Talavera Hair Prods. v. Taizhou Yunsung Elec. Appliance Co.
| Decision Date | 06 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 18-CV-823 JLS (JLB) |
| Parties | TALAVERA HAIR PRODUCTS, INC., a Nevada corporation, Plaintiff, v. TAIZHOU YUNSUNG ELECTRICAL APPLIANCE CO., LTD., a business entity; and THE INDIVIDUALS, PARTNERSHIPS, AND UNINCORPORATED ASSOCIATIONS IDENTIFIED ON EXHIBIT “1, ” Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of California |
ORDER (1) GRANTING IN PART AND DENYING IN PART PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT AND/OR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AGAINST DEFAULTED DEFENDANTS AND (2) GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE
Presently before the Court are Plaintiff Talavera Hair Products Inc.'s Motion for Default Judgment and/or Summary Judgment Against Defaulted Defendants[1] (“Mot., ” ECF No. 111), Supplemental Brief re: Personal Jurisdiction over Defaulted Defendants (“Supp. Br., ” ECF No. 112) and Request for Judicial Notice of Default Judgments and Permanent Injunctions Involving “Seller ID” Defendants Using Amazon and eBay (“RJN, ” ECF No. 113). No. Defaulting Defendant has filed a response to Plaintiff's Motion. The Court took the matter under submission without oral argument pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7.1(d)(1). See ECF No. 115. Having carefully considered Plaintiff's Complaint (“Compl., ” ECF No. 1), Plaintiff's arguments and evidence, and the law, the Court GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART Plaintiff's Motion, as set forth below, and GRANTS Plaintiff's supporting Request for Judicial Notice.
“Plaintiff sells a unique and revolutionary patented product under the federally registered trademark Split-Ender® that quickly and easily trims split ends from hair.” Compl. ¶ 13. “Plaintiff owns copyrights, trademark rights, and patent rights regarding its Split-Ender® product.” Id. ¶ 16. On April 30, 2018, Plaintiff filed the instant litigation against dozens of entities and individuals for copyright infringement pursuant to 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.; unfair competition pursuant the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a); trademark infringement pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1114; and infringement of Plaintiff's U.S. Patents Nos. 6, 588, 108, 7, 040, 021, and 9, 587, 811 (collectively, the “U.S. Patents”) pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 271(a). See generally Compl. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants “had full knowledge of Plaintiff's copyrights, trademark rights and/or patent rights, ” id. ¶ 20, but nonetheless “Defendants are promoting, advertising, distributing, selling, and/or offering for sale cheap copies of Plaintiff's Split-Ender® hair trimmers in interstate commerce that infringe Plaintiff's copyrights, trademark rights, and patent rights” on Amazon and/or eBay. Id. ¶ 21; see also Id. Ex. 1.
On May 3, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion for a temporary restraining order (“TRO”). See ECF No. 9. On May 10, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion. See ECF No. 10. The Court enjoined “[e]ach Defendant, its officers, directors, employees, agents, subsidiaries, distributors, and all persons in active concert or participation with any Defendant having notice of this Order” “from making, manufacturing, or causing to be manufactured, importing, using, advertising or promoting, distributing, selling or offering to sell split end hair trimmer products . . . that infringe” the U.S. Patents, id. at 9-10; “from infringing any of the exclusive rights in 17 U.S.C. § 106 with respect to Plaintiff's copyrighted packaging or from using Plaintiff's distinctive trade dress packaging on Defendants' packaging, ” id. at 10; from infringing Plaintiff's copyrighted manual, id.; and “from infringing, counterfeiting, or diluting Plaintiff's registered Split-Ender® trademark, ” id. The TRO was extended and remains in place. See ECF No. 57 at 2.
On May 23, 2018, Plaintiff filed a motion requesting authorization for alternative service. See ECF No. 18. On May 24, 2018, the Court granted Plaintiff's motion, authorizing service by e-mail and website publication. See generally ECF No. 19. On May 31, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Proof of Service of Summons and Complaint on Defendants 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 21, 22, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 75, 76, 77, and 78. See ECF No. 25. On September 27, 2018, Plaintiff filed a Proof of Service of Summons and Complaint on Defendants 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 60, and 61. See ECF No. 60. Subsequently, Plaintiff filed a Request for Clerk's Entry of Default as to the Defaulted Defendants, see ECF No. 63, which the Clerk entered on February 21, 2019, see ECF No. 65.
On March 16, 2020, Plaintiff initially filed the present Motion. See ECF No. 98. The Court took the matter under submission, see ECF No. 101, and on November 5, 2020, the Court denied the Motion without prejudice and requested supplemental briefing on the Court's personal jurisdiction over the Defaulted Defendants. See ECF No. 110. Plaintiff subsequently refiled the Motion, see ECF No. 111, along with the requested Supplemental Brief, see ECF No. 112, and its supporting Request for Judicial Notice, see ECF No. 113.
On March 4, 2021, the Court granted in part and denied in part Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment as to Defendant Taizhou Yungsung Electrical Appliance Co., Ltd. (“Taizhou”). See ECF No. 118 (the “MSJ Order”).
As an initial matter, in support of its Motion for Default, Plaintiff requests judicial notice of nine court orders granting default judgment and awarding permanent injunctive relief. See generally RJN. “Judicial notice under Rule 201 permits a court to notice an adjudicative fact if it is ‘not subject to reasonable dispute.'” Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)). “A fact is ‘not subject to reasonable dispute' if it is ‘generally known,' or ‘can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned.'” Id. (quoting Fed.R.Evid. 201(b)(1)-(2)). “Accordingly, ‘[a] court may take judicial notice of matters of public record.'” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th Cir. 2001)). “But a court cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts contained in such public records.” Id. (quoting Lee, 250 F.3d at 689).
Because “filings and orders in other court proceedings[] are judicially noticeable for certain purposes, such as to demonstrate the existence of other court proceedings, ” Missud v. Nevada, 861 F.Supp.2d 1044, 1054 (N.D. Cal. 2012) (citing Fed.R.Evid. 201), aff'd, 520 Fed.Appx. 534 (9th Cir. 2013), the Court finds it appropriate to judicially notice the existence of orders from other courts that on their face purport to grant motions for default judgment and permanent injunctive relief. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff's Request for Judicial Notice.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55 permits a court to enter default judgment upon a party's application. Although default judgments are ordinarily disfavored, a court may grant or deny a motion for default judgment at its discretion. See Alan Neuman Prods., Inc. v. Albright, 862 F.2d 1388, 1392 (9th Cir. 1988) (citing Haw. Carpenters' Tr. Funds v. Stone, 794 F.2d 508, 511-12 (9th Cir. 1986); Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471 (9th Cir. 1986); Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089, 1092 (9th Cir. 1980)).
The Ninth Circuit has set out seven factors, known as the Eitel factors, that a court may consider when exercising its discretion as to whether or not to grant default judgment:
(1) the possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the sum of money at stake in the action, (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts, (6) whether the default was due to excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
When weighing these factors, the well-pleaded factual allegations of the complaint are taken as true, except for those allegations relating to damages. TeleVideo Sys., Inc. v. Heidenthal, 826 F.2d 915, 917-18 (9th Cir. 1987); see also Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(b)(6). To prove damages, a plaintiff may submit declarations, or the Court may hold an evidentiary hearing. See Affinity Grp., Inc. v. Balser Wealth Mgmt., LLC, No. 05CV1555 WQH (LSP), 2007 WL 1111239, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Apr. 10, 2007); see also Taylor Made Golf Co. v. Carsten Sports, 175 F.R.D. 658, 661 (S.D. Cal. 1997) ().
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a party may move for summary judgment as to a claim or defense or part of a claim or defense. Summary judgment is appropriate where the Court is satisfied that there is “no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986) (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a)). Material facts are those that may affect the outcome of the case. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). A genuine dispute of material fact exists only if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Id. When the Court considers the evidence presented by the parties, “[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.” Id. at 255.
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