Talit v. Northwest Airlines
| Decision Date | 06 June 2000 |
| Citation | 752 A.2d 1131,58 Conn.App. 102 |
| Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
| Parties | (Conn.App. 2000) LYNN TALIT ET AL. V. NORTHWEST AIRLINES, INC. (AC 20017) Submitted on briefs March 22 Officially released |
The named plaintiff, Lynn Talit,1 appeals from the judgment of the trial court dismissing her complaint.2 The plaintiff claims that the court abused its discretion by improperly (1) rendering a judgment of dismissal and (2) denying her motion to open the judgment of dismissal. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
The following facts and procedural history are relevant to the resolution of this appeal. On April 23, 1995, the plaintiff's husband, Benjamin Talit, suffered a fatal heart attack while he was a passenger on an aircraft owned and operated by the defendant, Northwest Airlines, Inc. Thereafter, the plaintiff filed a pro se wrongful death action, claiming that the defendant was negligent in failing to have a defibrillator on board the aircraft, which might have saved her husband's life. Counsel for the plaintiff filed an appearance in addition to the pro se appearance. During a status conference on March 31, 1999, the court raised the issue of whether the defendant had a duty to carry a defibrillator on the flight in question. The parties agreed that at the time of the incident in question, there were no regulations requiring that a defibrillator be carried. The defendant had admitted that it did not equip its aircraft with defibrillators. The plaintiff's counsel asked for an opportunity to locate an expert witness to testify as to the industry standard at the time of the flight regarding the placement of defibrillators on aircraft. If no such expert could be found, it was agreed that the case would be withdrawn.
A deadline for disclosure of the expert was set for June 30, 1999, and discovery on issues unrelated to the presence of a defibrillator would be delayed. A postcard notice was sent by the court clerk's office to the parties setting forth the time, date and place of the next status conference. It noted that "[n]onappearance may result in dismissal, default or sanctions." The status conference was scheduled for 12:30 p.m. on June 30, 1999. One week before the scheduled status conference, defense counsel, through his secretary, attempted to change the time of the status conference with the permission of the plaintiff. When no other time could be agreed on, the date and time of the status conference remained unchanged; the plaintiff's counsel was notified two days prior to the status conference that the date was still set for June 30, 1999. The plaintiff's counsel then requested a future date because he had made other plans and appointments. This request was made on June 28, 1999, because counsel had been scheduled to work an afternoon shift on June 30, 1999, for the Bloomfield Volunteer Ambulance Association, of which he was a member. On June 29, 1999, defense counsel notified the court that the plaintiff's counsel had not been informed that the status conference had been canceled,3 and that defense counsel had rearranged his schedule and would attend the status conference at the original time, but would not oppose a motion for a continuance by the plaintiff's counsel. During a telephone conversation on June 29, 1999, the plaintiff's counsel informed the defendant's counsel that he would not be attending the scheduled status conference because he had a real estate closing.
On June 30, 1999, defense counsel appeared for the scheduled status conference. Neither the pro se plaintiff nor her counsel appeared. On July 2, 1999, the court ordered that the action be dismissed, and judgment entered thereafter. On July 19, 1999, the plaintiff's counsel filed a motion to open the judgment, which was denied on August 9, 1999. On August 20, 1999, the plaintiff filed a motion for reargument and reconsideration, which was denied on August 30, 1999. At no time was there a disclosure of the availability of the critical expert witness. The plaintiff filed this appeal on September 16, 1999.
Our standard of appellate review is whether the court's dismissal of the action or its denial of the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment was an abuse of discretion. See Gionfrido v. Wharf Realty, Inc., 193 Conn. 28, 34, 474 A.2d 787 (1984). The court may have acted pursuant to Practice Book §§ 17-194 in ordering a dismissal of the plaintiff's complaint. In denying the plaintiff's motion to open the judgment, the court acted pursuant to Practice Book §§ 17-435 and General Statutes §§ 52-212a.6 The court also may have invoked its inherent power in dismissing the matter.
It would appear from the record before us that the court properly exercised its authority in dismissing the action when the pro se plaintiff and her counsel failed to appear for a status conference specifically scheduled for the purpose of disclosing an expert witness who would testify that in April, 1995, the airline industry standard was to carry a defibrillator on the type of aircraft at issue.7 "It is an inherent power of the court to . . . provide for the imposition of reasonable sanctions to compel the observance of its rules." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Gionfrido v. Wharf Realty, Inc., supra, 193 Conn. 33. There are three possible sources for the authority of courts to sanction counsel and pro se parties. These are the court's inherent power to control the proceedings before it, the power delegated to it by statute and the power conferred by published rules of the court. The power of a court to manage its own affairs so as to achieve an orderly and expeditious disposition of cases exists independently of the power recognized by rule or statute. Srager v. Koenig, 42 Conn. App. 617, 620, 681 A.2d 323, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 935, 936, 684 A.2d 709 (1996).
The plaintiff first claims that the court abused its discretion in dismissing her complaint, given the circumstances that the matter was not scheduled for trial, but rather only for a status conference. The parties acknowledge that the court's action was a disciplinary dismissal. That the matter was not scheduled for trial is of no relevance. The plaintiff also argues that the plaintiff's counsel "clearly understood opposing counsel's representative to report that a continuance had been granted by the court." The court set a deadline date for disclosing an expert witness, an issue possibly dispositive of the action itself. The plaintiff chose to ignore that date. The plaintiff's counsel knew two days before the scheduled status conference that the defendant's counsel would be attending and that the court would not continue the matter. The plaintiff's counsel chose to spend his afternoon of June 30, 1999, with the Bloomfield Volunteer Ambulance Association, with full knowledge that failure to attend the scheduled status conference could lead to a dismissal of the action.
"An order of ...
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