A.T. Stearns Lumber Co. v. Howlett

• Citation: 157 N.E. 82,260 Mass. 45
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
• Decision Date: 23 May 1927
• Parties: A. T. STEARNS LUMBER CO. v. HOWLETT et al. IRVING & CASSON-A. H. DAVENPORT CO. et al. v. SAME.

260 Mass. 45

157 N.E. 82

A. T. STEARNS LUMBER CO.

v.HOWLETT et al.

IRVING & CASSON-A. H. DAVENPORT CO. et al.

v.SAME.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Suffolk.

May 23, 1927.

Report from Superior Court, Suffolk County; John D. McLaughlin, Judge.

Suits in equity by the A. T. Stearns Lumber Company, and by the Irving & Casson-A. H. Davenport Company and others, against Augustine J. Howlett and others for injunction against an alleged illegal combination and conspiracy of defendants. On report. Interlocutory decree, overruling exceptions to and confirming the master's report, reversed in part, and affirmed in part, and cases remanded for further proceedings.E. A. Whitman, of Boston, for plaintiffs.

L. A. Mayberry, of Boston (R. Gallagher and W. F. Levis, both of Boston, on the brief), for defendants.

BRALEY, J.

In these suits the plaintiffs, all manufacturers of trim or finish used in the construction of buildings, each having a usual place of business within this commonwealth, ask injunctive relief against an alleged illegal combination and conspiracy of the defendants, all named and unnamed members of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, hereinafter called the Brotherhood, to injure their business and to recover consequential damages. The cases were heard by a master and his reports were confirmed by the trial judge who, on February 16, 1926, reported them to this court for determination upon ‘* * * the bill, the substitute answer, the order of reference to * * * [the] master, the master's report, the objections and exceptions thereto, the decree overruling them and confirming the master's report, the plaintiffs' motion to recommit, * * * the order denying the motion to recommit and the appeal therefrom,’ the order of the court that these cases be heard together, ‘the demurrer of the defendants, * * * the decree overruling the same and the appeal therefrom, the bill of complaint having been dismissed as to certain * * * plaintiffs, on their request, and the case having proceeded to trial by stipulation against union defendants only and not against other defendants, demurrer of defendants * * * filed December 29, 1916, to amended bill, demurrer of defendants * * * filed January 2, 1917, orders overruling both demurrers and appeals therefrom by defendants, such decree to be entered, or order to be made, as justice may require.’

In the case of Irving & Casson-A. H. Davenport Company et al., hereinafter called the Casson Company, of the plaintiffs named in the bill only the following are conducting this suit: Davenport-Brown Company, Carder Woodworking Company, M. Frank Lucas, Burnham Bros., Benjamin Pearson, W. C. Miles Company and Thomas Uniacke.

In so far as the question raised by the plaintiffs are common to both cases, a single discussion of the governing principles of law will be sufficient.

A substantial summary of the pertinent facts found by the master is as follows: The A. T. Stearns Lumber Company, hereinafter called the Stearns Company, operated a so-called open shop. The W. C. Miles Company and Thomas Uniacke were, at the time the bill was filed, making no discrimination in their employment of union and nonunion men and, in consequence of this attitude no union men were employed by them on June 1, 1916. The remaining plaintiffs operated so-called union shops. Only three of these plaintiffs employed union foremen.

The master found that the aim of the United Brotherhood was to get men employed in the various mills to join the union and, in order to accomplish this, sought to compel the plaintiffs to sign an agreement, the result of which would be to unionize all shops and mills and, in consequence, none but members of the United Brotherhood would be employed either in the mills or on the work of construction and the union label would be used; that the ‘paramount, controlling and immediate object and purpose of the defendants was to benefit themselves and better their conditions by securing a larger field of employment, higher wages, and in consequence, a better living, and not to destroy or injure the business of the plaintiff or to create a monopoly’; that ‘votes were passed by the Carpenters' District Council of Boston and Vicinity in August, 1915, and January 6, 1916, making certain changes in their trade rules, as to working hours, wages and handling of trim not made under what they termed union conditions to take effect after June 1, 1916; that, for the purpose of giving notice thereof, the defendant Toomey sent out about March 11, 1916, some 2,000 circular letters in and around Boston and vicinity, stating the purpose of said vote to carpenters, contractors and builders, architects and others, inclosing a copy of the trade rules,’ as follows:

‘Inclosed you will please find a copy of the trade rules issued by the Carpenters' District Council of Boston and Vicinity. I desire to call your attention to the changes therein, particularly the working hours and wages, which will take place on June 1, 1916, for outside carpenters, also shop and millmen. Also to notify you that on and after the same date members will handle only trim that bears the label of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Any further information you may desire can be obtained from the secretary.’

After the circulation of this letter the plaintiffs suffered a loss of business.

The master further found that from about the first of January to April, 1916, oral agreements were made between the local unions in and about Boston and certain builders-among whom were McKenzie & Temple, W. F. Kearns Company, J. J. Prindiville Company, David R. Donaldson, J. F. Carroll Construction Company, Old Colony Realty Company, McGahey & O'Connor and Peter C. Baker-‘to operate union jobs, hire union carpenters, pay union wages, adopt union hours and furnish their carpenters with union material to work upon’; that in pursuance of the vote ‘to change working hours, increase wages, to employ union foremen and to refuse to set trim made in any shop or mill by men not members of the United Brotherhood,’ the carpenters who were members of the United Brotherhood declined to set trim so made, which included the shop of the Stearns Company; that none of the contractors attempted to secure nonunion carpenters on the jobs complained of, but preferred to accede to the requirements of the defendants that they employ union carpenters and thus avoid having the union carpenters quit work.

Section 59 of the constitution of the United Brotherhood provides, in part, that ‘it is necessary to all mill and shop members and the United Brotherhood that products made in factories, shops or mills where only members of the United Brotherhood are employed should be installed by fellow members.’ This section, among others, was known in substance to the plaintiffs and builders before they received notice of these rules on March 11, 1916; that ‘all manufacturers of woodwork who operated under an agreement with the said Brotherhood or any of its branches or subdivisions and agreed to employ its members exclusively are said to be unionized and are known by the defendants as union or fair manufacturers and their products are known as union or fair products'; that ‘all manufacturers who do not operate under such an agreement are known by the defendant as nonunion or unfair, and their products are known as nonunion or unfair material.’

As bearing upon the alleged conspiracy to create a monopoly, the master found that ‘if all the mills had signed the agreement referred to and thus become unionized, the union carpenters would have all the work of making building finish or trim in the existing mills where it is made, and so far as I can find as a fact, I do find that this would be a monopoly. If, however, this is a matter of law, I report the facts and leave it to the court to rule as a matter of law whether this fact and the other facts which I find would constitute a monopoly of the business of manufacturing and selling shop finish, either at common law or under the statutes of the United States or under the statutes of this commonwealth.’ That if the defendants had succeeded in causing all shops or mills to be unionized except those of the plaintiffs, ‘the business of the plaintiffs would have been impaired and that it would be of little value.’ That the building trade in and about Boston has varied in different years as to the extent of being unionized. That during the period affected by the war it was less unionized than at other times. That in general it is unionized and in a few instances only has it been possible to erect large buildings unless union men have been employed exclusively. That although by far the greater amount of construction work of all kinds is done by union men as union jobs, yet there is a large amount of construction work done by nonunion men as nonunion jobs, and that there is a substantial number of nonunion carpenters available ‘if a contractor desires to employ them, usually with attendant trouble.’ It appears from the report that there were in Boston and vicinity, at this time, approximately 5,263 union carpenters and 600 nonunion carpenters.

It is further found that:

‘Some architects and contractors refused to deal with the plaintiffs fearing that if they did so there would be trouble with the unions on the jobs where finish from the plaintiffs' mills was used. That all the plaintiffs suffered a substantial loss of business after June 1, 1916, but this loss was not shown to be due to the defendant, only in part, and in what part I am unable to find. All of these plaintiffs sell their product not only in Massachusetts but in other states of the Union.’

The master found that ‘The plaintiff Carder Woodwork Company has a mill in Boston. Its annual sales before June 1, 1916, were over $70,000 a year. The defendants Howlett, Feeley and Toomey called on the treasurer before June 1, 1916, and...