Talbot v. Ames Const., 20959

Citation904 P.2d 560,127 Idaho 648
Decision Date26 September 1995
Docket NumberNo. 20959,20959
PartiesRonald D. TALBOT, Claimant-Appellant, v. AMES CONSTRUCTION, Employer, and Aetna Casualty and Surety Company, Surety, Defendants-Respondents. . Idaho Falls, May 1995 Term
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court of Idaho

Dial, Looze & May, Pocatello, for appellant. Gregory C. May, argued.

Lynch, Moore, Baskin & Parker, Boise, for respondents. Thomas P. Baskin III, argued.

McDEVITT, Chief Justice.

I. BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURE

Claimant, Ronald D. Talbot (Talbot), suffered an injury on September 24, 1991 while driving a haul truck for Ames Construction at the Black Pine open pit gold mine. Talbot Talbot was diagnosed as having acute epididymitis in both testicles, which later subsided in the left testicle. Epididymitis is an inflammation of the structure that curves around the testicle which accepts the sperm from the testicle and transports it to the vas deferens. Talbot was later diagnosed as having a hydrocele and a painful testis. A hydrocele is an entrapment of the fluid around the testicle.

                [127 Idaho 649] filed a worker's compensation claim on September 26, 1991, and on February 8, 1992, he filed an application for a worker's compensation hearing.  In his application, Talbot claimed that he was injured while "driving a truck when [the] vehicle was struck by [the] loader causing a whiplash resulting in injury to scrotum."   Ames Construction and its surety Aetna Casualty and Surety Co.  (collectively referred to as Ames Construction) denied that any benefits were due because Talbot did not suffer an "accident" and that Talbot's condition was not caused by the alleged accident which arose out of and in the course of employment
                

On April 7, 1993, a hearing was held before referee, Robert C. Youngstrom. After the hearing, the record remained open for the parties to file post-hearing briefs and depositions. The parties submitted the post-hearing briefs, and the depositions were admitted into evidence. The referee issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and proposed order on September 14, 1993, and on September 28, 1993, the Industrial Commission issued its order adopting the referee's findings, conclusions, and proposed order. Although some of the depositions were not taken until after the hearing, the referee and the Commission considered all of the evidence and testimony in rendering their decisions.

The Commission, in its decision, addressed the issues of whether Talbot suffered an accident and injury on September 24, 1991, whether Talbot's condition was causally related to the alleged accident and injury, and whether Talbot was entitled to medical benefits, income benefits, and attorney fees.

The Commission concluded that Talbot failed to sustain his burden of establishing through persuasive medical evidence that his condition was causally related to the September 24, 1991 incident. Conflicting testimony as to the cause of Talbot's condition was presented to the Commission. However, after weighing the evidence presented, the Commission found most credible the opinions of Drs. Larsen, Celano, and Eskelson, who did not believe the sequence of events was a probable cause of Talbot's condition. In determining whether Talbot was subjected to repetitive trauma that aggravated Talbot's condition, the Commission determined that the record did not establish that Talbot was subjected to repeated traumatic incidents of bouncing and jarring which could have aggravated Talbot's condition. In coming to this conclusion, the Commission relied upon the testimony of Talbot's co-workers who stated that the trucks at Ames Construction provided an "extremely smooth" ride. The Commission noted the absence of any testimony from Talbot that he was bounced or jarred. The Commission next considered the arguments of Ames Construction that an accident never occurred, against Talbot's arguments to the contrary. The Commission concluded that while some incident did occur, the preponderance of the medical evidence established that the event did not cause an injury nor did it cause or aggravate Talbot's condition. The Commission concluded that Talbot failed to sustain his burden of proving that the condition for which he sought compensation was caused by an accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. The Commission denied worker's compensation benefits to Talbot.

Talbot appeals the decision of the Commission to this Court. There was a dispute between the parties about the documents to be included in the record, but after an objection was filed by Ames Construction, the parties stipulated to the contents of the record, and an order was entered correcting the record as stipulated by the parties.

II. THE DECISION OF THE COMMISSION IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE

This Court's scope of review in an Industrial Commission case is firmly established On appeal, Talbot requests this Court to reconsider the testimony and evidence and to call into question and review the credibility determinations of the Commission. In addition, Talbot asks this Court to reconsider the testimony from one of Talbot's physicians and to engage in a reweighing of the facts, contrary to the long established rule that this Court does not reweigh the findings of the Commission. Talbot essentially invites this Court to depart from the long standing and traditional scope of reviewing a decision from the Industrial Commission, as required by the Constitution, statutes, and a long line of case law, and review de novo the findings and credibility determinations of the Commission. No argument is made by Talbot that the Commission's findings are not supported by substantial, competent evidence in the record. In fact, at oral argument before this Court, the attorney for Talbot admitted without exception that the record contains substantial, competent evidence to support the Commission's findings. Additionally, no argument was made that the Commission's findings are clearly erroneous, that the conclusions are not supported by the findings, or that the Commission committed error as a matter of law. Talbot's single argument on appeal is a plea to this Court to call into question and review anew the findings of the Commission in the hope that this Court might come to a different conclusion than that of the Commission. This Court will not abandon established precedent and may not ignore the express directive of the Idaho Constitution and the Idaho Code. We will review the findings of the Commission on the exclusive basis of determining whether the findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence in the record. Langley, 126 Idaho at 784, 890 P.2d at 735; Roberts, 124 Idaho at 947, 866 P.2d at 970.

[127 Idaho 650] in the Idaho Constitution, the Idaho Code, and case law. On appeal, this Court's review of a decision from the Industrial Commission is limited to questions of law. Idaho Const. art. V, § 9; Langley v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 781, 784, 890 P.2d 732, 735 (1995). This Court reviews the Commission's findings of fact exclusively to determine whether the findings are supported by substantial, competent evidence. I.C. § 72-732; Lethrud v. Idaho Industrial Special Indemnity Fund, 126 Idaho 560, 563, 887 P.2d 1067, 1070 (1995); Roberts v. Kit Mfg. Co., 124 Idaho 946, 947, 866 P.2d 969, 970 (1993). The law is well established that this Court does not scrutinize the weight and credibility of the evidence relied upon by the Commission and will only disturb the Commission's findings as to weight and credibility if they are clearly erroneous. Langley, 126 Idaho at 784, 890 P.2d at 735; Challis v. Louisiana-Pac. Corp., 126 Idaho 134, 138, 879 P.2d 597, 601 (1994); Roberts, 124 Idaho at 947, 866 P.2d at 970; Ross v. Tupperware Mfg. Co./Premark, 122 Idaho 641, 643, 837 P.2d 316, 318 (1992); Nycum v. Triangle Dairy Co., 109 Idaho 858, 862, 712 P.2d 559, 563 (1985); Harrison v. Lustra Corp. of Am., 84 Idaho 320, 325-26, 372 P.2d 397, 400-01 (1962); Dyre v. Kloepfer & Cahoon, 64 Idaho 612, 617, 134 P.2d 610, 612 (1943). "It would be an improper invasion into the fact finding discretion of the Industrial Commission for the court to hold that the Commission must always give greater weight to one party's medical experts over the other." Soto v. J.R. Simplot, 126 Idaho 536, 539, 887 P.2d 1043, 1046 (1994) (quoting Poss v. Meeker Mach. Shop, 109 Idaho 920, 924-25, 712 P.2d 621, 625-26 (1985)).

From our independent review of the record, we conclude that substantial, competent evidence supports the determination of the Commission. Three of the four physicians who examined Talbot concluded that there was no causal connection between the September 1991 incident and Talbot's condition. The one physician who believed that it was probable that the September 1991 injury was the cause of Talbot's condition was found to be less credible by the Commission. The Commission relied upon the opinions of the three physicians who testified that there was no causal connection between the September 1991 incident and Talbot's condition. We conclude that the record supports by substantial and competent evidence the Commission's determination that Talbot's condition was not caused by a work-related accident.

On the issue of whether Talbot suffered repetitive traumatic events which aggravated

[127 Idaho 651] his condition, the record contains testimony by the project supervisor, the safety supervisor, and a co-worker that the trucks at Ames Construction provided a "smooth ride" with only a slight rocking motion in the truck. We conclude that substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's determination that Talbot was not subjected to a series of repeated traumatic events that aggravated his condition. Substantial and competent evidence supports the Commission's conclusion that Talbot did not meet his burden of establishing that he suffered from an injury that was caused by an...

To continue reading

Request your trial
27 cases
  • Litster Frost Injury Lawyers, PLLC v. Idaho Injury Law Grp., PLLC, Docket No. 48359
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 2 d5 Setembro d5 2022
    ...Constitution created the judicial branch of government in Idaho and vested in the judiciary certain powers." Talbot v. Ames Const. , 127 Idaho 648, 651, 904 P.2d 560, 563 (1995) (citing Idaho Const. art. II, § 1 ; art. V, §§ 2, 13 ). "The regulation of the practice of law is an inherent pow......
  • Litster Frost Injury Lawyers PLLC v. Idaho Injury Law Grp.
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 2 d5 Setembro d5 2022
    ...... bring the parties to their pre-contractual status quo. O'Connor v. Harger Const., Inc. , 145 Idaho 904,. 909, 188 P.3d 846, 851 (2008); see also Cruz v. Andrews. ... in Idaho and vested in the judiciary certain powers.". Talbot" v. Ames Const. , 127 Idaho 648, 651, 904 P.2d. 560, 563 (1995) (citing Idaho Const. art. II, \xC2"......
  • Kantor v. Kantor
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 13 d2 Setembro d2 2016
    ...to those that may properly be imposed for violation of discovery orders. In this, the district court erred.In Talbot v. Ames Const. , 127 Idaho 648, 904 P.2d 560 (1995), this Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the inherent powers of the courts to impose sanctions. We noted that “among......
  • Kantor v. Kantor
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Court of Idaho
    • 13 d2 Setembro d2 2016
    ...to those that may properly be imposed for violation of discovery orders. In this, the district court erred.In Talbot v. Ames Const. , 127 Idaho 648, 904 P.2d 560 (1995), this Court engaged in a lengthy discussion of the inherent powers of the courts to impose sanctions. We noted that "among......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT