms, the Kentucky Supreme Court in Caldwell plainly held that the limited process provided for in KRS 635.020(4) satisfies Kent. In Caldwell, the Court explained that:
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