T.L. Farrow Mercantile Co. v. Riggins

• Citation: 14 Ala.App. 529,71 So. 963
• Decision Date: 30 May 1916
• Docket Number: 8 Div. 306
• Parties: T.L. FARROW MERCANTILE CO. v. RIGGINS.
• Court: Alabama Court of Appeals

71 So. 963

14 Ala.App. 529

T.L. FARROW MERCANTILE CO. v. RIGGINS.

8 Div. 306

Court of Appeals of Alabama

May 30, 1916

Appeal from Circuit Court, Marshall County; W.W. Haralson, Judge.

Action by Oliver Riggins against the T.L. Farrow Mercantile Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Reversed and remanded.

John A. Lusk & Son, of Guntersville, for appellants.

Street & Isbell, of Guntersville, for appellee.

PELHAM P.J.

The appellee sued the appellants to recover damages for the breach of a contract. The complaint consists of one count which is as follows:

"The plaintiff claims of the defendants the sum of $250, for the breach and violation of a contract, the substance of which was and is as follows, to wit: Along about the first of the year 1913, one Ernest Howle rented lands to the plaintiff on the halves; that is, Howle was to furnish the land, stock, feed for the stock, and the tools, and plaintiff was to do the work of making and gathering the crops, and the crops were to be divided in halves, each party to pay one-half of the fertilizer. That under this agreement plaintiff started a two-horse crop plowed up some of the land, cleared up and prepared the land for cultivation, and planted some of the crops. In the spring when the crops had been thus started, the said landlord (Ernest Howle) died. And after the death of said Howle, the defendant came to plaintiff and told him that he held a mortgage on the land, stock, tools, etc., that Howle had agreed to furnish plaintiff to make the crops. And the said T.L. Farrow then and there agreed that he would take the place of said Ernest Howle and would let him keep the land, stock, and tools and would furnish feed for the stock as Howle had agreed to do. The proposition was accepted and agreed to by plaintiff. And plaintiff then and there entered upon the work of making the crops under the new contract, proceeding to prepare the land for planting, and planting the crops and working over the young crops. That after plaintiff had proceeded with his crops, under the new agreement with defendant for some days or weeks, defendant notified plaintiff that he could not and would not furnish the land, stock, and tools and feed for the stock as he had agreed to do, and took the stock away from plaintiff, and failed and refused to comply with his said contract, and notified plaintiff that he would no longer comply with, or try to comply with, his part of the contract, to the great damage of plaintiff, as aforesaid, of $250."

The complaint was amended by striking out "T.L. Farrow" wherever it appeared in the body of the complaint and inserting in lieu thereof the word "defendants."

It is elementary that in declaring upon a breach of contract, the parties must be held to observe reasonable certainty in the more substantial parts of the declaration which describe the cause of action. The subject-matter of the contract and the terms imposing the obligations relied upon must be stated with sufficient certainty, clearness, and precision to enable the defendant to prepare to defend against the action and plead a judgment thereon in bar of another recovery, and in such manner that from the breach assigned compensation therefor in damages can be computed with reasonable certainty. Moore v. Smith, 19 Ala. 774; Kennedy v. McDiarmid, 157 Ala. 496, 47 So. 792; American Tie & Timber Co. v. Naylor Lumber Co., 190 Ala. 319, 67 So. 246. An inspection of the complaint in the present case shows that it does not conform to these elementary rules, and it is too uncertain and indefinite to be supported, when attacked by demurrer. It does not attempt to describe the lands which, under the contract, were to be furnished by the defendants and cultivated by the plaintiff. A reasonable identification of the lands was material in the matter of enabling the defendants to prepare to defend the action, and, if necessary, to plead res adjudicata in another action. This point was not taken by demurrer, but the demurrer did point out that the complaint failed to show that there was any provision in the contract as to the quantity of land that was to be cultivated, and that it did not allege the kind of crops that were to be grown. The necessary fertilizer, one-half of the cost of which was to be paid by the defendants, for a crop of corn or oats might be materially different from that required for a crop of cotton or wheat or other kind of grain or vegetable, and would vary in amount as to the quantity of land to be cultivated. The number of stock required, which the defendants were to furnish, would vary with the quantity of land and probably with the kind of crop; and the feed for the stock and the number of plows, which the defendants were to furnish, would be increased or diminished according to the number of animals employed. It is therefore readily observed that these matters have to do, not only with the amount of damages, but are materially descriptive of the defendants' obligation or duty under the contract, and without them this obligation or duty is not described with such definiteness that the defendants would be enabled to prepare to defend the action and upon which a breach could be assigned that could be compensated for in damages capable of being computed with reasonable certainty. It is the insistence of counsel that the complaint alleges in substance that the defendants agreed to furnish the plaintiff lands, stock, and tools to make a two-horse crop, and that after the plaintiff had proceeded to the planting and working of the crop, the defendants breached the contract; that the complaint, therefore, alleges a contract and a breach thereof. Assuming this to be true, nevertheless the complaint is totally wanting as to a description of the kind of crop, as well as to the quantity of land. A complaint may allege a duty owing by the defendant to the plaintiff and a breach thereof, and, if not demurred to, may, if it states a substantial cause of action, support a judgment, but it may be so indefinite or uncertain as to fail to comply with the elementary rules first above referred to, and be fatal on attack by demurrer. City Delivery Co. v. Henry, 139 Ala. 161, 34 So. 389; Kennedy v. McDiarmid, 157 Ala. 496, 47 So. 792.

However, the allegations of the complaint do not bear out the insistence of counsel that there was a contract for a two-horse crop, except probably by inference. "Good pleading requires that the facts which constitute the cause of action relied on shall be stated in the complaint, and not left in inference. Facts, when averred, may be established inferentially from other facts shown in evidence, but this is a rule of evidence and not of pleading." Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland v. Walker et al., 158 Ala. 129, 48 So. 600; Daniels v. Carney, 148 Ala. 81, 42 South.

452, 7 L.R.A. (N.S.) 920, 121 Am.St.Rep. 34, 12 Am.Ann.Cas. 612.

The trial court, against objection, admitted evidence of the value of the crop at the time of the alleged breach of the contract. In this, it is our opinion that the court erred. The action is not for the destruction of or injury to a growing crop, but is for damages for the breach of a contract, by which breach on the part of the defendants the plaintiff was not permitted to complete the cultivation and gathering of the crop according to the contract, and was thereby deprived of the fruits of that contract. In actions ex contractu, only such damages as are the natural and proximate result of the breach of the contract, and which could reasonably have been contemplated by the parties as a probable result of the breach, are recoverable. Bell v. Reynolds & Lee, 78 Ala. 511, 56 Am.Rep. 52.

The primary purpose of awarding damages is actual compensation to the injured party. In the assessment of actual compensation to be paid to the plaintiff, in the present case, it is necessary to arrive at what would have been the value of the crop if the plaintiff had been permitted to complete and gather it, because he, under the contract, was to receive one-half of it. To show the probable future yield of any crop would be a most difficult matter, because it depends upon so many varying contingencies as to render it very indeterminate; but where, as in the present case, the year in which the crop was planted has passed, and the character of the season and the circumstances and conditions existing throughout the year are known, it is possible to arrive at what the lands would have produced with reasonable certainty. "A party who has broken his contract cannot escape liability because of the difficulty there may be in finding a perfect measure of damages. It is enough if the evidence furnishes data for an approximate estimate of the *** damage." W.T. Adams' Machine Co. v. South State Lumber Co., 2 Ala.App. 476, 56 So. 826; Bigbee Fertilizer Co. v. Scott, 3 Ala.App. 333, 56 So. 834. In arriving at the value of the crop that would have been made and gathered had the plaintiff been permitted to perform the contract, it would be proper to admit, and for the jury to consider, evidence showing what, if anything, was gathered from the crops, if any part thereof was completed and gathered by another person, and the manner of cultivation the kind of crops the land was capable of producing, the adaptability of the land to the kind of crops that were planted, the manner in which the lands were being cultivated by the plaintiff, the average yield of that land per acre under similar conditions and with similar cultivation, as well as the average yield of similar crops on similar lands in the immediate neighborhood under similar circumstances, and the market value of the crops when they, under the conditions and circumstances, would have been gathered ( Bigbee...