Tabler v. Castle

• Decision Date: 07 October 1864
• Citation: 22 Md. 94
• Parties: WILLIAM TABLER v. JOHN A. CASTLE.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

22 Md. 94

WILLIAM TABLER v. JOHN A. CASTLE.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

October 7, 1864

APPEAL from the Equity side of the Circuit Court for Frederick County.

This was a proceeding by Bill in Equity by the appellee against the appellant. The case is thus stated by COCHRAN, J delivering the opinion of this Court.

The appellee filed the bill in this case on the 30th of January 1854, to obtain a decree to sell certain real estate devised to the appellant by Peter Tabler deceased, for the purpose of satisfying, from the proceeds thereof, an alleged debt of the appellant's testator, his personal assets being insufficient for that purpose. The appellee founds his claim to relief on a single bill for the sum of $843.13, executed by Peter Tabler to him on the 1st of March 1843. The record shows that a decree for the sale of the property in question was passed by the Court below on the 20th of August 1855, and that when the property was advertised for sale, as directed by the decree the appellant, who, up to that time, had failed to obey the summons to appear and answer, then filed a petition to open the decree on the alleged ground of mistake and surprise, and for leave to appear and answer the bill. During the pendency of this petition, a short copy of the docket entries of a case at law between the appellee and Peter Tabler, No. 37 Trials of February Term 1846, in Frederick County Court, was admitted as evidence by agreement. A short copy of a judgment obtained by the appellee against the appellant, as executor, in a case, No. 45, Trials of February Term 1854, in the Circuit Court for Frederick County, was also filed by the appellee, with his answer to the petition to open the decree; to the admission of which as evidence, the appellant excepted. Another petition was then filed by the appellant for the issuing of a commission to take testimony to support the allegations of the previous petition. These petitions were dismissed by the Court below, and an appeal taken to this Court, and on hearing the decree was reversed on terms, and the cause remanded for further proceedings. After the cause was sent back the appellant appeared and answered the bill of complaint, filing therewith a full copy of the record in the case above mentioned between the appellee and Peter Tabler. Testimony on both sides was taken under a commission, some portions of which were excepted to, and on final hearing, the Court below (NELSON, J.,) passed the decree from which this appeal was taken.

The cause was argued before BOWIE, C. J., and BARTOL, GOLDSBOROUGH and COCHRAN, J. J. M. Palmer, for the appellant.

I 1st. A party to be entitled to relief in a Court of Equity must make out a case free from suspicion of unfairness, free from any taint of fraud, free from any design to enforce an unjust claim. Has the appellee made such a case? Certainly not. Every fact and circumstance connected with the case carries with it conclusive evidence of unfairness.

2nd. The withdrawal of the single bill from the record and proceedings of the action at law, without disclosing the object of its withdrawal, and the use intended to be made of it, was not warranted by any law or practice in this State, and if such transactions can be sanctioned by this Court, it will lead to endless mischiefs and frauds.

3rd. The decree of the Circuit Court ought to be reversed, and the bill dismissed, because the evidence in the case is conclusive that the single bill in question has been fully settled and satisfied.

4th. The acquiescence of the appellee in the correctness of the docket entry " " settled," for more than six years, under the circumstances of the case, is evidence irresistibly conclusive of the correctness of the entry.

5th. If the appellee had any remedy by reason of any thing wrong, from any cause, in making said entry " settled," it was to have applied to the Court of law in the case, in proper time, and in a proper manner, under the Act of 1787, ch. 9, sec. 6, to have had the " entry" stricken out, and the case brought regularly to trial.

6th. It is a well settled principle of the common law; that a record and judgment of a Court of competent jurisdiction cannot be impeached or inquired into collaterally.

7th. But by virtue of the Act of 1817, ch. 119, sec. 9, all docket entries of all actions or suits, & c., ended during the term of Court, by " trial, judgment, decree, submission, agreement, non pros., satisfaction or otherwise however," as they shall appear upon the docket, by which the actions or suits were terminated, & c., shall be transcribed and constitute the records of the cases so terminated; therefore the record of the action at law in this case, is entitled to full faith and credit, and the entry " settled" is entitled to the same verity, as if it had been a judgment for the plaintiff, and cannot be impeached or inquired into collaterally.

8th. The identical question involved in this case in relation to the legal effect of docket entries, has been decided in this State by the Court of Appeals.

The record and docket entry of " settled," like all other records and judicial proceedings are entitled to full faith and credence, and purport absolute verity, and cannot be impeached or inquired into collaterally. If in fact the docket entry " settled," made under the eye and sanction of the Court, was made and entered by fraud, mistake or surprise, & c., the appellee in the Court of law had a full and complete remedy, under the Act of 1787, ch. 9, sec. 6, and indeed it was his only remedy, by making application to the Court of law at the term of the Court when the entry of " settled" was made, or at any subsequent term, within a reasonable time. There was ample opportunity to have had the entry " settled," & c., stricken out, and the case regularly tried, by complying with the terms of the Act. This was not done: Why? Because there was no mistake,--no surprise,--no suspicion,--no fraud in the docket entry so made. Munnikhuyson vs. Dorsett, 2 H. & G., 378. Hall vs. Sewell, 9 Gill, 155. But even under the provisions of this salutary Act, Judge DORSEY in delivering the opinion of the Court in 2 H. & G., 376, says: " Judgments at law are not lightly to be interfered with, and it must be a case infinitely stronger than the present to induce the Court to sanction the striking out of a judgment of almost eight years standing," & c. There is no evidence in this case to have sustained a motion to strike out the entry, as a part of the record, even if a motion had been made in due time in the case at law. The certified copy of the record of the action at law, exhibited in the appellant's answer in the Court below, as a defence to complainant's bill and claim, is entitled to " " full faith and credence," and cannot be impeached or inquired into collaterally. This is a proposition too well settled to require argument or authority to sustain it. Bowie vs. Jones, 1 Gill, 124. Magruder vs. Peter, 11 G. & J., 218. Miles vs. Knott, 12 G. & J., 442. Marshall vs. Greenfield, 8 G. & J., 349. Raborg vs. Hammond, 2 H. & G., 50. Ranoul vs. Griffie, 3 Md. Rep., 55. More vs. Garretson, 6 Md. Rep., 444. Powles vs. Dilley, 9 Gill, 241.

The entry on the docket of " settled," & c., is, by virtue of the provisions of the 9th sec. of the Act of 1817, ch. 119, entitled to the same verity as a judgment would have been in favor of the plaintiff. The entry " " settled," & c., was of course made under the eye and authority of the Court, and become as much a part of the record made by the clerk, as any other judgment by virtue of the 9th sec. of said Act,--it constituted the termination of the action by the authority of the Court, under said Act, and the clerk was bound to make and certify precisely such a record as he did make, which is a part of defendant's answer in this case. In legal contemplation, all docket entries are made under the eye of the Court and by its authority, and when not properly entered or extended, the error may be corrected. Weighorst vs. State, 7 Md. Rep., 450. In the case of Campbell, & c. vs. Booth, 8 Md. Rep., 117, it seems to have been conceded both by the counsel and the Court, as settled law in this State, that the docket entry satisfied in the ordinary mode was conclusive, & c. In this case the entry was made in term time, and the record made up according to the provisions of the 9th sec. of said Act of 1817. But this is not all--the precise question involved in this case was directly settled by this Court in the case of the State, use of Sprigg vs. Jones, 8 Md. Rep., 95.

The only remedy of the appellee was, if there had been any irregularity, surprise, mistake, & c., in making the entry of " settled" on the docket, to have applied to the Court in the case at law in proper time to correct or strike out the entry, but so long as it is permitted to remain a part of the record, the appellee is estopped from denying its legal effect. 1 Greenleaf's Ev., sec. 27. 4 vol. Com. Digest, Estoppel, (A 1,) pages 195 to 197. " The question is indisputably settled, in this State, that the record and judicial proceedings of a Court of competent jurisdiction, when coming incidentally in question between the same parties or privies, are conclusive upon the question decided and terminated by the Court, and cannot be impeached or inquired into on the ground of informality in the proceedings, or error or mistake of the Court in the matter upon which it has adjudicated." It would be a waste of...