On September 30, 2011, petitioner was convicted in the Martin County Superior Court of voluntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle, following a jury trial at which he was tried with his brother and co-defendant Frederick Karl Taft, Jr. ("F. Taft"). State v. Taft, No. COA-12-646, 2013 WL 602999, at *2 (N.C. App. Feb. 19, 2013) (unpublished). Petitioner was sentenced to the following three terms of imprisonment, 51 to 71months, 31 to 47 months, and 51 to 71 months. Id. The sentencing court ran petitioner's last two terms of imprisonment concurrently and consecutive to the first term of imprisonment. Id.
Petitioner appealed, and, on February 19, 2013, the North Carolina Court of Appeals issued an order finding no error. 2013 WL 602999 at *5. On June 12, 2013, the North Carolina Supreme Court dismissed petitioner's notice of appeal and denied discretionary review. State v. Taft, 743 S.E.2d 200 (2013).
On June 8, 2014, petitioner filed the instant petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner alleged the following claims: (1) his conviction and sentence are constitutionally invalid pursuant to the United States Supreme Court's decision in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), because the state's own evidence established perfect self-defense; (2) he was denied his rights pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution when the trial court issued an inaccurate, incomplete, and misleading instruction on self-defense; and (3) he received ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial attorney failed to object to a self-defense instruction that was legally erroneous and lowered the state's burden of proof. On July 15, 2014, respondent filed a motion for summary judgment arguing that petitioner's claims are without merit. The motion was fully briefed.
The facts as stated by the North Carolina Court of Appeals are summarized as follows:
On 27 July 2009, warrants were issued for the arrest of defendants as a result of a 23 May 2009 shootout. Defendants were thereafter arrested. On 2 February 2010, defendants were each indicted on charges of murder, assault with a deadly weapon with intent to kill and inflicting serious injury, and discharging a weapon into an occupied vehicle while in operation. Defendant 11 was additionally indicted on charges of attempted murder and possession of a firearm by a felon. The charges against defendant 1 and defendant 2 were joined for trial and came on to be tried before a jury at the 26 September 2011 Criminal Session of Martin County Superior Court, the Honorable Wayland J. Sermons, Jr., presiding.
Testimony proffered by the State at trial tended to show that the 23 May 2009 shootout stemmed from a dispute earlier that day between defendant 2 and two males, Jarrell Lovette ("Lovette") and Gregory Collier ("Collier"). The dispute arose when defendant 2 took a firearm from Lovette and Collier, who were trying to sell the firearm outside of a convenience store in Hamilton, North Carolina, and refused to return the firearm. As a result of the altercation, on the night of 23 May 2009, Lovette, Collier and two of their acquaintances, Patrick Staton ("Staton") and Travonn Barnes ("Barnes"), traveled by vehicle from Hamilton to defendants' residence in Oak City, North Carolina.
Upon their arrival in Oak City, Staton drove the vehicle by defendants' residence at least one time before the shootout began. Staton then circled back around the block and slowed the vehicle to approximately fifteen miles per hour as they approached defendants' residence for another pass. Collier, Lovette, and Staton testified that they did not see anyone outside defendants' residence on their first pass. However, testimony indicated that defendants were waiting outside their residence with pistols in their hands when the vehicle approached for the subsequent pass.
It is unclear from the testimony proffered at trial who fired the first shots. Lovette and Staton testified that the first shots came from inside the vehicle. However, Collier offered contradictory testimony that the first shots came from outside the vehicle as the vehicle approached defendants' residence. Regardless of who fired the first shots, the evidence tended to show that Barnes, Collier, and Lovette fired shots from the vehicle and defendant 1 and defendant 2 each fired shots at the vehicle.
During the exchange of gunfire, Barnes and Collier were shot. Barnes, who was riding in the rear driver side seat, was struck in the head and killed. Collier, who occupied the rear passenger side seat, was struck in the neck and is now a quadriplegic.
Taft, 2013 WL 602999, at *1-2.
DISCUSSION
Summary judgment is appropriate when there exists no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247 (1986). The party seeking summary judgment bears the burden of initially coming forward and demonstrating an absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party then must affirmatively demonstrate that there exists a genuine issue of material fact requiring trial. Matsushita Elec. Industrial Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). There is no issue for trial unless there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a verdict for that party. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
The standard of review for habeas petitions brought by state inmates, where the claims have been adjudicated on the merits in the state court, is set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). That statute states that habeas relief cannot be granted in cases where a state court considered a claim on its merits unless the decision was contrary to or involved an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law as determined by the United States Supreme Court, or the state court decision was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) and (2). A state court decision is "contrary to" Supreme Court precedent if it either arrives at "a conclusion opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question of law" or "confronts facts that are materially indistinguishable from a relevant Supreme Court precedent and arrives at a result opposite" to that of the Supreme Court. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 406 (2000). A state courtdecision "involves an unreasonable application" of Supreme Court law "if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from [the Supreme] Court's cases but unreasonably applies it to the facts of the state prisoner's case." Id. at 407. A state court decision also may apply Supreme Court law unreasonably if it extends existing Supreme Court precedent to a new context where it does not apply, or unreasonably refuses to extend existing precedent to a new context where it should apply. Id. The applicable statute
does not require that a state court cite to federal law in order for a federal court to determine whether the state court's decision is an objectively reasonable one, nor does it require a federal habeas court to offer an independent opinion as to whether it believes, based upon its own reading of the controlling Supreme Court precedents, that the [petitioner's] constitutional rights were violated during the state court proceedings.
Bell v. Jarvis, 236 F.3d 149, 160 (4th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 830 (2001). Moreover, a determination of a factual issue made by a state court is presumed correct, unless rebutted by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1).
In his first claim, petitioner attacks the sufficiency of the evidence used to convict him of voluntary manslaughter, assault with a deadly weapon inflicting serious injury, and discharging a firearm into an occupied vehicle pursuant to the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the United States Supreme Court's ruling in Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979). In support of his claim, petitioner argues that the State's own evidence establishesperfect self-defense. The North Carolina Court of Appeals adjudicated this claim and found it to be without merit. Specifically, the court of appeals found:
Perfect self-defense is a complete defense "and requires a verdict of not guilty, not only as to the charge of murder in the first degree but as to all lesser included offenses as well." State v. Norris, 303 N.C. 526, 530, 279 S.E.2d 570, 573 (1981). In order for perfect self-defense to justify a killing, the following four elements must be present at the time of the killing:
(1) it appeared to defendant and he believed it to be necessary to kill the deceased in order to save himself from death or great bodily harm; and
(2) defendant's belief was reasonable in that the circumstances as they appeared to him at the time were sufficient to create such a belief in the mind of a person of ordinary firmness; and
(3) defendant was not the aggressor in bringing on the affray, i.e., he did not aggressively and willingly enter into the fight without legal excuse or provocation;
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