TallBear v. Soldi Inc.
| Decision Date | 14 May 2020 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 19-CV-2789 (SRN/TNL) |
| Parties | Susan TallBear, Plaintiff, v. Soldi Inc., Z&H Hospitality L.L.C., and Antonio Tettamanzi, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota |
Amy E. Boyle and Colin J. Pasterski, Halunen Law, 80 South 8th Street, Minneapolis, MN, 55402, for Plaintiff.
Bruce J. Douglas and Molly E. Nephew, Ogletree, Deakins, Nash, Smoak & Stewart, P.C., 225 South 6th Street, Minneapolis, MN, 55402, for Defendant Soldi Inc.;
Britt M. Gilbertson, Justin P. Weinberg, and Samuel N. Louwagie, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP, 80 South 8th Street, Minneapolis, MN 55402; Erin S. Conlin, Nilan Johnson Lewis PA, 250 Marquette Avenue South, Minneapolis, MN 55401, for Defendant Z&H Hospitality L.L.C.
Before the Court is Plaintiff Susan TallBear's Motion to Remand to State Court (("Motion to Remand") [Doc. No. 11]), brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Defendants oppose the motion, arguing this action was properly removed to federal court because Plaintiff's Amended Complaint raises claims "arising under" federal law, namely, the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 ("FLSA").
At oral argument on the present motion, Plaintiff moved to voluntarily dismiss the claims in the Amended Complaint that Defendants have asserted, at the time of removal, raise a substantial issue of federal law under the FLSA. Thus, the Court addresses whether a remand is warranted under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, or alternatively, under the Court's exercise of its discretion under 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3). For the reasons set forth below, the Court exercises its discretion under 28 U.S.C § 1367(c)(3) and remands this case to Ramsey County District Court.
The facts relevant to the Court's disposition of this motion may be briefly stated. On September 25, 2019, Plaintiff Susan TallBear commenced a state-court action when she delivered to the Minnesota Secretary of State a five-count amended complaint ("Amended Complaint") against Defendants, her former employer.1 TallBear's Amended Complaint asserts five state-law statutory claims of discrimination, fraudulent conveyance, retaliation, and failure to pay wages. (Compl. [Doc. No. 1-1] ("Compl") ¶¶ 50-77.) Atissue in this present motion are two counts asserted in TallBear's Amended Complaint: (1) a retaliation claim under the Minnesota Whistleblower Act ("MWA") (Count I of the Amended Complaint), and (2) a claim for unpaid wages under the Minnesota Wage Payment Statute (Count II of the Amended Complaint).2 (Id. ¶¶ 50-60.)
Although there is no count expressly identified as a cause of action under the FLSA, her Amended Complaint does in fact allege violations of the FLSA. For instance, the Amended Complaint includes the following allegations:
Among the various forms of relief she seeks are "liquidated damages . . . where permitted by statute." None of the relevant state statutory provisions cited in the Amended Complaint explicitly allow for the recovery of liquidated damages. See Minn. Stat. §181.13 (); Minn. Stat. §181.935 (). The FLSA, on the other hand, awards liquidated damages for unpaid back wages. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (b).
After Defendants Soldi Inc. ("Soldi") and Z&H Hospitality L.L.C. ("Z&H") (collectively, "Defendants")3 were served with the Amended Complaint, they timely, and jointly, sought to remove the Amended Complaint to this Court on October 25, 2019, on federal question jurisdiction grounds with respect to the allegations of violations of the FLSA, see 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and on "supplemental jurisdiction" grounds with respect to the state-law claims, see 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (a).4 (Notice of Removal [Doc. No. 1].) Plaintiff then promptly moved to remand, arguing that none of the claims in the Amended Complaint arise under federal law. (See Pl.'s Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Remand [Doc. No. 15] ("Pl.'s Mem.") at 5-10.) Plaintiff contends that her references to the FLSA merely set up the predicate for her MWA claim, but the claims do not present a substantial federal question. (Id. at 7-9.)
In response, Defendants contend that Plaintiff "expressly alleges" a claim under the FLSA and cannot artfully plead her way out of federal jurisdiction. (See Defs.' Mem in Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Remand [Doc. No. 19] ( ) at 7-12.) Alternatively, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's unpaid wage claim under Minnesota law is specifically grounded on the FLSA and therefore, supports federal subject matter jurisdiction. (Id. at8.) Without the FLSA, Defendants contend there is no viable claim for unpaid overtime. (Id.)
At oral argument on the present motion, to avoid any issue as to whether her overtime claims arise under federal law, Plaintiff orally moved to dismiss her FLSA claim and her unpaid wages claim under Minnesota law with prejudice.5 ( ) Defendants, however, urge the Court not to consider Plaintiff's subsequent motion to dismiss these claims, arguing that jurisdiction must be determined at the time of removal. (See Defs.' Suppl. Mem in Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. to Remand [Doc. No. 32] ( ) at 3-10.)
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), remand to state court is proper if the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the asserted claims. Junk v. Terminx Intern. Co., 628 F.3d 439, 444-45 (8th Cir. 2010) () (citations omitted)). The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence falls on the party who is attempting to invoke the jurisdiction of the federal court. Cent. Iowa Power Coop. v. Midwest Indep. Transmission Sys. Operator, Inc., 561 F.3d 904, 912 (8th Cir. 2009) (citation omitted). Courts should strictly construe the requirements of removal jurisdiction and remand all cases in which such jurisdiction is doubtful. Id. (citation omitted); see also Arnold Crossroads, L.L.C. v. Gander Mountain Co., 751 F.3d 935, 940 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation omitted); Nichols v. Harbor Venture, Inc., 284 F.3d 857, 861 (8th Cir. 2002) (citing Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 108-09, 61 S.Ct. 868, 85 L.Ed. 1214 (1941)). "A defendant may remove a state claim to federal court only if the action originally could have been filed there." Baker v. Martin Marietta Materials, Inc., 745 F.3d 919, 923 (8th Cir. 2014) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
"[F]ederal question jurisdiction extends only to 'civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.'" Mamot Feed Lot and Trucking v.Hobson, 539 F.3d 898, 902 (8th Cir. 2008) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1331). "Removal based on federal question jurisdiction is governed by the well pleaded complaint rule: jurisdiction is established only if a federal question is presented on the face of the plaintiff's properly pleaded complaint." Pet Quarters, Inc. v. Depository Trust & Clearing Corp., 559 F.3d 772, 779 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing Phipps v. FDIC, 417 F.3d 1006, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005)); see also Baker, 745 F.3d at 923.
Courts must determine jurisdiction "at the time of removal, even though subsequent events may remove from the case the facts on which jurisdiction was predicated." McLain v. Andersen Corp., 567 F.3d 956, 965 (8th Cir. 2009) (quoting Quinn v. Ocwen Fed. Bank FSB, 470 F.3d 1240, 1248 (8th Cir. 2006)); Knudson v. Sys. Painters, Inc., 634 F.3d 968, 975 (8th Cir. 2011); Schubert v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 649 F.3d 817, 822 (8th Cir. 2011) (); Mueller v. RadioShack Corp., No. 11-cv-0653 (PJS/JJG), 2011 WL 6826421, at *1, n. 2 (D. Minn. Dec. 28, 2011) () (citing James Neff Kramper Family Farm P'ship v. IBP, Inc., 393 F.3d 828, 834 (8th Cir. 2005) (emphasis in original)).
To determine whether a "well-pleaded complaint" establishes federal-question jurisdiction, courts must consider whether (1) "federal law creates the cause of action" or (2) "the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law." General Mills, Inc. v. Retrobands USA, LLC, No. 19-cv-258 (NEB/DTS),2019 WL...
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