Tancredi v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 08 April 2003 |
| Docket Number | No. 00 Civ. 5780(LAK).,00 Civ. 5780(LAK). |
| Parties | Stephen TANCREDI, et ano., Plaintiffs, v. METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, et ano., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Michael P. Malakoff, Malakoff Doyle & Finberg, P.C, Pittsburgh, PA, Barry A. Weprin, Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, LLP, New York City, Peter Wasylyk, Law Offices of Peter Wasylyk, Providence, RI, for Plaintiffs.
Bruce E. Yannett, Carl Micarelli, Debevoise & Plimpton, New York City, Duncan J. Logan, Metropolitan Life Insurance Company, New York City, for Defendants.
Plaintiffs in this case challenged the demutualization of Metropolitan Life Insurance Company ("MetLife") on constitutional grounds, suing pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This Court dismissed the complaint, holding that plaintiffs had failed to allege the requisite state action and, in any case, that their constitutional claims lacked merit.1 The Court of Appeals affirmed on the state action ground without reaching plaintiffs' other contentions.2 MetLife now moves for attorneys' fees pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as a prevailing party. Plaintiffs resist, contending that the motion is untimely, foreclosed by the mandate rule, and in any case without merit.
Judgment dismissing the amended complaint was entered on July 11, 2001. Plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal on July 27, 2001. On August 2, 2001, twenty-two days after entry of judgment, MetLife moved for attorneys' fees. In an October 17, 2001 order, the Court denied the motion without prejudice to renewal within fourteen days following entry of the appellate mandate. The mandate was entered on February 27, 2003. The renewed motion was filed eight days later, on March 7, 2003.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(d)(2)(B) provides in relevant part that "[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court, the motion [for attorneys' fees] must be filed and served no later than 14 days after entry of judgment. ..." Rule 6(b)(2) provides in relevant part that the Court may enlarge certain time periods afforded under the rules "upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period ... where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. ..."
Plaintiffs argue that the renewed motion for attorneys' fees is untimely because:
1. The initial motion was filed twenty-two days after the entry of judgment and thus beyond the fourteen day period provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(B);
2. In any case, the motion was filed after the filing of the notice of appeal supposedly divested this Court of jurisdiction to pass on MetLife's initial motion;
3. MetLife never moved for enlargement of the fourteen day period and, in any case, never made a showing of excusable neglect;
3. The pendency of the appeal, the lack of a motion for extension of the fourteen day period, and the lack of a showing of excusable neglect negate the extension of time implicit in the October 17, 2001 order.
This argument in most respects is utterly frivolous.
To begin with, the filing of the notice of appeal quite did not divest this Court of jurisdiction to pass on the initial motion for attorneys' fees. To be sure, "[t]he filing of a notice of appeal is an event of jurisdictional significance—it confers jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal."3 As the Court of Appeals has said however, 4 The touchstone is efficiency.5
There is simply no reason to suppose that the filing of a notice of appeal from a final judgment ousts the district court of jurisdiction to determine a motion for attorneys' fees. Indeed, the Supreme Court—in a decision cited by plaintiffs— has made clear that an application for attorneys' fees is a collateral issue independent of the merits which the court may consider even years after the principal suit is over.6 This of course implies that an appeal on the merits does not oust the district court of jurisdiction over such a motion. And if there were any doubt on the matter, it would have been eliminated by the 1993 Advisory Committee Note to Rule 54(d)(2), which specifically noted that a district court remains free, notwithstanding an appeal from a judgment on the merits, to award attorneys' fees during the pendency of the appeal and, of special importance to this case, to defer such a motion until the appeal is decided:
Thus, there is not the slightest responsible doubt that this Court was empowered, notwithstanding the pendency of the appeal, to act on MetLife's initial motion for attorneys' fees.7
This brings us to plaintiffs' next contention, viz. that the untimeliness of MetLife's initial motion precluded the Court from denying the motion without prejudice to renewal after disposition of the appeal. The premise of the argument, of course, is that Rule 6(b)(2) qualifies the Court's power under Rule 54(d)(2)(B) to provide a time other than fourteen days from the entry of judgment for the filing of a motion for attorneys' fees, at least once the fourteen day period has elapsed. This contention also is without merit for several reasons.
First of all, plaintiffs hang their hat on the supposed inconsistency between Rule 54(d)(2)(B)'s open-ended grant of power to extend time and Rule 6(b)(2)'s requirement of a showing of excusable neglect where the application for an extension is made after expiration of the prescribed time period. If the revisors had meant simply to fix a deadline for the filing of attorneys' fee motions while leaving Rule 6(b)(2) to control any extensions, however, it would have been necessary to set forth in Rule 54(d)(2)(B) only the fourteen day period for such motions. The opening phrase of the Rule—"[u]nless otherwise provided by statute or order of the court"—would have been entirely superfluous. The most reasonable reading of the rules in light of the 1993 amendment to Rule 54 therefore is that district courts have discretion to fix the timing of attorneys' fees motions, before or after the fourteen day period expires, without regard to Rule 6(b)(2). In consequence, no showing of excusable neglect was required.
Second, whatever showing might be required for an extension of the fourteen day period, either by Rule 54(d)(2) or by Rule 6(b)(2), has been made.8 The failure to file the initial motion within the fourteen day period obviously was inadvertent, and plaintiffs do not argue otherwise. Judges repeatedly have allowed late fee motions where, as here, the delay was short, inadvertent, resulted in no prejudice and was not a product of bad faith.9
Plaintiffs' further contention that, even assuming the existence of excusable neglect, the lack of a formal motion for an extension of the fourteen day period is fatal is virtually preposterous. A formal motion is nothing more than a means of bringing a request for relief to the attention of the Court in an orderly way10 and, in most cases, to afford the nonmoving party notice of the request. Here, plaintiffs have had ample notice and opportunity to be heard at every stage of MetLife's application. The fact that a particular non-jurisdictional piece of paper was not filed is of no moment.
Finally, plaintiffs' contention that an award of attorneys' fees is precluded by the mandate rule is at least as frivolous as the arguments previously addressed. The attorneys' fee issue was not before the Court of Appeals, so its mandate quite plainly did not decide the issue. Nor is there anything in the mandate precluding this Court now from addressing it. Thus, this Court is free to decide whether an award of attorneys' fees is appropriate in this case.11
As plaintiffs contend, "Section 1988 allows an award of defendants' attorney's fees only where the court finds that the plaintiffs claim was frivolous, unreasonable, or groundless, or that the plaintiff continued to litigate after it clearly became so."12 The Court assumes, moreover, that plaintiffs are right in asserting that an award of attorneys' fees to a prevailing defendant would be inappropriate "if a claim presents an issue of first impression." 13
In so assuming however, it is critically important to bear in mind that the question whether a case is one of "first impression" in any sense relevant to this analysis is a matter of degree, not of kind. Indeed, at too high a level of generality, there are no cases of first impression, while at too low a level, every case is one of first impression.14
Fixing the level of pertinent generality is crucial. The infinite variability of human experience means that every tort claim based on a driver running a red light and striking a pedestrian is different in some way. The legal principles that govern...
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Tancredi v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.
...for attorneys' fees. The district court granted the motion, holding that plaintiffs' claims were frivolous. Tancredi v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 256 F.Supp.2d 196 (S.D.N.Y.2003). We hold that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction to award attorneys' fees. Although we cannot resolv......