Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., Civ. A. No. 2418.
Court | United States District Courts. 6th Circuit. United States District Court of Middle District of Tennessee |
Writing for the Court | WILLIAM E. MILLER |
Citation | 168 F. Supp. 456 |
Decision Date | 18 November 1958 |
Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 2418. |
Parties | TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff, v. NASHVILLE COAL COMPANY et al., Defendants. |
168 F. Supp. 456
TAMPA ELECTRIC COMPANY, Plaintiff,
v.
NASHVILLE COAL COMPANY et al., Defendants.
Civ. A. No. 2418.
United States District Court M. D. Tennessee, Nashville Division.
November 18, 1958.
David Keeble, of Hooker, Keeble, Dotson & Harris, Nashville, Tenn., William C. Chanler, of Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, New York City, for plaintiff.
Cecil Sims, of Bass, Berry & Sims, Nashville, Tenn., Abe Fortas and Norman Diamond, of Arnold, Fortas & Porter, Washington, D. C., for defendants.
WILLIAM E. MILLER, District Judge.
This is an action for a declaratory judgment seeking to establish that a certain contract referred to as the Potter-Tampa contract is valid and enforceable and binding upon both the plaintiff and the defendants.
The defendants, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Seller, have moved the Court for summary judgment, contending that there are no issues of fact to be decided by the Court, and that the undisputed facts establish the illegality of the contract under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 14 and Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1, 2. The plaintiff, Tampa Electric Company, hereinafter sometimes referred to as the Buyer, has also moved for summary judgment, insisting that the Potter-Tampa contract upon the basis of the undisputed facts is valid and enforceable. The Buyer is a large electric utility company serving Tampa, Florida, and its metropolitan area. Prior to the Potter-Tampa contract, oil was the only fuel used by the Buyer in its production of electric power. It is at present constructing a new plant or station near Tampa, known as the Gannon Station, which will eventually contain six separate power-producing units. Two of these units have been completed and are using coal as fuel, and a third coal-burning unit is under construction.
The contract in issue was made May 23, 1955, between the Tampa Electric Company and Justin Potter and David K. Wilson, co-partners doing business as the Potter Towing Company. After a series of transfers Nashville Coal Company, Inc., a wholly owned subsidiary of West Kentucky Coal Company, succeeded to the Potter-Wilson position under the contract. The West Kentucky Coal Company then made an agreement with Potter and Wilson to indemnify them against any loss resulting from nonperformance of the Potter-Tampa contract. After all transfers of the contract had been completed the Seller refused to perform on the ground that it was in violation of the Clayton and Sherman Acts, and subsequently the Buyer filed this action for declaratory judgment.
The terms of the Potter-Tampa contract are substantially as follows: The Seller agrees to provide the Buyer and the Buyer agrees to purchase from the Seller all the coal required as fuel for the production of electric energy at the Gannon Station for a period of 20 years. The first two units of the plant now in operation will use coal as fuel, and as to these units "the full requirements shall not be less than 225,000 tons of coal per unit per year". It is agreed that a third unit now under construction will also use coal, and that all future units constructed
It is estimated by the Buyer that within a very few years the Gannon Station will consume more coal than is presently consumed in the entire State of Florida. Peninsular Florida's present coal consumption is approximately 700,000 tons per year as compared to the 450,000 tons required by the Potter-Tampa contract as a minimum for the first two units at the Gannon Station. The Buyer is presently purchasing coal for the first two units from Love and Amos Coal Company under a contract which is subject to cancellation on twelve months' notice by the Buyer, or subject to immediate cancellation should the Seller begin to perform under the Potter-Tampa contract.
It is the contention of the Seller that the Potter-Tampa contract is invalid under Section 3 of the Clayton Act in that it is an agreement or understanding not to purchase the product of the Seller's competitors and as such its effect is to substantially lessen competition. The relevant provisions of Section 3 are as follows:
"It shall be unlawful for any persons engaged in commerce, in the course of such commerce, to lease or make a sale or contract for sale of goods, wares, merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities, whether patented or unpatented, for use, consumption, or resale within the United States * * * on the condition, agreement, or understanding that the lessee or purchaser thereof shall not use or deal in the goods * * * of a competitor or competitors of the * * * seller, where the effect of such lease, sale, or contract for sale or such condition, agreement, or understanding may be to substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in any line of commerce."
To sustain the validity of the contract the Buyer insists, first, that the Potter-Tampa contract does not fall within the scope of Section 3 in that it does not have the effect of requiring that the purchaser shall not use the goods of a competitor of the Seller. In support of this argument it is pointed out that the Buyer, consistently with the Potter-Tampa contract, may use oil as a fuel in the remaining three units at the Gannon Station, and that it may use the coal of a competitor of the Seller in any future plant to be constructed and in any present oil-burning plant converted to the use of coal. However, in the present case the Court is persuaded that the Potter-Tampa contract is a requirements contract having the effect of requiring the Buyer not to use the goods of a competitor of the Seller within the intent and meaning of Section 3. It clearly provides, in effect, that the Buyer must buy only from the Seller all of its coal for the two units now in operation and for the additional unit now under construction at the Gannon Station, representing in fact all of the Buyer's present coal requirements. According to the Buyer's estimation, it will require 1,000,000 tons of coal per year at the Gannon Station by 1961. A contract to supply the total coal requirements of an operation of such magnitude for such a protracted exclusionary period clearly falls within the purview of the statute. The question must be decided upon the basis of realities and the contract construed reasonably in the light of existing facts. It is true that coal could conceivably be used in future plants or by converting existing plants, but there is no evidence that this is presently planned. While the possibilities suggested do exist the unalterable fact remains that the contract at issue is one which "preempts"
This conclusion as to the effect of the contract under the Clayton Act is supported by the decision of the Supreme Court in International Salt Co., Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392, 68 S.Ct. 12, 92 L.Ed. 20, in which the International Salt Company required tying arrangements wherein the lessees of its patented machines could use only salt purchased from the lessor. In the year 1944 the company sold approximately 119,000 tons of...
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Tampa Electric Company v. Nashville Coal Company, No. 13775.
...of the appellees on account of their refusal to perform under the contract. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., D.C. M.D.Tenn., 168 F.Supp. 456. This appeal Appellant is an electric public utility serving the city of Tampa, Florida, and neighboring communities. The appellees are engag......
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Tampa Electric Company v. Nashville Coal Company, Civ. A. No. 2418.
...the defendants' motion and denied the motion of the plaintiff, holding that the contract was illegal under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 168 F.Supp. 456. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on April 4, 1960, 276 F.2d 766, but the Supreme Court on Februar......
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Tampa Electric Company v. Nashville Coal Company, No. 87
...at its Gannon Station in Tampa, Florida, over a 20-year period. 363 U.S. 836, 80 S.Ct. 1612, 4 L.Ed.2d 1723. Both the District court, 168 F.Supp. 456, and the Court of Appeals, 276 F.2d 766, Judge Weick dissenting, agreed with respondents that the contract fell within the proscription of § ......
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Tampa Electric Company v. Nashville Coal Company, No. 13775.
...of the appellees on account of their refusal to perform under the contract. Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., D.C. M.D.Tenn., 168 F.Supp. 456. This appeal Appellant is an electric public utility serving the city of Tampa, Florida, and neighboring communities. The appellees are engag......
-
Tampa Electric Company v. Nashville Coal Company, Civ. A. No. 2418.
...the defendants' motion and denied the motion of the plaintiff, holding that the contract was illegal under Section 3 of the Clayton Act, 168 F.Supp. 456. This judgment was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit on April 4, 1960, 276 F.2d 766, but the Supreme Court on Februar......
-
Tampa Electric Company v. Nashville Coal Company, No. 87
...at its Gannon Station in Tampa, Florida, over a 20-year period. 363 U.S. 836, 80 S.Ct. 1612, 4 L.Ed.2d 1723. Both the District court, 168 F.Supp. 456, and the Court of Appeals, 276 F.2d 766, Judge Weick dissenting, agreed with respondents that the contract fell within the proscription of § ......