Talley v. Ribicoff
| Decision Date | 01 November 1961 |
| Docket Number | No. C-157-G-60.,C-157-G-60. |
| Citation | 199 F. Supp. 276 |
| Parties | Annie TALLEY, Plaintiff, v. Abraham A. RIBICOFF, Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare of the United States of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of North Carolina |
William H. Murdock, U. S. Atty., Greensboro, N. C., for defendant.
The plaintiff seeks a review of the final decision of the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, Social Security Administration, holding that she was not entitled to a period of disability and disability benefits.
Both plaintiff and defendant have moved for summary judgment pursuant to the provisions of Rule 56(a), Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 28 U.S.C.A., and have supported their motions by briefs.
Under the jurisdictional statute, 42 U.S.C.A. § 405(g), the findings of the Secretary, if supported by substantial evidence, are conclusive, and such conclusiveness extends to inferences logically drawn from the evidence. Fuller v. Folsom, D.C.W.D.Ark.1957, 155 F. Supp. 348; Adams v. Flemming, 2 Cir., 1960, 276 F.2d 901. Substantial evidence means "enough evidence to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury." National Labor Relations Board v. Columbian Co., 1939, 306 U.S. 292, 59 S.Ct. 501, 505, 83 L.Ed. 660. The burden of proof, both before the hearing examiner and in this court, is upon the plaintiff to establish her claim by the preponderance of the evidence. Roberts v. Flemming, D.C.N.D.Ala.1960, 186 F. Supp. 426; Adams v. Flemming, 2 Cir., 1960, 276 F.2d 901. We are not authorized, in a proceeding such as this, to substitute our own judgment for that of the hearing examiner, and his determinations may not be set aside if there is any legal basis therefor, "even though upon a consideration of all the evidence this Court might have reached a different conclussion." Thurston v. Hobby, D.C.W.D.Mo. 1955, 133 F.Supp. 205, 209; Julian v. Folsom, D.C.S.D.N.Y.1958, 160 F.Supp. 747; Wilson v. Ribicoff, D.C.W.D.Pa. 1961, 196 F.Supp. 579.
Plaintiff's application to establish a period of disability and for disability insurance benefits was filed on May 18, 1959. The Bureau of Old-Age and Survivors Insurance, Social Security Administration, denied the application, and plaintiff was so notified by letter dated September 24, 1959. Dissatisfied with the disallowance of her application, plaintiff requested a hearing before a hearing examiner, and such hearing was held on June 23, 1960. The plaintiff personally appeared and testified at the hearing and was represented by counsel.
The issue before the hearing examiner was whether the plaintiff was entitled to have established for her a period of disability under Section 216(i) of the Social Security Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 416(i), because she was unable to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable mental or physical impairment, or to disability insurance benefits under Section 223(a) of the Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 423. The plaintiff alleges that she became unable to engage in a substantial gainful activity on October 30, 1958, and it is conceded that she met the earning requirements under the 1958 amendments to the Act in the quarter of her alleged disability, and will continue to meet such requirements until December 31, 1963.
Following the adverse decision by the hearing examiner, the plaintiff, on July 29, 1960, requested a review by the Appeals Council. On September 28, 1960, the Appeals Council, being of the opinion that a formal review of the hearing examiner's decision would result in no advantage to the plaintiff, denied the request. Thus, the decision of the hearing examiner became the final decision of the Secretary.
In her original application, the plaintiff stated that she first became unable to work on October 30, 1958, due to "loss of use of right arm and hand due to extra rib which grows through a muscle." She described her daily activities as doing some "light cooking" in her son's home. She stated that she could not do any sweeping, could not fasten buttons or hooks on her clothing, and had difficulty in combing her hair. Plaintiff further stated that she had a sixth-grade education, was divorced, and that all of her employment had been in textile mills.
At the hearing held on June 23, 1960, plaintiff testified that she was born on January 8, 1901; that she went to the sixth grade in school; that she was divorced from her husband, and lived in the home of one of her sons; that she started working in a textile mill when she was about fifteen years of age, but stopped working while her children were small; that she returned to the textile mill in 1942 and worked continuously until she was discharged on October 30, 1958, due to her disability; that she was a weaver in the textile mill for about ten years after she returned to work in 1942, but had to discontinue that work due to trouble with her hand; that she then took a job patrolling warps, but had to discontinue this work because she could not tie knots; that she was then assigned to filling shuttles, and had to discontinue this work because she could not hold the shuttles; that her last job was filling batteries for the looms, and when she became unable to do this work she was discharged from the mill; that she has been totally disabled since she was discharged from the mill on October 30, 1958; that she has never done any public work except in textile mills; that she was unable to do much at her son's home because she could hardly walk; that while she did a small amount of cooking, she could not help much with the shopping because she was unable to walk to the store and back; that in addition to being partially paralyzed in her right arm and hand, she had diabetes for which she was required to take twenty units of insulin each day; that she drew unemployment compensation for a short period after she was discharged from the textile mill...
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