T.S.H. v. Green

• Decision Date: 11 May 2021
• Docket Number: No. 19-3280,19-3280
• Citation: 996 F.3d 915
• Parties: T.S.H.; M.J., Next friend of H.R.J., a minor, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. Clarence GREEN ; Anthony Williams, Defendants - Appellants.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

996 F.3d 915

T.S.H.; M.J., Next friend of H.R.J., a minor, Plaintiffs - Appellees,

v.Clarence GREEN ; Anthony Williams, Defendants - Appellants.

No. 19-3280

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

Submitted: November 19, 2020

Filed: May 11, 2021

Robert Edward Murphy, Jamie Ann Rodriguez, Murphy & Taylor, Saint Joseph, MO, for Plaintiffs-Appellees.

Hayley Elizabeth Hanson, Allen F. James, Michael T. Raupp, Husch & Blackwell, Kansas City, MO, for Defendants-Appellants.

Before COLLOTON, MELLOY, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.

COLLOTON, Circuit Judge.

Clarence Green and Anthony Williams, police officers at Northwest Missouri State University, investigated a report of misconduct by high school students attending a summer camp on the university campus. Green was the chief of police; Williams was an officer in the department. The students sued the officers for allegedly violating certain statutory and constitutional rights during the investigation. The officers moved to dismiss the claims against them, arguing that they were entitled to qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, but we come to a different conclusion and therefore reverse.

I.

In June 2016, two high school students who are identified by their initials, T.S.H. and H.R.J., attended a high school football camp at the University. They stayed in a dormitory and received instruction from university coaches, but were supervised by their high school coach. At the time same, the University also hosted a high school cheerleading camp, and participants resided in a neighboring dormitory. In reciting what transpired, we assume for analysis that the facts alleged in the complaint are true.

During the camps, a female cheerleading coach reported to residence assistants that she had seen people in a nearby window observing her, and possibly photographing her, while she undressed in a dormitory room. The residence assistants contacted Officers Green and Williams with the University Police. The officers investigated and inferred that the window in question belonged to one of two dormitory rooms that were assigned to seven football camp participants. According to the students, the officers created an "offense report" that included the students’ names.

The students allege that Officer Williams directed their high school coach to gather the seven players in a room and hold them there "for interrogation" about the incident. Acting at the officers’ direction, "and in submission to their perceived authority as law enforcement officers," the coach assembled the players and told them they were being investigated. The coach allegedly kept the players in the room "for a period of hours," questioned them, and asked to see photographs on their cell phones. The players revealed this information "[i]n submission to the perceived authority" of the officers. When no one confessed, the players were expelled from the camp.

T.S.H. and H.R.J. sued Green and Williams under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The students claim that the officers violated their rights against unreasonable seizures under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Specifically, the students assert that they were subjected to an unlawful seizure, because their coach "confined" them at the officers’ direction. The students also allege that the officers denied them certain statutory rights to due process and privacy that are accorded to juveniles in federal delinquency proceedings. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5033, 5038. Finally, the students claim that the officers conspired to violate their civil rights.

The officers moved to dismiss the complaint based on qualified immunity. The district court concluded, however, that the students adequately alleged violations of clearly established constitutional and statutory rights. Reasoning that qualified immunity could not be established "on the face of the complaint," Bradford v. Huckabee , 330 F.3d 1038, 1041 (8th Cir. 2003), the court denied the motion to dismiss. The officers appeal, and we have jurisdiction to consider their interlocutory appeal addressing purely legal issues. Mitchell v. Forsyth , 472 U.S. 511, 530, 105 S.Ct. 2806, 86 L.Ed.2d 411 (1985).

II.

State actors are entitled to qualified immunity from suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 "unless (1) they violated a federal statutory or constitutional right, and (2) the unlawfulness of their conduct was ‘clearly established at the time.’ " District of Columbia v. Wesby , ––– U.S. ––––, 138 S. Ct. 577, 589, 199 L.Ed.2d 453 (2018) (quoting Reichle v. Howards , 566 U.S. 658, 664, 132 S.Ct. 2088, 182 L.Ed.2d 985 (2012) ). A right is "clearly established" if "every reasonable official" would have known the conduct was unlawful at the time of the alleged violation. Id. at 589-90. A reviewing court must not define clearly established law at a "high level of generality," because that approach "avoids the crucial question whether the official acted reasonably in the particular circumstances that he or she faced." Id . at 590 (quoting Plumhoff v. Rickard , 572 U.S. 765, 779, 134 S.Ct. 2012, 188 L.Ed.2d 1056 (2014) ). "[S]pecificity of the rule is especially important in the Fourth Amendment context." Id . (internal quotation omitted).

We review de novo the denial of a motion to dismiss based on qualified immunity. Because the appeal arises from a ruling on a motion to dismiss, we accept as true all of the complaint's factual allegations and view them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Stodghill v. Wellston Sch. Dist. , 512 F.3d 472, 476 (8th Cir. 2008).

A.

The officers first argue they are entitled to qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim. The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from "unreasonable searches and seizures." U.S. Const. amend. IV. The appeal presents two issues through the lens of qualified immunity: whether the officers seized the students and, if so, whether the seizure was reasonable.

On the question of seizure, the students allege that the officers "instructed" their coach to confine the students to a room and question them about the incident. "Consistent with the instructions of Green and Williams, and in submission to their perceived authority," the coach then confined the students to a dorm room. The students claim that their coach "was acting at the behest of" and "following the instructions of" the officers throughout the confinement. And the students allege that they, too, acted "[i]n submission to the perceived authority" of the officers.

Because the officers allegedly knew that the coach carried out the seizure at their direction, and because the coach allegedly intended to assist the officers, we will assume for the sake of analysis that the coach was acting as an agent of the officers. See United States v. Ringland , 966 F.3d 731, 735 (8th Cir. 2020). Because the students claim that they submitted to the officers’ authority, we will also assume that they were seized within meaning of the Fourth Amendment.

Even so, the officers argue, any seizure was reasonable, or at least they reasonably believed that was the case. They contend that the students, on these alleged facts, had no clearly established right to be free from seizure by school officials acting at the behest of university police. As this court has observed, "in the public school context, children have a diminished expectation of privacy, and this expectation becomes even more diminished for school children engaged in extracurricular activities and athletics." Barrett v. Claycomb , 705 F.3d 315, 323 (8th Cir. 2013).

A school official need not have probable cause to search a student in a school; "[r]ather, the legality of a search of a student should depend simply on the reasonableness, under all the circumstances, of the search." New Jersey v. T.L.O. , 469 U.S. 325, 341, 105 S.Ct. 733, 83 L.Ed.2d 720 (1985). A student search is reasonable if it is "justified at its inception," and "reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified the interference in the first place." T.L.O. , 469 U.S. at 341, 105 S.Ct. 733 (quoting Terry v. Ohio , 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968) ).

The law is not settled on whether the same reasonableness inquiry applies to student seizures, see K.W.P. v. Kan. City Pub. Schs. , 931 F.3d 813, 822 (8th Cir. 2019), but there is no clearly established law to the contrary. At least one circuit has concluded that the reasonableness standard from T.L.O. applies to student seizures. Gray ex rel. Alexander v. Bostic , 458 F.3d 1295, 1304 (11th Cir. 2006). This court and the Ninth Circuit have reserved judgment on whether to apply T.L.O. or the objective reasonableness standard from Graham v. Connor , 490 U.S. 386, 109 S.Ct. 1865, 104 L.Ed.2d 443 (1989). K.W.P. , 931 F.3d at 826 ; C.B. v. City of Sonora , 769 F.3d 1005, 1029-30 (9th Cir. 2014) (en banc). Given the state of the law, a reasonable officer could have proceeded on the understanding that a student seizure is permissible if it is reasonable under the standard of T.L.O.

Although the alleged seizure in this case did not occur at the high school and was initiated by law enforcement, reasonable officers could have believed that probable cause was not required. We have applied the reasonableness standard to searches of high school students outside of "traditional school grounds," because the "nature of administrators’ ... responsibilities for the students entrusted to their care, not school boundary lines, renders the Fourth Amendment standard in the public-school context less onerous." Shade v. City of Farmington , 309 F.3d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 2002).

T.L.O. left open whether the reasonableness test should apply to actions "conducted by school officials in conjunction with or at the behest of law enforcement agencies," 469 U.S. at 341 n.7, 105 S.Ct. 733, but our decision in Shade applied the reasonableness standard where both school officials and law enforcement officers were involved. 309 F.3d at 1060. Although school officials initiated the...