Taggart v. Wells Fargo Home Mortg., Inc., CIVIL ACTION No. 10-cv-00843
| Decision Date | 27 September 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION No. 10-cv-00843 |
| Parties | KENNETH J. TAGGART, Plaintiff, v. WELLS FARGO HOME MORTGAGE, INC., et. al. Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Pennsylvania |
This is the mortgage foreclosure case that pro se plaintiff, Kenneth Taggart, filed against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage, Inc. ("Wells Fargo"), American Partners Bank, and Eagle Nationwide Mortgage Company ("Eagle Nationwide"). Pending before this court is Plaintiff's Motion to Amend the Complaint (Doc. No. 103), to which Eagle Nationwide and Wells Fargo filed responses (Doc. Nos. 107 & 108). For the reasons set forth, I will deny Plaintiff's Motion to Amend.
In December, 2008 Kenneth Taggart applied to refinance his mortgage loan on property located at 709 Schwab Road, Hatfield, Pennsylvania.1 Eagle Nationwide Mortgage Company acted as a broker and American Partners Bank funded the loan. Complaint at ¶¶ 8-9. The mortgage loan closed on December 16, 2008. Wells Fargo now services the loan, which is owned by a securitized trust. Complaint at ¶ 11.
On March 1, 2010, Kenneth Taggart filed a cause of action alleging various federal and state law claims. The complaint alleges various violations of the Real Estate Settlement and Procedures Act, the Truth in Lending Act, the Pennsylvania Unfair Trade Practices & Consumer Protection Laws, the Fair Credit Reporting Act, and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act. In addition, the complaint raises breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty claims.2 Plaintiff now seeks leave to add Mortgage Electronic Systems ("MERS") as a defendant because Plaintiff claims that MERS was the original lender of the mortgage loan in question.
Wells Fargo filed a motion to dismiss Taggart's complaint on June 4, 2010. (Doc. No. 5). On September, 27, 2010, I granted Wells Fargo's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. No. 40). On December 10, 2010, Taggart filed an amended complaint. (Doc. No. 51). Again, Wells Fargo filed a second motion to dismiss on December 20, 2010 (Doc. No. 52), which was granted on April 19, 2011, and dismissed Wells Fargo from Taggart's amended complaint with prejudice.3 (Doc. No. 70). That same day Eagle Nationwide's Motion to Dismiss was denied as untimely. 4 (Doc. No. 79).
On January 16, 2012, without filing a motion for leave to file an amended complaint, Plaintiff filed another Amended Complaint. (Doc. No. 99). On January 19,2012, I entered an Order permitting Plaintiff to file a Motion for Leave to File an Amended Complaint on or before Thursday, January 26, 2012. On January 26, 2012, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion, which added claims against the previously-dismissed Wells Fargo and attempts to substitute Mortgage Electronic Registration systems ("MERS") with a John Doe alleged in the initial complaint. Eagle Nationwide responded on February 9, 2012 and Wells Fargo was permitted to file a response on February 12, 2012.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a), FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a). "While this Rule also states that leave to amend should be 'freely given,' a district court has discretion to deny a request to amend if it is apparent from the record that (1) the moving party has demonstrated undue delay, bad faith or dilatory motives, (2) the amendment would be futile, or (3) the amendment would prejudice the other party." Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 352 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 83 S. Ct. 227, 9 L. Ed. 2d 222 (1962)). Thus, an amendment must be permitted unless it would be inequitable or futile. See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 109 (3d Cir. 2002).
Shane v. Fauver, 213 F.3d 113, 115 (3d Cir. 2000) (citations omitted). Under this standard, a court must take all the well pleaded allegations as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief. See Vallies v. Sky Bank, 432 F.3d 493, 494 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Colburn v. Upper Darby Twp., 838 F.2d 663, 665-66 (3d Cir. 1988)).
Bad Faith, Undue Delay, and Prejudice
"Mere delay alone is not enough to deny leave to amend, but 'at some point, the delay will become undue, placing an unwarranted burden on the court, or will become prejudicial, placing an unfair burden on the opposing party.'" McKenna v. City of Phila., 511 F. Supp. 2d 518, 527 (E.D. Pa. 2007) (Arthur v. Maersk, Inc., 434 F.3d 196, 204 (3d Cir. 2006)). In deciding whether to grant leave to amend, "prejudice to the non-moving party is the touchstone for the denial of the amendment." Bechtel v. Robinson, 886 F.2d 644, 652 (3d Cir. 1989) (quoting Cornell & Co., Inc. v. Occupational Health and Safety Review Comm'n, 573 F.2d 820, 823 (3d Cir. 1978)).
Prejudice has been defined as "undue difficulty in prosecuting a lawsuit as a result of a change of tactics or theories on the part of the other party." Hesling v. Avon Grove Sch. Dist., 428 F. Supp. 2d 262, 278 (E D. Pa. 2006) (Deakyne v. Comm'rs of Lewes, 416 F.2d 290, 300 (3d Cir. 1696)). To establish prejudice, the non-moving party must make a showing that allowing the amended pleading would (1) require the non-moving party to expend significant additional resources to conduct discovery and prepare for trial, (2) significantly delay the resolution of the dispute, or (3) prevent a party frombringing a timely action in another jurisdiction. See Long v. Wilson, 393 F.3d 390, 400 (3d Cir. Pa. 2004).
I will deny Plaintiff's motion because his proposed amendments are untimely, substantially prejudice the Defendants, and are futile. Additionally, Plaintiff improperly seeks to add additional parties by adding Wells Fargo as a Defendant when they were twice dismissed. First, Plaintiff unduly delayed in filing his proposed amended complaint, which was filed nearly two years after his original complaint was filed on March 1, 2010. Plaintiff alleges that he was just provided the information concerning MERS and that Wells Fargo has committed additional violations since it was dismissed from the action with prejudice. However, these contentions are unpersuasive. The party seeking leave to amend has the burden of showing that justice requires the amendment and that the non-moving party is not prejudiced by the allowance of the amendment. Benson v. City of Phila., No. 89-8571, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12359, at *6 (E.D. Pa., July 24, 2000).
Further, upon review of Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint, it is clear that the amendments essentially recite the same facts and arguments presented in Plaintiff's original complaint. See Hill v. City of Scranton, 411 F.3d 118, 134 (3d Cir. 2005) ().
Although Plaintiff is pro se, he is not exempt from complying with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Nguyen v. ATM Corp. of Am., No. 08-531, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 106547, *2 (W.D. Pa. Nov. 21, 2008) (). Plaintiff filed a Motion to Amend consisting of less than a paragraph. It does not provide any explanation or case law to support his request and does not even cite to a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure on which his request is grounded.
Moreover, granting Plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint would significantly prejudice the Defendants because it would require Eagle Nationwide to have to amend their motions for summary judgment or file additional dispositive motions in this matter. Wells Fargo would have to expend considerable resources and file numerous motions after having been dismissed with prejudice over six months ago. Further, Defendants would be forced to expend additional cost and preparation in defending against Plaintiff's accusations. See Duffy v. Charles Schwab & Co., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14070, 2001 WL 1104689, at *1-3(D.N.J. Sept. 4, 2001) ().
Further, Plaintiff's proposed amendments would ultimately be futile.5 With regard to Wells Fargo, each count asserted against the Defendant is either duplicative of claims I have previously dismissed with prejudice or does not state a claim upon which relief can be granted.6 Plaintiff does not dispute that claims against Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc., were dismissed with prejudice. Instead, he argues that he never asserted claims, nor were any claims dismissed, against Wells Fargo Bank N.A. This argument is unpersuasive because Wells Fargo Bank N.A. is the successor in interest to Wells Fargo Home Mortgage Inc., and I have already found that the two merged in my Order dated November 22, 2010, denying Plaintiff's motion to add Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. to his original complaint. (Doc. No. 47). Plaintiff cites to no case law supporting his claims nor does he make any viable arguments.
Specifically, Count 30 and Count 37 allege that Wells Fargo violated the UTPCPL based on a...
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