Tabron v. Gold Leaf Farms, Inc., 295

• Decision Date: 03 February 1967
• Docket Number: No. 295,295
• Citation: 269 N.C. 393,152 S.E.2d 533
• Parties: Atlas TABRON, Employee, v. GOLD LEAF FARMS, INC., Employer, and Great American Insurance Company,Insurer.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

Page 533

152 S.E.2d 533

269 N.C. 393

Atlas TABRON, Employee, v. GOLD LEAF FARMS, INC., Employer, and Great American Insurance Company,Insurer.

No. 295.

Supreme Court of North Carolina.

Feb. 3, 1967.

Herman L. Taylor, Greensboro, and Mitchell & Murphy, Raleigh, for plaintiff appellant.

Battle, Winslow, Merrell, Scott & Wiley, Rocky Mount, for defendant appellees.

BOBBITT, Justice.

Plaintiff's brief states the question involved is whether the court committed 'prejudicial and reversible error by failing to find that the employer-employee relationship did not exist between appellant and appellee and that appellant's injury did not arise out of compensable employment.' The judgment of Judge Peel is not based on findings of fact and conclusions of law relating to these questions. It is based on his conclusion, after consideration of the full record, there was no evidence before the full Commission or before him to justify setting aside the 'Agreement for Compensation for Disability,' approved by the Commission on March 16, 1965, because of fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence, mutual mistake or excusable neglect.

The jurisdiction of the Commission may be invoked either by filing a claim for compensation or by submission of a voluntary settlement for approval before a claim is filed as provided by G.S. § 97--82. Biddix v. Rex Mills, 237 N.C. 660, 75 S.E.2d 777. 'In approving settlements the Commission acts in its judicial capacity.' Letterlough v. Atkins, 258 N.C. 166, 128 S.E.2d 215. As stated in Biddix, supra, 237 N.C. at 663, 75 S.E.2d at 780 by Barnhill, J. (later C.J.): 'In a judicial proceeding the determinative facts upon which the rights of the parties must be made to rest must be found from admissions made by the parties, facts agreed, stipulations entered into and noted at the hearing and evidence offered in open court, after all parties have been given full opportunity to be heard.' 'An agreement for the payment of compensation when approved by the Commission is as binding on the parties as an order, decision or award of the Commission unappealed from, or an order of the Commission affirmed on appeal. G.S. 97--87.' Tucker v. Lowdermilk, 233 N.C. 185, 188, 63 S.E.2d 109, 111; Smith v. Mecklenburg County Chapter American Red Cross, 245 N.C. 116, 120, 95 S.E.2d 559, 562; Neal v. Clary, 259 N.C. 163, 166, 130 S.E.2d 39, 41.

Unquestionably, the matters set forth on I.C. Form 21, 'Agreement for Compensation for Disability,' if true, conferred jurisdiction on the Commission.

G.S. § 97--17 provides: 'Nothing herein contained shall be construed so as to prevent settlements made by and between the employee and employer so long as the amount of compensation and the time and manner of payment are in accordance with the provisions of this article. A copy of such settlement agreement shall be filed by employer with and approved by the Industrial Commission: Provided, however, that no party to any agreement for compensation approved by the Industrial Commission shall thereafter be heard to deny the truth of the matters therein set forth, unless it shall be made to appear to the satisfaction of the Commission that there has been error due to fraud, misrepresentation, undue influence or mutual mistake, in which event the Industrial Commission may set aside such agreement.' (Our italics.) The proviso was added to G.S. § 97--17 (by Session Laws of 1963, Chapter 436) subsequent to our decision in Hart v. Motors, 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E.2d 673 (1956).

In Neal v. Clary, supra, a car operated by the defendant, in which the plaintiff was a passenger, was involved in a collision. The plaintiff alleged the collision and her injuries were proximately caused by the defendant's negligence. The defendant pleaded the Workmen's Compensation Act in bar of the plaintiff's action. It was admitted that both the plaintiff and the defendant were employees of a corporation having more than five regular employees; also, that I.C. Form 21, 'Agreement for Compensation for Disability,' signed by the plaintiff, her employer and its compensation carrier, had been approved by the Industrial Commission. A judgment dismissing the plaintiff's action for lack of jurisdiction was affirmed by this Court. With reference to the motion by the plaintiff for leave the amend her pleadings, Denny, J. (later C.J.), said: 'The motion to amend filed in this Court is denied without prejudice to move before the Industrial Commission, after notice to all interested parties, to set aside the agreement contained in Form No. 21 * * * as well as the award made pursuant thereto, On the grounds of mutual mistake, misrepresentation and fraudulent statements. (Citation) If such agreement is set aside by the Industrial Commission On the aforesaid grounds, the plaintiff may, if so advised, institute a new action and allege the facts with respect to jurisdiction as they may then exist.' (Our italics.)

Reference is made to Stanley v. Brown, 261 N.C. 243, 134 S.E.2d 321, for a full statement of the factual situation considered therein. The injured plaintiff, his employer and the employer's compensation carrier had executed an agreement on I.C. Form 21...