El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc.

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Citation: El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 740 (Tex. App. 2011)
• Decision Date: 08 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. 05–11–00489–CV.,05–11–00489–CV.
• Parties: EL TACASO, INC., Appellant, v. JIREH STAR, INC. and Aaron Kim, Appellees.

356 S.W.3d 740

EL TACASO, INC., Appellant,

v.JIREH STAR, INC. and Aaron Kim, Appellees.

No. 05–11–00489–CV.

Court of Appeals of Texas, Dallas.

Dec. 8, 2011.

Terry Jarvis, Law Offices of Terry Jarvis, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Appellant.

Tailim Song, Tailim Song Law Firm, Chad M. Ruback, The Ruback Law Firm, Dallas, TX, for Appellees.

Before Justices MORRIS, O'NEILL, and FILLMORE.

OPINION

Opinion By Justice FILLMORE.

This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal of the trial court's order granting a temporary injunction. In a single issue, appellant El Tacaso, Inc. (El Tacaso) contends the trial court abused its discretion in granting the temporary injunction because appellees Jireh Star, Inc. (Jireh Star) and Aaron Kim (Kim) did not prove an imminent threat of irreparable harm, the temporary injunction altered the status quo of the subject matter of the suit, the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, the temporary injunction fails to comply with Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 683 and is void on its face, and the temporary injunction is vague and overly broad. We conclude the temporary injunction is void because it does not comply with the mandatory requirements of rule of civil procedure 683. We reverse the trial court's order granting the temporary injunction, dissolve the temporary injunction, and remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings.

Background

El Tacaso owns real property located on Harry Hines Boulevard in Dallas, Texas, where it operated a restaurant under the name of “Gordita's.” In April 2007, Jireh Star entered into two agreements with El Tacaso regarding the continued operation of Gordita's: a Lease Agreement (the Lease) for lease to Jireh Star of the real property on which Gordita's is located and a License Agreement (the License) permitting Jireh Star to operate Gordita's for a period of twelve months. Kim, president of Jireh Star, executed a written addendum to the Lease personally guaranteeing performance of the Lease.

The License contained an option to extend its initial twelve-month term, so long as the Lease remained in force. In order to exercise the option to extend the License term, Jireh Star was required to pay El Tacaso “a one-time fee of $158,000.” In early 2008, Jireh Star decided to exercise its option to extend the License term and executed a Promissory Note agreeing to pay El Tacaso the one-time License fee of $158,000 over forty-eight months with interest. An additional term of the Promissory Note was a cross-default provision that a default by Jireh Star under the Promissory Note would be considered a default under both the Lease and the License.

El Tacaso filed suit against Jireh Star and Kim alleging appellees defaulted under the Promissory Note and, therefore, had breached the Lease. Jireh Star filed counterclaims of fraud, violations of the Deceptive Trade Practices–Consumer Protection Act (DTPA),¹ negligent misrepresentation, breach of contract, intentional interference with business relations, breach of quiet enjoyment, and false imprisonment against El Tacaso, Raul Rios, and Abel Hernandez.² Jireh Star also sought a temporary restraining order, a temporary injunction, and a permanent injunction. Jireh Star contended it would suffer imminent and irreparable loss and damage, for which it could not be compensated by monetary damages, unless the trial court enjoined El Tacaso from “continu[ing] to interfere with [Jireh Star's] business, desir[ing] to ruin Jireh Star's business, and continu[ing] ... prejudicial acts.”

The trial court granted a temporary injunction in favor of Jireh Star. El Tacaso filed this interlocutory appeal, contending the trial court abused its discretion by entering the temporary injunction order. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(4) (West 2008) (order granting or denying a temporary injunction is an appealable interlocutory order); see also In re Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, 85 S.W.3d 201, 205 (Tex.2002) (orig. proceeding).

Applicable Law and Standard of Review

The purpose of a temporary injunction is to preserve the status quo of the subject matter of a suit pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex.2002). A party asking for a temporary injunction seeks extraordinary equitable relief. Wilson N. Jones Mem'l Hosp. v. Huff, 188 S.W.3d 215, 218 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2003, pet. denied). The extraordinary equitable remedy of an injunction must be carefully regulated and confined to proper cases. See Associated Gen. Contractors of Tex., Inc. v. City of El Paso, 932 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1996, no pet.); Raine v. Searles, 302 S.W.2d 486, 487 (Tex.Civ.App.-El Paso 1957, no writ); see also Camp v. Shannon, 162 Tex. 515, 348 S.W.2d 517, 519 (1961). ³ The decision to grant or deny a temporary injunction lies in the sound discretion of the trial court, and the court's grant or denial is subject to reversal only for a clear abuse of that discretion. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Huff, 188 S.W.3d at 218.

To be entitled to a temporary injunction, an applicant must plead and prove three specific elements: (1) a cause of action against the defendant; (2) a probable right to the relief sought; and (3) a probable, imminent, and irreparable injury in the interim. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; see Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.Code Ann. § 65.011 (West 2008). “Probable injury” includes the elements of imminent harm, irreparable injury, and no adequate remedy at law. Univ. of Tex. Med. School v. Than, 834 S.W.2d 425, 428 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ). For purposes of a temporary injunction, an injury is irreparable if the injured party cannot be adequately compensated in damages or if the damages cannot be measured by any certain pecuniary standard. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204; Huff, 188 S.W.3d at 218; see also Tex. Indus. Gas v. Phoenix Metallurgical Corp., 828 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, no writ) (applicant for injunctive relief must establish damages are incapable of calculation or party sought to be enjoined is incapable of responding in damages). “The general rule at equity is that before injunctive relief can be obtained, it must appear that there does not exist an adequate remedy at law.” Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 210. “An adequate remedy at law is one that is as complete, practical, and efficient to the prompt administration of justice as is equitable relief.” Huff, 188 S.W.3d at 218 (citing Cardinal Health Staffing Network, Inc. v. Bowen, 106 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex.App.Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)).

In relevant part, rule of civil procedure 683 requires every order granting a temporary injunction to state the reasons for its issuance, be specific in terms, and describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained. Tex.R. Civ. P. 683; Lifeguard Benefit Servs., Inc. v. Direct Med. Network Solutions, Inc., 308 S.W.3d 102, 116 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2010, no pet.). “[T]he obvious purpose of [rule 683] is to adequately inform a party of what he is enjoined from doing and the reason why he is so enjoined.” Schulz v. Schulz, 478 S.W.2d 239, 244–45 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1972, no writ); see also Bd. of Equalization of the City of Plano v. Wells, 473 S.W.2d 88, 91 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1971, no writ).

A trial court's order stating its reasons for granting a temporary injunction must be specific and legally sufficient on its face and not merely conclusory. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 683 (order “shall be specific in terms”); see also State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 106 (Tex.1971); San Antonio Bar Ass'n v. Guardian Abstract & Title Co., 156 Tex. 7, 291 S.W.2d 697, 702 (1956) (quoting Villalobos v. Holguin, 146 Tex. 474, 208 S.W.2d 871, 875 (1948)) (law in Texas regarding the specificity of temporary injunctions is that they must be “as definite, clear and precise as possible”); Charter Med. Corp. v. Miller, 547 S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1977, no writ); Vaughn v. Drennon, 202 S.W.3d 308, 316 (Tex.App.-Tyler 2006, no pet.) (injunction must be definite, clear, and concise, leaving the person enjoined in no doubt about his duties, and should not be such as would call on person enjoined for interpretations, inferences, or conclusions); Arkoma Basin Exploration Co. v. FMF Assocs. 1990–A, Ltd., 249 S.W.3d 380, 389 n. 32 (Tex.2008) (“conclusory” is defined as “[e]xpressing a factual inference without stating the underlying facts on which the inference is based”) (citing Black's Law Dictionary 308 (8th ed. 2004)). To comply with rule 683, a trial court must set out in the temporary injunction order the reasons the court deems it proper to issue the injunction, including the reasons why the applicant will suffer injury if the injunctive relief is not ordered. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d at 106; see also City of Corpus Christi v. Friends of the Coliseum, 311 S.W.3d 706, 708 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2010, no pet.) (“When a temporary injunction is based in part on a showing that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the injunction is not issued, Rule 683 requires the order to state precisely why the applicant would suffer irreparable harm.”) (emphasis in original)); Byrd Ranch, Inc. v. Interwest Sav. Ass'n, 717 S.W.2d 452, 454 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 1986, no writ) (necessary for the trial court to give the reasons why injury will be suffered if the temporary relief is not ordered); cf. In re Office of Attorney Gen., 257 S.W.3d 695, 697 (Tex.2008) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (temporary restraining orders that did not meet requirements of rule of civil procedure 680 that such orders “define injury they were designed to prevent” and “explain why such injury would be irreparable” were void (citing InterFirst Bank San Felipe v. Paz Const. Co., 715 S.W.2d 640, 641 (Tex.1986)).

The requirements of rule of civil procedure 683 are mandatory and must be strictly followed. Qwest...