Tai Tam, LLC v. Missoula Cnty.

• Decision Date: 15 November 2022
• Docket Number: DA 21-0660
• Citation: 410 Mont. 465,520 P.3d 312
• Parties: TAI TAM, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. MISSOULA COUNTY, acting BY AND THROUGH its BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant and Appellee.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

410 Mont. 465

520 P.3d 312

TAI TAM, LLC, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.MISSOULA COUNTY, acting BY AND THROUGH its BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS, Defendant and Appellee.

DA 21-0660

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs: November 9, 2022

Decided: November 15, 2022

For Appellant: Alan F. McCormick, Garlington, Lohn & Robinson, PLLP, Missoula, Montana

For Appellee: Kirsten H. Pabst, Missoula County Attorney, John W. Hart, Dylan Jaicks, Civil Deputy County Attorneys, Missoula, Montana

Justice Ingrid Gustafson delivered the Opinion of the Court.

¶1 Plaintiff and Appellant Tai Tam, LLC (Tai Tam), appeals from the December 2, 2021 Order Granting Defendant's Motion to Dismiss issued by the Fourth Judicial District Court, Missoula County. The District Court's order granted the August 30, 2021 motion to dismiss filed by Defendant and Appellee Missoula County, acting by and through its Board of County Commissioners (Board), after determining Tai Tam's complaint was both time-barred and insufficiently pled.

¶2 We address the following restated issues on appeal:

1. Did the District Court err when it determined a claim pursuant to § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), is subject to a 30-day statute of limitations?

2. Did the District Court err when it determined the Appellant's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims lacked a sufficient protected property interest to survive an M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim?

¶3 We reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶4 Tai Tam is the owner of real property in Missoula County. The subject property at issue in this case consists of a 28.3-acre parcel, known as McCauley Meadows. In 2018, Tai Tam submitted a subdivision proposal for McCauley Meadows, which sought to subdivide the parcel into 17 lots and set aside a 2.5-acre parcel for permanent agricultural use. The Board denied Tai Tam's subdivision application, in part because it determined the proposal failed to adequately mitigate the loss of agricultural soils. Tai Tam later submitted a second application to subdivide McCauley Meadows, this time seeking to subdivide the parcel into 14 lots and set aside a 3.8-acre parcel for permanent agricultural use. On June 31, 2021, this proposal was denied after the Board determined the proposal failed to adequately mitigate the loss of agricultural soils and mitigate the impact to bird habitat.

¶5 Several years before Tai Tam's first application to the Board, a prior landowner had sought to subdivide the parcel into a 12-lot subdivision to be known as Reilly Acres. The Board did not approve the application and suggested the applicant redesign the subdivision to mitigate the loss of agricultural soils. The applicant redesigned the proposed subdivision, but did not resubmit the application to the Board. In late 2015, the Missoula Consolidated Planning Board sent a recommendation to the Board to approve standards for mitigating the loss of agricultural land in subdivisions. In January 2016, the Board declined to adopt the proposed standards. McCauley Meadows is also subject to several planning documents, including the Missoula County Subdivision Regulations, 2016 Missoula County Growth Policy, 2019 Missoula Area Land Use Element, and the Target Range Neighborhood Plan. The relevant planning documents contained a land use designation for McCauley Meadows as "residential," with a density of one dwelling unit per acre. This designation is the same as the adjacent residential developments around McCauley Meadows.

¶6 Tai Tam filed its Complaint in this matter on July 14, 2021. In its Complaint, Tai Tam made a claim for statutory damages against the Board pursuant to § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), as well as equal protection, takings, and due process claims alleging deprivation of rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Board moved to dismiss Tai Tam's Complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The Board's motion asserted Tai Tam's claims brought under § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), were subject to a 30-day statute of limitations and were not timely filed, while the § 1983 claims failed to state a sufficient protected property interest and were not well-pled. After the parties briefed the matter, the District Court granted the Board's motion to dismiss. The court determined Tai Tam's § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), claims were barred by a 30-day statute of limitations and its § 1983 claims failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, as the Complaint failed to show Tai Tam had a sufficient protected property interest and its claims were not well-pled.

¶7 Tai Tam appeals. Additional facts will be discussed as necessary below.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶8 We review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss pursuant to M. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) de novo. Dickson v. Marino , 2020 MT 196, ¶ 6, 400 Mont. 526, 469 P.3d 159. A district court should not dismiss a complaint for failure to state a claim unless it appears beyond doubt the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim that would entitle him to relief. Marshall v. Safeco Ins. Co. , 2018 MT 45, ¶ 6, 390 Mont. 358, 413 P.3d 828. A district court's determination that a complaint has failed to state a claim for which relief can be granted is a conclusion of law which we review for correctness. Cossitt v. Flathead Indus., Inc. , 2018 MT 82, ¶ 7, 391 Mont. 156, 415 P.3d 486.

DISCUSSION

¶9 1. Did the District Court err when it determined a claim pursuant to § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), is subject to a 30-day statute of limitations?

¶10 The District Court determined Tai Tam's action for statutory damages under § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), was barred by a 30-day statute of limitations. On appeal, Tai Tam asserts the District Court erred by importing the 30-day statute of limitations provided for in § 76-3-625(2), MCA (2019), to Tai Tam's claims brought under § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), which does not contain a specific statute of limitations. The Board contends the District Court correctly construed § 76-3-625, MCA (2019), as a whole when it determined claims brought under § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), were subject to a 30-day statute of limitations. We agree with Tai Tam.

¶11 "All civil actions must be commenced within the periods prescribed in [Title 27, Chapter 2, Part 2, MCA] except when another statute specifically provides a different limitation." Section 27-2-105, MCA. The Board argued, and the District Court determined, that § 76-3-625, MCA (2019), specifically provided for a different limitation—30 days. That statute stated, in full:

(1) A person who has filed with the governing body an application for a subdivision under this chapter may bring an action in district court to sue the governing body to recover actual damages caused by a final action, decision, or order of the governing body or a regulation adopted pursuant to this chapter. The governing body's decision, based on the record as a whole, must be sustained unless the decision being challenged is arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.

(2) A party identified in subsection (3) who is aggrieved by a decision of the governing body to approve, conditionally approve, or deny an application and preliminary plat for a proposed subdivision or a final subdivision plat may, within 30 days from the date of the written decision, appeal to the district court in the county in which the property involved is located. The petition must specify the grounds upon which the appeal is made. The governing body's decision, based on the record as a whole, must be sustained unless the decision being challenged is arbitrary, capricious, or unlawful.

(3) The following parties may appeal under the provisions of subsection (2):

(a) the subdivider;

(b) a landowner with a property boundary contiguous to the proposed subdivision or a private landowner with property within the county or municipality where the subdivision is proposed if that landowner can show a likelihood of material injury to the landowner's property or its value;

(c) the county commissioners of the county where the subdivision is proposed; and

(d)

(i) a first-class municipality, as described in 7-1-4111, if a subdivision is proposed within 3 miles of its limits;

(ii) a second-class municipality, as described in 7-1-4111, if a subdivision is proposed within 2 miles of its limits; and (iii) a third-class municipality or a town, as described in 7-1-4111, if a subdivision is proposed within 1 mile of its limits.

(4) For the purposes of this section, "aggrieved" means a person who can demonstrate a specific personal and legal interest, as distinguished from a general interest, who has been or is likely to be specially and injuriously affected by the decision.

Section 76-3-625, MCA (2019).¹

¶12 The 30-day limitation the District Court determined was applicable to Tai Tam's claims in this case is located in § 76-3-625(2), MCA (2019). The District Court's Order found "any claim under § 76-3-625(2), MCA, is barred." While correct, the court's finding was not necessary in this case because Tai Tam's Complaint specifically brought claims under § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), not § 76-3-625(2), MCA (2019). What remained for the District Court to determine, then, was whether the 30-day limitation of § 76-3-625(2), MCA (2019), claims was necessarily imported to claims brought under § 76-3-625(1), MCA (2019), when interpreting the statute as a whole.

¶13 "In the construction of a statute, the office of the judge is simply to ascertain and declare what is in terms or in substance contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted or to omit what has been inserted. Where there are several provisions or particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all." Section 1-2-101, MCA. We interpret a statute first by looking to its plain language and "will not interpret the statute further if the language is clear and unambiguous." Mont. Sports Shooting Ass'n, Inc. v. State , 2008 MT...