Talandar v. Manchester-Murphy
| Docket Number | 22-CV-03814 |
| Decision Date | 27 November 2023 |
| Citation | 2023 Vt Super 112701 |
| Parties | Draxxion Talandar Plaintiff v. Elizabeth Manchester-Murphy Defendant |
| Court | Superior Court of Vermont |
DECISION ON MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS DECISION ON SPECIAL MOTION TO STRIKE
Plaintiff Draxxion Talandar was charged in December 2019 with aggravated sexual assault, sexual assault, aggravated domestic assault, and domestic assault. He was held without bail for two years, then released on conditions for an additional period of time, then found not guilty at a jury trial held in September 2022. He now alleges that the criminal charges were based upon false statements made by the complainant, Elizabeth Manchester-Murphy, when she reported her allegations to police in October 2019. Plaintiff has sued Ms. Manchester-Murphy in this civil action for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages in a total amount of three million dollars.
Ms Manchester-Murphy has filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings, and a special motion to strike the complaint. She contends that she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because her statements to the police were protected by an absolute privilege, and therefore cannot form the basis for defamation liability. She also contends that this lawsuit should be characterized as a "strategic lawsuit against public participation," and that the complaint should be dismissed under the provisions of 12 V.S.A. § 1041.
In response, plaintiff contends that: (1) the absolute privilege does not apply to statements made by a complaining witness prior to the initiation of a criminal proceeding, (2) the "anti-SLAPP" provisions of § 1041 do not apply to this civil action because the complainant's report was false, and false reports are not an exercise of free speech made in connection with a public issue, and (3) the complaint should not be dismissed under § 1041 because the complainant's false report was "devoid of any reasonable factual support." He also argues that a ruling dismissing the lawsuit at this stage, either because of the absolute privilege or because of the application of § 1041, would unconstitutionally deprive him of a right to a remedy under Chapter I, Article 4 of the Vermont Constitution.
Before addressing the arguments of the parties, the court makes three preliminary observations. First and foremost is that plaintiff's lawsuit seeks compensatory and punitive damages from the person who made a criminal complaint against him for sexual assault and domestic assault. A lawsuit of this nature is "not favored in law," and is directly contrary to numerous public policies, including the substantial public interest in encouraging citizens to seek the protection of the criminal-justice system and report suspected crimes to relevant law-enforcement authorities. Couture v. Trainer, 2017 VT 73, ¶ 14, 205 Vt 319; Jacobsen v. Garzo, 149 Vt. 205, 208 (1988); Anello v. Vinci, 142 Vt. 583, 587 (1983); Ryan v. Orient Ins. Co., 96 Vt. 291, 297 (1923); 2 Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 429, at 1213. Defamation lawsuits based upon disclosures of domestic and sexual violence chill the constitutional rights of survivors to seek their own remedies and protections, and harm the criminal-justice system by influencing courtroom testimony through fear and intimidation, and by deterring survivors and witnesses from speaking candidly with law-enforcement officers in the first instance. A number of opinions have eloquently expressed the reasons why courts should be very cautious about the prospects for civil liability under these circumstances, e.g., Couture, 2017 VT 73, ¶ 14; Jacobsen, 149 Vt. at 208-10; Ryan, 96 Vt. at 297; Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 333-34 (1983); Ledvina v. Cerasini, 146 P.3d 70, 74-75 (Ariz. 2006); McGranahan v. Dahar, 408 A.2d 121, 128 (N.H. 1979); Egei v. Johnson, 192 F.Supp.3d 81, 90 (D.D.C. 2016).
Second, plaintiff's lawsuit seeks recovery from the complainant for harms suffered during the criminal proceeding while omitting any references to the independent roles and decisions of law enforcement, the prosecutor, and the judge. In particular, plaintiff makes no mention of: (1) the role of law enforcement in investigating the allegations made by the complainant, (2) the role of the elected prosecutor or their deputy in reviewing the evidence and making an independent prosecutorial decision as to whether to file charges, (3) the role of the prosecutor in making pretrial decisions, including the decision to seek to hold the defendant without bail pending trial, (4) the role of the court in reviewing and ruling upon the motion to hold the defendant without bail pending trial, along with any subsequent motions for bail review, and (5) the role of the appellate court in reviewing any of those determinations in the event of an appeal. In other words, plaintiff seeks compensation from the complainant for the consequences of decisions that were made by prosecutors and judges, who are each bound by their own professional and ethical standards, and who are themselves immune from liability. Plaintiff's theory of the case does not account for these independent decisions, and does not explain why financial compensation for these alleged harms should be paid by the complainant, who had no decisive role in filing the criminal charge, finding probable cause, filing the motion to hold the defendant without bail, or granting that request.[1] It is for these reasons that defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress are usually understood to be unavailable theories for pursuing a claim that a plaintiff has suffered harm as the result of the wrongful initiation of a criminal proceeding. Jacobsen, 149 Vt. at 209-10; 2 Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 436, at 1229.
Third, there does not appear to have been anything particularly unusual about this criminal prosecution for sexual assault and domestic assault. Although the relevant affidavits and motions from the criminal case have not been provided to this court, and although this court cannot access those materials because they were evidently expunged following the not-guilty verdict, e.g., 13 V.S.A. § 7603(e)(1)(A), the parties have described the case in a fair amount of detail. It appears that the complainant made a report to police detectives regarding historical incidents of sexual and domestic assault, that the detectives investigated the matter and submitted an affidavit to the state's attorney's office, that the prosecutor filed an information based upon the affidavit and sought to hold the defendant without bail, and that the judge granted the motion after conducting a weight-of-the-evidence hearing. At the eventual trial, the evidence consisted largely of the complainant's testimony, and the defense attorney cross-examined the complainant with a variety of materials. A judge found the evidence to be sufficient to submit the matter to the jury, and the jury thereafter concluded that the state had not proven the essential elements of its case beyond a reasonable doubt.
Plaintiff now seeks an opportunity to persuade a civil jury, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the complainant lied in making her initial disclosure to the police. She has not been charged with perjury or false information to police or any other crime based upon her disclosure or involvement in these proceedings, and there is no direct evidence that she lied. Plaintiff's claim is based upon the inference to be drawn from the cumulative effect of his impeachment evidence. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages against the complainant in the amount of three million dollars. Fundamentally at issue is whether this complaint should be dismissed.
The first question presented is whether the complaint should be dismissed because the complainant's statements to police detectives were protected by the common-law doctrine immunizing statements made by parties and witnesses in judicial proceedings. Couture, 2017 VT 73, ¶ 12; Mower v. Watson, 11 Vt. 536, 540 (1839); Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 330-31; Khan v. Yale University, 27 F.4th 805, 818 (2d Cir. 2022); Khan v. Yale University, 295 A.3d 855, 868 (Conn. 2023). The premise of the doctrine is that witnesses in judicial proceedings should not be subject to liability for their testimony, because even the risk of liability could discourage witnesses from testifying, or could cause them to shade their testimony in court, and therefore interfere with the truth-finding process. Couture, 2017 VT 73 ¶ 14; Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333; Khan, 27 F.4th at 818; Egei, 192 F.Supp.3d at 90; Ledvina, 146 P.3d at 74; McGranahan, 408 A.2d at 128.
Different states have adopted different levels of protection for witness testimony. Vermont has chosen a rule of "absolute privilege," which is the most-protective approach, and which immunizes testimony even if it is false. Couture, 2017 VT 73, ¶ 14. The reasons for choosing this level of protection are summarized above. "False reporting is a legitimate concern" with this approach, but the risks and consequences of false reporting are mitigated by the procedural safeguards available in judicial proceedings, id., accord Briscoe, 460 U.S. at 333-34; Gregoire v. Biddle, 177 F.2d 579, 581 (2d Cir. 1949) (Hand, J.); Egei, 192 F.Supp.3d at 90-91; Ledvina, 146 P.3d at 75-76.
In this case, the complainant's disclosure was subjected to a number of independent reviews and procedural safeguards. These included that: (1) the police detectives might have concluded that the statements were not sufficiently reliable to present to the prosecutor, (2) the prosecutor might have reviewed the...
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