Talerico v. Vill. of Clarendon Hills
| Decision Date | 22 June 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2-20-0318 |
| Citation | 2021 IL App (2d) 200318,186 N.E.3d 50,452 Ill.Dec. 603 |
| Parties | Richard TALERICO, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. The VILLAGE OF CLARENDON HILLS, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Jerome F. Marconi, of Chicago, for appellant.
Jason A. Guisinger, Anthony G. Becknek, and Caitlyn R. Culbertson, of Klein, Thorpe & Jenkins, Ltd., of Chicago, for appellee.
¶ 1 Plaintiff, Richard Talerico, was a law enforcement officer employed by defendant, the Village of Clarendon Hills (defendant or Village). Plaintiff filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant in the circuit court of Du Page County, seeking a ruling that he was entitled to the payment of health insurance benefits pursuant to section 10 of the Public Safety Employee Benefits Act (Act) ( 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2014) ). Following cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court entered judgment in favor of defendant and against plaintiff. On appeal, plaintiff argues that he is entitled to the payment of health insurance benefits under the Act, because he suffered a "catastrophic injury" and the injury occurred "during the investigation of a criminal act." 820 ILCS 320/10 (West 2014). For the reasons explained herein, we agree. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment for defendant and remand the case to the trial court with directions to enter summary judgment in favor of plaintiff.
¶ 3 Plaintiff was hired by defendant as a full-time, probationary police officer on November 1, 1986, and received his regular appointment on May 1, 1988. On January 11, 2015, plaintiff was dispatched to a home in the Village in response to a report of a home invasion. While carrying evidence-technician equipment, plaintiff slipped on snow and ice located at the rear of his squad car. Plaintiff injured his left shoulder when he stuck out his left arm to brace himself from falling. In September 2016, plaintiff filed an application for line-of-duty disability benefits with the Board of Trustees of the Clarendon Hills Police Pension Fund (Pension Board). A hearing was held before the Pension Board over two dates in March and May 2017. In a written decision issued in August 2017, the Pension Board determined that the incident of January 11, 2015, constituted an "act of duty" under the Illinois Pension Code (see 40 ILCS 5/5-113 (West 2014) ; Harroun v. Addison Police Pension Board , 372 Ill. App. 3d 260, 262, 309 Ill.Dec. 910, 865 N.E.2d 273 (2007) ) inasmuch as plaintiff "was acting in his capacity as [an] evidence technician when injured and was responding to an active crime scene to perform [an] investigation." Accordingly, the Pension Board awarded plaintiff a line-of-duty disability pension for his injury. See 40 ILCS 5/3-114.1 (West 2014).
¶ 4 After being awarded the line-of-duty disability pension, plaintiff contacted defendant by letter to request the payment of health insurance benefits pursuant to the Act ( 820 ILCS 320/1 et seq. (West 2014)). To qualify for health insurance benefits under the Act, a full-time law enforcement officer must "suffer[ ] a catastrophic injury or [be] killed in the line of duty" ( 820 ILCS 320/10(a) (West 2014)) and the injury or death "must have occurred as the result of the officer's response to fresh pursuit, the officer[’s] *** response to what is reasonably believed to be an emergency, an unlawful act perpetrated by another, or during the investigation of a criminal act" ( 820 ILCS 320/10(b) (West 2014)). In his letter to defendant, plaintiff asserted that he was entitled to benefits under the Act because he suffered a catastrophic injury "while in the course of investigating a crime." Defendant denied the request on the basis that plaintiff was not injured under any of the four factors listed in section 10(b) of the Act ( 820 ILCS 305/10(b) (West 2014)).
¶ 5 Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against defendant. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. Attached to plaintiff's motion for summary judgment were copies of the transcripts of the proceedings before the Pension Board and a copy of the Pension Board's decision. Attached to defendant's motion for summary judgment were, inter alia , transcripts of deposition testimony from plaintiff and James Shaw, another patrol officer who responded to the home invasion. The documents attached to the parties’ cross-motions for summary judgment disclose the following with respect to the circumstances leading to plaintiff's injury.
¶ 6 On January 11, 2015, plaintiff was assigned to the day shift as patrol supervisor and on-duty evidence technician. Sometime between 1 p.m. and 1:30 p.m. that day, plaintiff responded to a call of a home invasion in progress at 358 Reserve Circle in the Village. Shaw also responded to the dispatch, as was the protocol for a felony. Plaintiff and Shaw parked in different locations away from the home, met somewhere "outside the residence," and approached the scene together. Upon their arrival, plaintiff noticed that the front door of the residence appeared to have been forced open. The homeowner related that she was upstairs when she heard a loud noise and a chime that sounds when her door is opened. The homeowner walked to the top of the staircase and saw an unidentified male standing at the foot of the stairs. The subject fled after being seen by the homeowner. The officers moved the homeowner to Shaw's squad car for safety reasons. The officers then conducted a "quick search" of the residence to make sure there were no other offenders in the building.
¶ 7 Plaintiff testified that it took only "a few minutes" to secure the homeowner and search the residence. After the scene was secured, plaintiff directed Shaw to canvass the neighborhood to obtain information about the offender or ascertain his whereabouts. Plaintiff would gather evidence at the scene. Shaw escorted the homeowner back into the home and took her upstairs. Plaintiff testified that, although the scene was secure in that there was no immediate physical threat to anyone, "there was still evidence that needed to be located, evidence that needed to be documented, [and] evidence that needed to be collected." Plaintiff noted, for instance, that there was snow on the ground, so he would need to search for "footprints in the snow." He would also dust for fingerprints and look for "tools that may have been used to pry open the door" or any other evidence "to establish who the perpetrator may be." Plaintiff stated that, if he did not respond "quickly," the evidence would "deteriorate or be destroyed." Plaintiff explained that "snow footprints" could be lost due to melting snow or "snow kicked over the top." Likewise, he stated that any fingerprints that may have been left on any surfaces could be lost if not handled "expeditiously" and that, if a tool is buried in the snow, its evidentiary value could be "ruined."
¶ 8 Plaintiff did not have in his squad car the equipment to process the evidence, because the police department has only one set of such equipment and it is for the use of all the police department's evidence technicians. Accordingly, plaintiff went to the police station to retrieve the equipment needed to process the crime scene. Shaw remained at the scene to wait with the homeowner. At some point, however, Shaw left the homeowner to canvass the neighborhood as plaintiff had directed.
¶ 9 Plaintiff estimated that he was at the crime scene for about 10 minutes before getting into his squad car to return to the police station. Plaintiff drove "normally" to the police station and did not use the lights or sirens on his squad car. At the police station, plaintiff retrieved a camera, a fingerprint-dusting kit, and a kit for packaging and marking evidence. Each of these items was kept in a separate bag. Plaintiff placed all three bags in his squad car. The camera bag was placed either on the passenger seat beside him or on the rear driver's side seat. The other two bags were placed on the back seat. Plaintiff testified that it did not take him more than 15 minutes to drive to the police station, retrieve the equipment, and return to the scene.
¶ 10 When plaintiff arrived back at the scene, he parked on the street in front of the residence. Plaintiff parked in this location because, unlike when he first arrived, the scene was secure from any offender. Nevertheless, plaintiff still had his "eyes open" because the subject was still at large. After parking, plaintiff picked up the camera bag and exited the squad car. Plaintiff then walked to the rear of the vehicle to get the rest of his equipment from the back seat. While carrying the camera bag, plaintiff slipped on snow and ice. As plaintiff was falling, he "stuck [his] left arm out, caught the back of the vehicle with it to break [his] fall and it shoved [his] arm and everything back up into [his] shoulder." Plaintiff immediately felt a sharp pain in his left arm, and the arm went numb. Plaintiff took some time to regain his composure and allow the pain to subside. Despite the pain, plaintiff retrieved the rest of the equipment from the squad car and spent the next 30 to 45 minutes processing the crime scene. At some point, a third officer, Zach Finfrock, showed up to assist plaintiff and Shaw. Once plaintiff finished processing the crime scene, he returned to the police station and notified his supervisor of the injury.
¶ 11 Plaintiff acknowledged that the crime scene had been left unattended for a time while he went to retrieve the evidence-technician equipment and Shaw canvassed the area. He stated, however, that canvassing the area was a priority because there was a description of the offender and the situation had to be handled "expeditiously." He explained that tracking the suspect was possible if the officers could obtain information...
To continue reading
Request your trial