Taglianetti v. Fontaine

• Decision Date: 28 May 1969
• Docket Number: No. 556-M,556-M
• Citation: 253 A.2d 609,105 R.I. 596
• Parties: Louis J. TAGLIANETTI v. Jean Marc FONTAINE, Sheriff of Providence County and/or Harold V. Langlois, Warden. P.
• Court: Rhode Island Supreme Court

Page 609

253 A.2d 609

105 R.I. 596

Louis J. TAGLIANETTI v. Jean Marc FONTAINE, Sheriff of Providence County and/or Harold V. Langlois, Warden.

No. 556-M.P.

Supreme Court of Rhode Island.

May 28, 1969.

John A. Varone, Providence, for petitioner.

Herbert F. DeSimone, Atty. Gen., Richard J. Israel, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondents.

OPINION

KELLEHER, Justice.

This is a petition for habeas corpus wherein the petitioner seeks to be admitted to bail pending his trial on the charge of murder. Application was made to this court after petition for the same relief had been heard and denied by a justice of the superior court.

Under Rhode Island law, a defendant convicted of murder in the first degree must be sentenced to life in prison. The portion of Article I, Sec. 9 of the Rhode Island Constitution which is relevant hereto reads as follows:

'All person imprisoned ought to be bailed by sufficient surety, unless for offences punishable by death ¹ or by imprisonment for life, when the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great.'

The issues presented in this cause are of first impression in this state. We must first determine who carries the burden of proof at a hearing for bail under our constitutional standard. Is it for the prosecution to show that the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great, or rather should the defendant come forward with evidence sufficiently exculpatory to secure his own release? Secondly, we decide what weight, if any, is to be given a grand jury indictment at the hearing on bail.

Before us, petitioner points to Article I, Sec. 9 and to the constitutional presumption of innocence ² and argues that together they require the state to show that an accused is not entitled to bail as a matter of right. In response the state contends that the burden is upon the accused to establish his right to bail and further argues that the grand jury's return of an indictment is ipso facto proof that guilt is evident or the presumption great.

At early common law, the grant of bail was not a matter of right but rested in the sound discretion of the court or magistrate to whom application had been made. Fischer v. Ball, 212 Md. 517, 129 A.2d 822; State v. Pett, 253 Minn. 429, 92 N.W.2d 205. However, most states now limit the discretion found in the common law by providing a specific constitutional or statutory guarantee that all accused persons shall be entitled to bail except in certain cases. Today, there are over 40 states that have a constitutional provision for bail which is substantially identical to Article, I, Sec. 9 of the Rhode Island Constitution. See Constitutions of the United States, Vols. 1 and 2, columbia University (ed. 1962).

We believe it is clear from the language of Sec. 9 that bail was to be withheld from an accused charged with a crime carrying a punishment of life imprisonment only when the proof of his guilt or the presumption thereof was great. While the language of the constitution is plain, there have been divergent views expressed by the various courts as to where the burden rests within the exception. Generally speaking, the states which have considered this question have expressed three different points of view.

First, it has been held in several jurisdictions that the grand jury's return of an indictment for a capital offense operates ipso facto to deny the accused his liberty on bail as a matter of right. The state need go no further than to bring the indictment on the record. McCarroll v. Faust, 278 F.Supp. 448; also People v. Tinder and Smith, 19 Cal. 539. ³

A second view holds that the return of an indictment by the grand jury raises a strong presumption that the proof of a defendant's guilt was evident and that the burden of proof to rebut the presumption raised by the indictment is upon the accused. State ex rel. Reams v. Stuart, 127 Ohio 314, 188 N.E. 393; Russell v. State, 71 Fla. 236, 71 So. 27; Quillen v. Betts, 48 Del. (9 Terry) 93, 98 A.2d 770; Fischer v. Ball, supra; Shaw v. State, 164 Tenn. 192, 47 S.W.2d 92.

Finally, other jurisdictions hold that the grand jury's return of an indictment profits the state nothing. Rather, these courts hold, in effect, that a constitutional provision like our own confers a right upon an accused, prior to conviction, ⁴ to have bail fixed in every case, including capital offenses, absent a showing by the state that the applicant for bail is not entitled to release because his guilt is evident or the presumption thereof great. The courts which follow this rule place an affirmative burden upon the state when it seeks to detain an individual before trial. State v. Konigsberg, 33 N.J. 367, 164 A.2d 740, 89 A.L.R.2d 345; Ford v. Dilley, 174 Iowa 243, 156 N.W. 513; Day v. Caudill, Ky., 300 S.W.2d 45; Application of Wheeler, 81 Nev. 495, 406 P.2d 713; Ex parte Perez, Tex.Cr.App., 428 S.W.2d 323.

It would unduly lengthen this opinion if we were to marshall and cite all the authorities supporting the respective schools of thought. They are set out in an annotation to State v. Konigsberg, supra, appearing in 89 A.L.R.2d 355; See Note: Determination of Accused's Right to Bail in Capital Cases, 7 Vill.L.Rev. 438.

In our opinion, the views expressed by the New Jersey court in the Konigsberg case are the most persuasive expressed upon the issue before us because they give meaning to the constitutional mandates that bail shall be available to an accused and a man is to be presumed innocent until proven guilty. The rationale of these two provisions, we believe, is that incarceration should follow conviction-not precede it. Accordingly, it is our considered judgment that all offenses, including the offenses which call for a punishment of life in prison, are bailable as a matter of right. The right of one who is accused of a crime which is punishable by a life sentence is limited however if 'proof of guilt is evident or the presumption great.'

We deem it just and proper to place the burden of proof upon the state at a hearing for bail. The presumption of innocence protects an accused from...