Talavera Hair Prods. v. Taizhou Yunsung Elec. Appliance Co.
| Decision Date | 04 March 2021 |
| Docket Number | Case No.: 18-CV-823 JLS (JLB) |
| Parties | TALAVERA HAIR PRODUCTS, INC., a Nevada corporation, Plaintiff, v. TAIZHOU YUNSUNG ELECTRICAL APPLIANCE CO., LTD., a business entity; and THE INDIVIDUALS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON EXHIBIT "1," Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff Talavera Hair Products, Inc.'s ("Plaintiff") Motion for Partial Summary Judgment against the only remaining non-defaulting defendant, Defendant Taizhou Yunsung Electrical Appliance Co., Ltd. ("Defendant") ("Mot.," ECF No. 107). The Court took the matter under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 108. Having carefully considered Plaintiff's arguments, the evidence, and the relevant law, the Court GRANTS IN PART and DENIES IN PART the Motion, as set forth below.
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"Plaintiff sells a unique and revolutionary patented product under the federally registered trademark Split-Ender® that quickly and easily trims split ends from hair." See ECF No. 1 ("Compl.") ¶ 13. "Plaintiff owns copyrights, trademark rights, and patent rights regarding its Split-Ender® product." Id. ¶ 16. On April 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant litigation against Defendant and several other entities for copyright infringement pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.; unfair competition pursuant to the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); trademark infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114; and infringement of Plaintiff's U.S. Patents Nos. 6,588,108, 7,040,021, and 9,587,811 pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). See generally Compl. On April 19, 2019, Defendant filed an answer to the Complaint. See generally ECF No. 66. The remaining defendants defaulted. See generally Docket.
On May 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed an ex parte application for a temporary restraining order ("TRO"), see ECF No. 9, which the Court granted on May 10, 2018, see ECF No. 10. On March 16, 2020, Plaintiff moved for default and/or summary judgment against the defaulted defendants, see ECF No. 98, which motion subsequently was refiled and is currently pending, see ECF No. 111 ("Mot. for Default J."). On July 17, 2020, Plaintiff filed the present Motion. See generally ECF No. 107. Defendant did not file an opposition.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), a party may move for summary judgment as to a claim or defense or part of a claim or defense. Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that there is "no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists only if "the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. When the Court considers the
/ / /evidence presented by the parties, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Id. at 255.
The initial burden of establishing the absence of a genuine issue of material fact falls on the moving party. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323. The moving party may meet this burden by identifying the "portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,'" that show an absence of dispute regarding a material fact. Id. When a plaintiff seeks summary judgment as to an element for which it bears the burden of proof, "it must come forward with evidence which would entitle it to a directed verdict if the evidence went uncontroverted at trial." C.A.R. Transp. Brokerage Co. v. Darden Rests., Inc., 213 F.3d 474, 480 (9th Cir. 2000) (quoting Houghton v. South, 965 F.2d 1532, 1536 (9th Cir. 1992)). "This is true, even when the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is directed has not filed any opposition." Cristobal v. Siegel, 26 F.3d 1488, 1495 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing Sheet Metal Workers' Int'l Ass'n. v. Nat'l Labor Relations Bd., 716 F.2d 1249, 1254 (9th Cir. 1983). "[W]here no evidence is presented in opposition to the motion, summary judgment should not be granted if the evidence in support of the motion is insufficient." Hoover v. Switlik Parachute Co., 663 F.2d 964, 967 (9th Cir. 1981) (citations omitted).
Plaintiff incorporates by reference the evidence in support of its Motion for Default Judgment and "seeks partial summary judgment against [D]efendant" as to the following issues:
Mot. at 1; see also ECF No. 107-1 ("Mot. Mem.") at 2. The Court will address the fifth issue in ruling on the separately briefed and pending Motion for Default Judgment. Moreover, the Court will leave the matter of whether Defendant was the manufacturer or source of any of the infringing products sold on Amazon.com or eBay to be resolved at trial, as Plaintiff has not come forward with evidence on this issue.1
The Court will now address each remaining issue in turn.
"In order to establish copyright infringement, a plaintiff must show: (1) ownership of a valid copyright; and (2) that the defendant violated the copyright owner's exclusive rights under the Copyright Act." Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 508 F.3d 1146, 1159 (9th Cir. 2007).
A copyright registration is "prima facie evidence of the validity of the copyright and the facts stated in the certificate." 17 U.S.C. § 410(c); see also S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1085 (9th Cir. 1989). To establish copying, the plaintiff must show either: "(1) the two works in question are substantially similar and the defendant had access to the subject work; or (2) that the works are strikingly similar." Malibu Textiles, Inc. v. Label Lane Int'l, Inc., 922 F.3d 946, 952 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). "In assessing whether particular works are substantially similar, or strikingly similar, this Circuit applies a two-part analysis: the extrinsic test and the intrinsic test." Unicolors, Inc. v. Urban Outfitters, Inc., 853 F.3d 980, 985 (9th Cir. 2017). "The extrinsic test requires plaintiffs to show overlap of concrete elements based on objective criteria, while the intrinsic test is subjective and asks whether the ordinary, reasonable person would find the total concept and feel of the works to be substantially similar." Id. (). On a motion for summary judgment, both parts are satisfied, and summary judgment in favor of the plaintiff is proper, where the "works are so overwhelmingly identical that the possibility of independent creation is precluded." Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp. v. MCA, Inc., 715 F.2d 1327, 1330 (9th Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff seeks partial summary judgment that the product packaging at issue infringes Plaintiff's registered copyright for its packaging. See Mot. Mem. at 3-4. Plaintiff owns a registered copyright for its packaging for the Split-Ender product, VA 2e-092-823, registered on February 5, 2018. See Compl. Ex. 2 (ECF No. 1-4); Statement of Undisputed Facts ("SOF," ECF No. 107-14) at 1. In the absence of any opposition from any defendant, Plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to create a presumption of validity.
Because Plaintiff did not provide evidence of access, the Court solely will analyze whether the works are strikingly similar as a matter of law. See generally Mot. Mem. Here, the works are "so overwhelmingly identical that the possibility of independent creation is precluded." Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 715 F.2d at 1330. Plaintiff's copyrighted product packaging and the FASIZ, LESCOLTON, UMATE, and HAIR TRIMMER marked packaging are virtually identical and word-for-word, aside from the omission of Plaintiff's patent and copyright notices on the latter. See Mot. for Default J. Exs. A & B (ECF Nos. 111-4 & 111-5) (comparing Plaintiff's product packaging with the FASIZ, LESCOLTON, UMATE, and HAIR TRIMMER marked packaging); see also Mot. Mem. at 3-4; SOF at 1-2. Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied its burden in proving that the packaging at issue infringes Plaintiff's copyright as a matter of law.
Plaintiff also seeks partial summary judgment that the user manuals at issue infringe Plaintiff's registered copyright for its manual. See Mot. Mem. at 4-6. Plaintiff owns a registered copyright for its manual for the Split-Ender product, VA 2-093-290, registered on February 5, 2018. See Compl. Ex. 3 (ECF No. 1-5). Again, in the absence of any
/ / /opposition from any defendant, Plaintiff's evidence is sufficient to create a presumption of validity.
Similar to the infringing product packaging, the text in Plaintiff's copyrighted manual is nearly identical to that found in the FASIZ, LESCOLTON, UMATE, and HAIR TRIMMER marked manuals, aside from the omission of Plaintiff's trademark, copyright, and patent notices in the latter. Compare Compl. Ex. 3 (ECF No. 1-5) with Compl. Exs. 10-13 (ECF Nos. 1-12-15); see also Mot. Mem. at 4-5; SOF at 2-4. Because Plaintiff's manual and the FASIZ, LESCOLTON, UMATE, and HAIR TRIMMER marked manuals are so "overwhelmingly identical," the Court finds that the manuals...
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