Taggart v. Keebler
| Decision Date | 22 December 1926 |
| Docket Number | 25,329 |
| Citation | 154 N.E. 485,198 Ind. 633 |
| Parties | Taggart v. Keebler |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
1 TRIAL.---Inconsistent answers to interrogatories do not control the general verdict.---Inconsistent answers to interrogatories submitted to a jury nullify one another and therefore, do not have any effect in controlling the general verdict. p. 636.
2 TRIAL.---Repeated admission of testimony that defendant said he was heavily insured was reversible error in trial of action for personal injuries.---In an action for personal injuries from being struck by defendant's automobile, the repeated admission of testimony, over objection, that defendant had said he was heavily insured was reversible error, although, in one instance, defendant's motion to strike out the evidence was sustained and the jury instructed to disregard such testimony. p. 638.
3. TRIAL.---Instruction that declarations of defendant that he was heavily insured should be considered only as admission of liability for injuries sued for held prejudicial error.---In an action for personal injuries from being struck by an automobile, where several witnesses had been permitted to testify that defendant had said he was heavily insured, an instruction that such admissions should be considered only as tending to prove his acknowledgment of his responsibility for the injuries, was prejudicial error. p. 638.
4. APPEAL.---Error in permitting eight witnesses to testify that defendant had admitted he was heavily insured could not be cured by an instruction.---Error in the admission of testimony, over objection, by eight witnesses that the defendant had declared he was heavily insured could not be cured by an instruction that the jury should disregard such testimony in an action against him for personal injuries received by a bicycle rider who was struck by the defendant's machine. p. 638.
5. EVIDENCE.---Exclusion of evidence that plaintiff in action for personal injuries, who claimed prior good health, had recently received increased pension of permanent disability was reversible error.---In an action for personal injuries where the plaintiff had testified that his health had been fairly good before the injury and that he had worked continuously at one factory for more than twenty years, it was error to exclude testimony that, before the injury, he had been granted an increase of pension as a Spanish War veteran under the act of 1920 which increase of pension was allowed for "physical disability of a permanent character" which incapacitated the pensioner "from the performance of manual labor" to such an extent as to render him unable to earn a support, as such testimony might have some bearing on his credibility as a witness. p. 640.
6. EVIDENCE.---Courts have judicial knowledge of acts of Congress, and it is not error to refuse proof of their provisions.---Courts have judicial knowledge of laws in force at place where they are sitting, including acts of Congress, and it is not error to refuse to admit evidence of the provisions of an act of Congress. p. 642.
7. TRIAL.---United States law pertinent to a case may be placed before the jury by requesting instruction stating such law.---Where the provisions of an act of Congress are pertinent to the issues on trial, such provisions may be placed before the jury by asking an instruction stating so much of the law as is applicable to the case made by the evidence, as it is the duty of the court, under 584 Burns 1926, when properly requested, to declare all the law applicable to the case. p. 642.
8. APPEAL.---Refusal of instruction based on facts which the jury found not to exist held not prejudicial.---Where the jury, by answers to interrogatories, found that the facts did not exist on which a requested instruction purported to declare the law, the refusal to give such instruction cannot be deemed prejudicial error. p. 642.
From Elkhart Superior Court; William B. Hile, Judge.
Action by George Keebler against Quimby N. Taggart. From a judgment for plaintiff, the defendant appeals. (Transferred from the Appellate Court under cl. 2, § 1357 Burns 1926).
Reversed.
Arthur L. Gilliom, Harman & Jay and Fenton, Steers, Herbst & Klee, for appellant.
Church & Chester, W. S. Carlisle and Parker, Crabill, Crumpacker & May, for appellee.
Appellee, who was the plaintiff below, recovered a judgment against appellant, the defendant below, for $ 5,000 damages on account of injuries sustained when an automobile driven by defendant collided with a bicycle on which plaintiff was riding. Overruling defendant's motion for judgment on the answers to interrogatories returned with the general verdict and overruling his motion for a new trial are assigned as errors.
The complaint alleged, in substance, that shortly after noon on December 2, 1920, plaintiff was riding his bicycle south on Michigan street in the city of South Bend, traveling on a line approximately four feet west of the west rail of the street car track, which was in the center of the street. That defendant was riding in and operating a large automobile in the same direction on that street, and when plaintiff reached a point about thirty feet north of where the south line of Elder street intersects the east line of Michigan street, defendant ran his automobile against plaintiff's bicycle on which he was riding, and thereby caused him to be thrown to the pavement, after which defendant drove the automobile upon and over plaintiff and pushed and dragged him twenty-five feet. That this was at a place where the city was closely built up and near a schoolhouse, and that defendant was negligently and recklessly driving at a speed exceeding twenty miles per hour. That, in approaching plaintiff from behind, defendant had a clear and unobstructed view of him, but negligently failed to give any warning or signal of any kind. That thereby plaintiff was injured in certain particulars named, and though he was previously a strong, healthy man earning $ 125 per month, he had not been able to earn anything since, and was permanently injured so that he probably never would be able to earn any money again. And that he was run upon, struck and injured because of the carelessness and negligence of the defendant, as stated, and not because of any fault or negligence on his part. The answer was a general denial, and a second paragraph setting up a city ordinance requiring that any vehicle turning toward the left into another street should pass to the right of and beyond the center of the street intersection before turning, and alleging that defendant negligently turned to the left in front of plaintiff's automobile to go upon an intersecting street when he was thirty feet north of the center of the intersection, and thereby negligently drove his bicycle immediately in front of plaintiff's automobile without any warning, and was struck and injured by reason of his own negligence in so doing, and not because of any negligence of the defendant. The reply was a general denial. Overruling defendant's motion for a new trial and his motion for judgment on the answers to interrogatories notwithstanding the verdict are assigned as errors.
The jury returned a general verdict in favor of plaintiff and answered twenty-eight interrogatories. One of the answers stated that the left wheel of defendant's automobile was traveling eighteen inches from the east rail of the west street car track when the accident occurred. Another that plaintiff was traveling four feet west of the west rail of the west street car track "before he made any turn to the left." But in answer to other interrogatories the jury found that plaintiff did not turn his bicycle to the left and in front of the approaching automobile of the defendant just before the collision, and did not turn to the right immediately after turning to the left and just before he was struck, and there was nothing in the answers to the interrogatories contradicting the allegations of the complaint, which the general verdict found to be true, to the effect that the collision took place only thirty feet north of the south line of the intersecting street and that defendant ran against plaintiff from behind at the rate of twenty miles an hour when he had an unobstructed view of him, and dragged him twenty-five feet after running over him; nor was there any finding to the effect that the plaintiff had turned or started to turn into the intersecting street at the time he was struck. The answers that were inconsistent with each other nullified each other, and could have no effect in controlling the general verdict. Cleveland, etc., R. Co. v. Wolf, Admr. (1920), 189 Ind. 585, 593, 128 N.E. 695; General, etc., Car Corp. v. Melville (1926), ante 529, 145 N.E. 890, 893. No error was committed in overruling the motion for judgment on the answers to interrogatories.
Repeatedly witnesses were permitted to testify that, at different times and places soon after the accident, in connection with admitting his liability, the defendant had said: "I am heavily insured." In each instance, the defendant objected and reserved an exception, and each of these rulings is specified as a cause for a new trial. Once the statement of which this constituted part was stricken out, and once the part of the answer stating what defendant had said about being insured was withdrawn, after a motion to strike it out on the ground that it did not tend to prove or disprove any of the issues and was calculated to prejudice the jury had been overruled, and, at the time it was withdrawn, the jury was instructed that it should not consider...
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