Tabech v. Gunter, CV87-L-377

Decision Date01 December 1994
Docket NumberNo. CV87-L-377,CV87-L-497 and CV87-L-607.,CV87-L-476,CV87-L-377
Citation869 F. Supp. 1446
PartiesMohamed Abdul Hafiz El TABECH, Plaintiff, v. Frank GUNTER, et al., Defendants. Victor LUNA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Harold CLARKE, et al., Defendants. Reginald PIERCE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Harold CLARKE, et al., Defendants. Jerry JENSEN, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Frank GUNTER, et al., Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Nebraska

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Gregory D. Barton, Harding & Ogborn, Robert W. Shively, Jr., DeMars, Gordon, Olson, Recknor & Shively, Barry L. Hemmerling, Jeffrey, Hahn & Hemmerling, Lincoln, NE, Scott D. Freese, Hutton & Freese, Norfolk, NE, for plaintiffs.

Don Stenberg, Atty. Gen., Terri M. Weeks, Asst. Atty. Gen., Lincoln, NE, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

KOPF, District Judge.

Two motions1 are pending before me: The defendants have moved the court (Filing 255) to revoke its prior order indicating that injunctive relief would be granted, arguing that recently enacted federal legislation precludes such relief; and the plaintiffs have moved the court (Filing 252) for an award of attorney fees and expenses, arguing that they are prevailing parties entitled to such an award under federal law.

I shall deny the defendants' motion. I shall grant the plaintiffs' motion in part and deny it in part, awarding the plaintiffs attorney fees and expenses. The plaintiffs request attorney fees of approximately $321,705.382 and expenses of $10,321.83, but I shall limit the attorney-fee award to $168,543.27, plus expenses of $10,321.83.

I. VIOLENT CRIME CONTROL AND LAW ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 1994

These consolidated cases are class-action civil-rights cases brought by inmates at the Nebraska State Penitentiary (NSP) challenging their conditions of confinement.

After an 18-day trial to the court, the court determined, among other things, that the evidence proved an Eighth Amendment violation regarding the random placement of newly arrived inmates in double cells at NSP's main housing units. Jensen v. Gunter, 807 F.Supp. 1463 (D.Neb.1992). Thereafter, the court considered the contours of appropriate injunctive relief and in August, 1994, notified the parties of the terms and conditions the court would incorporate in its injunctive order.

The court subsequently became aware of the so-called Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 hereinafter "Act", particularly section 20409 of the Act. Pub.L. No. 103-322, 108 Stat. 1796, 1827-28 (Sept. 13, 1994) (to be codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3626 (1994)) hereinafter "section 20409 of the Act". The court advised the parties of the provisions of the Act. Based on section 20409 of the Act, the defendants now move the court to set aside its decision to issue injunctive relief.

Section 20409 of the Act states:

(a) AMENDMENT OF TITLE 18, UNITED STATES CODE. — Subchapter C of chapter 229 of part 2 of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following new section:
§ 3626. Appropriate remedies with respect to prison crowding
(a) REQUIREMENT OF SHOWING WITH RESPECT TO THE PLAINTIFF IN PARTICULAR.
(1) HOLDING. — A Federal court shall not hold prison or jail crowding unconstitutional under the eighth amendment except to the extent that an individual plaintiff inmate proves that the crowding causes the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment of that inmate.
(2) RELIEF. — The relief in a case described in paragraph (1) shall extend no further than necessary to remove the conditions that are causing the cruel and unusual punishment of the plaintiff inmate.
(b) INMATE POPULATION CEILINGS.
(1) REQUIREMENT OF SHOWING WITH RESPECT TO PARTICULAR PRISONERS. — A Federal court shall not place a ceiling on the inmate population of any Federal, State, or local detention facility as an equitable remedial measure for conditions that violate the eighth amendment unless crowding is inflicting cruel and unusual punishment on particular identified prisoners.
(2) RULE OF CONSTRUCTION. Paragraph (1) shall not be construed to have any effect on Federal judicial power to issue equitable relief other than that described in paragraph (1), including the requirement of improved medical or health care and the imposition of civil contempt fines or damages, where such relief is appropriate.
(c) PERIODIC REOPENING. — Each Federal court order or consent decree seeking to remedy an eighth amendment violation shall be reopened at the behest of a defendant for recommended modification at a minimum of 2-year intervals.
18 U.S.C. § 3626 note:
(b) APPLICATION OF AMENDMENT. Section 3626 of title 18, United States Code, as added by paragraph (1), shall apply to all outstanding court orders on the date of enactment of this Act. Any State or municipality shall be entitled to seek modification of any outstanding eighth amendment decree pursuant to that section.

In essence, the defendants argue that under section 20409 of the Act injunctive relief is not appropriate in these cases because (1) the relief recommended by the magistrate judge and ordered by this court is premised on the fact that double-celling of inmates is required due to overcrowding at NSP, and the Act precludes such relief; and (2) the Act eliminates the use of class-action lawsuits to resolve claims that prison overcrowding violates the Eighth Amendment because individual plaintiffs must prove that overcrowding inflicts cruel and unusual punishment with respect to each plaintiff inmate, and class representatives cannot make (and have not made) such an individualized showing in class-action cases. I disagree with the defendants' arguments for three reasons.

A.

First, even if section 20409 applied to class actions generally, it would not apply to these cases because these cases are not "crowding" cases within the meaning of the Act. As this court observed in its prior liability determination, "this case is not an overcrowding case...." Jensen v. Gunter, 807 F.Supp. 1463, 1469 (D.Neb.1992). Indeed, when I determined to issue injunctive relief in these cases, I also found that "here, the violation was not overcrowding or double-celling per se, but rather random double-celling of new inmates without consideration of important data." (Filing 244, at 20.) Therefore, the provisions of section 20409 are inapplicable because these are not cases where the court has held "prison ... crowding unconstitutional under the eighth amendment...." Section 20409(a)(1) of the Act (emphasis added).

B.

Second, section 20409 of the Act has no application to these cases because these are class-action lawsuits, and section 20409 does not by its plain terms, or by reference to pertinent legislative history, indicate congressional intent to apply the Act to class-action suits.

Section (a)(1) of section 20409 of the Act states that "a Federal court shall not hold prison or jail crowding unconstitutional under the eighth amendment except to the extent that an individual plaintiff inmate proves that the crowding causes the infliction of cruel and unusual punishment of that inmate."

By its terms ("an individual plaintiff inmate"), section (a)(1) of the Act pertains to lawsuits involving individuals. Thus, section 20409(a)(1) would bar a federal court from imposing injunctive relief in a case brought by one or more individual inmates beyond the relief necessary to remedy the specific overcrowding grievance of the individual inmate(s) who brought suit.3 However, there is nothing in section 20409 that expressly seeks to alter or amend the long-standing provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizing the courts to issue relief to a "class" of individuals, so long as the class representatives prove the case for themselves and the unnamed members of the class. Indeed, the "rule of construction" found in section (b)(2) of the Act strongly implies that Congress had no intent to limit the power of a court to issue class-wide relief.

If there were any doubt about this fact, such doubt is resolved by reference to the report of the conference committee of the House and Senate. In that report, the conferees specifically stated that "the Conferees note that this section has no effect on the certification or success of class action lawsuits." Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conference, Amendment of the House to the Bill (H.R. 3355) to amend the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 140 Cong.Rec. H7474 (daily ed. Aug. 10, 1994).4 See also Joint Explanatory Statement of the Comm. of Conference, 140 Cong. Rec. H8868 (daily ed. Aug. 21, 1994) ("The Conferees note that this section 20409 has no effect on the certification or success of class action lawsuits.").

Thus, whether the plain words of the statute are reviewed without reference to the legislative history or whether the Act is viewed in light of the legislative history, the conclusion is the same: Section 20409 of the Act does not apply in these cases because these cases are certified as class-action lawsuits.

C.

Finally, even if the Act applied to these cases generally, there was sufficient specific evidence in the record as to each plaintiff (whether named or unnamed) to justify the remedial order which will be issued in these cases.

For example, at the liability stage of these cases, the court found as fact that (1) within three days of his transfer to a double cell in one of the four main housing units, named plaintiff Jensen "was awakened by Svitak Jensen's cellmate punching him in the face," Jensen, 807 F.Supp. at 1473; (2) five of inmate Hart's cellmates "checked into protective custody" because of their fear of being assaulted, id. at 1475; (3) "violent cellmate confrontations are routine," id.; (4) the "practice of double celling is, of course, the primary factor leading to violent attacks by a cellmate on a cellmate," id.; (5) the "amount of violence and threatened violence as well as the presence...

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  • Klinger v. Nebraska Dept. of Correctional Services, 4:CV88-L-399.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska
    • December 15, 1995
    ...($50) and law clerks ($35) are actually lower than that allowed for similar work in other civil rights cases, Tabech v. Gunter, 869 F.Supp. 1446, 1456 & 1461 (D.Neb.1994) (attorney rate of $85-$105 per hour in civil rights cases of the type involved in that case was reasonable; $55 allowed ......
  • Jensen v. Clarke
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit
    • September 5, 1996
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    ...in cases such as this, and I therein explored in depth the appropriate range of fees in the relevant economic market. El Tabech v. Gunter, 869 F.Supp. 1446 (D.Neb.1994) (awarding attorney fees under section 1988(b) in the sum of $168,543.27 at rates for lawyers ranging from $105.00 per hour......
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