Tahja L. v. State (In re L.S.)
| Decision Date | 27 May 2021 |
| Docket Number | No. 79124,79124 |
| Parties | In the MATTER OF the Parental Rights as to L.L.S., a Minor. Tahja L., Appellant, v. State of Nevada Department of Family Services; and L.L.S., Respondents. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
The Grigsby Law Group and Abira Grigsby, Las Vegas, for Appellant.
Steven B. Wolfson, District Attorney, and Candice Saip, Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent State of Nevada Department of Family Services.
Lewis Roca Rothgerber Christie LLP and Abraham G. Smith and Daniel F. Polsenberg, Las Vegas; Legal Aid Center of Southern Nevada, Inc., and Dewey Fowler, Jr., Las Vegas, for Respondent L.L.S.
BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.
This case requires us to decide whether a hearing master may preside over a termination of parental rights (TPR) trial. The Nevada Legislature has provided that masters may preside over certain proceedings in the district court. In TPR proceedings pursuant to NRS Chapter 432B, the matter must be conducted by a "court." Under NRS 62A.180(2), a hearing master may constitute a court in this sense when the juvenile court delegates authority for the master to perform a role in accordance with the Nevada Constitution, Resolution of this appeal turns on whether having a hearing master preside over the trial in a TPR proceeding satisfies the due process requirements enshrined in the Nevada Constitution.
Balancing the fundamental importance of the rights at stake in a TPR trial and the profound consequences of an erroneous deprivation of those rights against the minimal value to the State of inserting an extra layer between the parties and the ultimate decision maker, we hold that due process requires the TPR trial to be heard before a district judge in the first instance. Central to this holding is our conclusion that when a trial takes place before a hearing master, a district judge's subsequent review of the trial record is not sufficient to safeguard the rights of the parent and child against the uniquely grave consequence of the permanent loss of parental rights. Because a master cannot preside over a TPR trial pursuant to NRS Chapter 432B without infringing on a parent's constitutional right to procedural due process, the master is not statutorily authorized to serve the role that the Legislature requires to be conducted by a "court." Rather, the district judge must perform that function. Accordingly, because the juvenile court erred in delegating that role to a hearing master in the proceedings below, we reverse and remand for a new TPR proceeding.
Appellant Tahja L. was still a teenager when she brought her then six-month-old daughter, L.L.S., into a Department of Family Services (DFS) facility. Tahja intended to temporarily place L.L.S. with DFS, pursuant to NRS 432B.360, while she completed her high school education. Tahja lacked the family and financial resources to care for L.L.S. and was concerned about her ability to provide adequate care for L.L.S. while attending school. A DFS representative explained child care options and the difficulties Tahja could face regaining custody should she surrender L.L.S. Tahja reiterated that she believed L.L.S. would be better off in DFS custody.
Shortly after Tahja surrendered her daughter, DFS filed a petition under NRS 432B.330 alleging that the child was in need of protection due to neglect. The matter was assigned to juvenile dependency Hearing Master David Gibson. Tahja pleaded no contest, and DFS placed L.L.S. in foster care outside the home. DFS designed a case plan to reunify Tahja and L.L.S. But DFS was dissatisfied with Tahja's progress under that case plan, and so it shifted the case plan from reunification to termination of parental rights and eventual adoption.
DFS sought to terminate Tahja's parental rights as to L.L.S. by filing a motion within the ongoing NRS Chapter 432B proceedings. Hearing Master Gibson was assigned to conduct the trial and to produce findings and recommendations regarding the TPR motion. L.L.S. objected that a district judge, not a hearing master, should conduct the trial. Tahja did not join this objection.
The juvenile court thoroughly considered L.L.S.’s objection and denied it by written order. The court held that it had the power to appoint any qualified person as a master and that it could order the master to conduct proceedings in the same manner as a district judge would, including taking evidence and making findings of fact and recommendations. It concluded that the TPR petition was brought under NRS Chapter 432B and that it had statutory authority to delegate the hearing to a master because the term "juvenile court" includes a master to whom the juvenile court delegates authority. Cf. NRS 62A.180(2). The court further considered Eighth Judicial District Court Rules contemplating the use of masters in juvenile dependency cases and the Eighth Judicial District Court's "one-family-one-judge" policy that required holding the TPR proceeding before the same hearing master previously assigned to the case. Lastly, the court concluded that NRCP 53, which governs the appointments of hearing masters in general, permitted the assignment, as the one-family-one-judge rule, limited judicial resources, and "best practices" constituted "exceptional conditions" justifying the appointment of a master.
Before the trial took place, however, Hearing Master Gibson was elevated to the bench, becoming District Judge Gibson. The clerk then reassigned the matter to Hearing Master Holly Roys. The master heard from several witnesses, considered the exhibits and orders filed in the NRS Chapter 432B proceedings, and recommended terminating Tahja's parental rights.
Tahja objected to Hearing Master Roys’ findings and recommendations but did not specifically request a trial de novo. The juvenile court, through Judge Bryce C. Duckworth, held a hearing on the objection and offered the parties an opportunity to present additional evidence, but the parties did not offer new evidence. After the hearing, the juvenile court entered an order rejecting Tahja's challenges and terminating her parental rights. The court noted that it—not the hearing master—held the sole constitutional power of decision.
By all indications, the court took its responsibility seriously. Although it took no new evidence, it conducted a thorough review of the record before it, including viewing the video of the entire trial proceedings. Judge Duckworth explicitly stated that he "observe[d] issues pertaining to the credibility and demeanor of each witness who testified." The court ultimately found, based on the record, that clear and convincing evidence supported the conclusion that termination of Tahja's parental rights was in L.L.S.’s best interests.
Tahja appealed. She now argues that the juvenile court lacked authority to appoint a master to preside over the trial in the TPR proceeding. L.L.S. agrees, consistent with her prior position.
Both statutes and court rules may have a role to play in the inquiry into whether a master may hear a case.1 But these statutes and court rules must be consistent with the constitution. The dispositive issue here is whether the proceedings before the hearing master, followed by the juvenile court's review, provided Tahja and L.L.S. with due process. We conclude that they did not. We do not fault the juvenile court's careful and thoughtful review of the record. But this sort of trial by video-recording is not congruent with the gravity of the rights at issue and is not justified by a sufficient state interest.
A juvenile court is statutorily authorized to appoint a master if and only if the appointment is constitutional
Tahja argues that the juvenile court lacked authority to appoint a hearing master to preside over the TPR trial. The Nevada Constitution allows the Legislature to Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6 (2)(a); cf. NRCP 53(a)(1) (). The Legislature has repeatedly exercised this authority by enacting laws permitting masters to act as referees in district courts. See Henry v. Nev. Comm'n on Judicial Discipline , 135 Nev. 34, 36, 435 P.3d 659, 661 (2019) ().
The Legislature, however, has provided that TPR proceedings under NRS Chapter 432B are to be conducted by the "court." See generally NRS 432B.5901 -.5908. "Court," in NRS Chapter 432B, has the same meaning as "juvenile court" in NRS Chapter 62A. See NRS 432B.050. And under NRS 62A.180, a "juvenile court" includes a master only if "[t]he juvenile court delegates authority to the master to perform [a specific] act in accordance with the Constitution of the State of Nevada." NRS 62A.180(2)(a) (emphasis added).2 Accordingly, a master may constitute a "court" in this context and preside over a TPR proceeding only if the exercise of that authority does not violate a parent's constitutional rights.
As discussed below, having a hearing master preside over Tahja's TPR trial violated her right to due process. Therefore, the master did not perform that function in accordance with the constitution, and the master did not constitute a "court" for purposes of NRS 62A.180 and NRS 432B.5901 -.5908, Consequently, a district judge, not a master, must preside over the trial of a TPR proceeding conducted pursuant to NRS 432B.5901 -.5908.
Due process does not permit the juvenile court to delegate TPR trials to a master
The Nevada Constitution states that "[n]o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." Nev. Const. art. 1, § 8 (2); see also U.S. Const. amend. XIV (1). In analyzing the analogous provision of the federal constitution, the United States Supreme Court has recognized the "fundamental liberty interest of natural parents in the care, custody, and management of their child" and explained that "[e]...
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