Tanner v. Merrill

• Decision Date: 30 December 1895
• Citation: 65 N.W. 664,108 Mich. 58
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court
• Parties: TANNER v. MERRILL ET AL.

65 N.W. 664

108 Mich. 58

TANNER v. MERRILL ET AL.

Supreme Court of Michigan

December 30, 1895

Error to circuit court, Saginaw county; Eugene Wilber, Judge.

Action by Frank A. Tanner against Thomas Merrill and others for work and labor performed. Plaintiff had judgment, and defendants bring error. Reversed.

McGrath C.J., and Montgomery, J., dissenting.

Dan P Foote, for appellants.

Rowland Connor, for appellee.

HOOKER J.

The defendants appeal from a judgment recovered against them at circuit. They are lumbermen, and the plaintiff worked for them at Georgian Bay, his transportation from Saginaw to that place having been paid by them. When he quit work, a question arose as to who should pay this, under the contract of employment, and defendants' superintendent declined to pay any transportation. The plaintiff needed the money due him to get home, and showed a telegram announcing the illness or death of his mother, and said that he must go home, to which the superintendent replied that "he did not pay any man's fare"; whereupon a receipt in full was signed, and the money due, after deducting transportation, was paid. The plaintiff testified that they had no dispute, only he claimed the fare, and the superintendent refused to allow it.

The most important question arises over a request to charge upon the part of the defendants, which reads as follows: "The testimony of the plaintiff is that, at the time the receipt put in evidence in this case was signed by him, he claimed that his railroad fare should not be deducted from his wages that this was denied by the agents and superintendents of defendants, and it was taken out of his wages; that he then signed the receipt with full knowledge of its contents; and that his railroad fare had been taken out of his wages. This being so, the receipt in this case, upon the plaintiff's own testimony, cannot be contradicted. While a receipt, in certain cases, may be contradicted, it must be in a case of mistake, ignorance of fact, fraud, or when some unconscionable advantage had been taken of one by the other party. Therefore, the receipt, in this case, shows a full settlement of all claims plaintiff had against the defendants." The only theory upon which it can be contended that this request should have been given is that the plaintiff accepted less than he claimed (but no more than defendants admitted to be due), and gave a receipt in full when the defendants' superintendent refused to pay more. We do not discover any testimony tending to show an agreement to accept as payment, either in full or by way of compromise except the receipt; and the question resolves itself into this, whether a receipt in full is conclusive of the question of defendants' liability, when it is given upon payment of a portion of a claim admittedly due, accompanied by a refusal to pay more, in the absence of mistake, fraud, duress, or undue influence. It is urged upon behalf of the plaintiff that receipts are always open to explanation, and that there is no consideration to support the acceptance of a portion of a valid claim as full payment. The cases which counsel cite do not support the broad contention of plaintiff's counsel, which would seriously derange business affairs if it should be sustained. The doctrine that the receipt of part payment must rest upon a valid consideration to be effective in discharge of the entire debt is carefully limited to cases where the debt is liquidated, by agreement of the parties or otherwise, which was not the case here. It was in dispute. In the case of Railway Co. v. Davis (Kan.) 11 P. 421, the opinion says that "it is a well-settled principle of law that the payment of a part of an ascertained, overdue, and undisputed debt, although accepted in full satisfaction, and a receipt in full is given, does not estop the creditor from recovering the balance. In such case the agreement is without consideration." The case of Day v. Gardner (N. J. Ch.) 7 Atl. 366, was one where the agreement was to forgive a debt, implying its existence. In Hasted v. Dodge (Iowa) 35 N.W. 462, the opinion of Mr. Justice Rothrock shows the debt not to have been in dispute. Moreover, the doctrine was not applicable to the case for reasons shown. See, also, Bridge Co. v. Murphy, 13 Kan. 35. In Bailey v. Day, 26 Me. 88, the claim was liquidated by judgment. In Hayes v. Insurance Co., 18 N.E. 322, the supreme court of Illinois applies the doctrine relied upon, but expressly states "that it has no application where property other than money is taken, or where there is an honest compromise of unliquidated or disputed demands." See, also, Bish. Cont. � 50; 2 Pars. Cont. 618. In Marion v. Heimbach, 64 N.W. 386, the supreme court of Minnesota say: "But where the claim is unliquidated, it would seem to be that if the creditor is tendered a less sum than his claim upon the conditions that, if it is accepted, it must be in full satisfaction of his whole claim, his acceptance is an accord and satisfaction." See, also, Fuller v. Kemp, 138 N.Y. 234, 33 N.E. 1034, where the same doctrine is held; Association v. Wickham, 141 U.S. 577, 12 S.Ct. 84.

The important fact to ascertain is whether the plaintiff's claim was a liquidated claim or not. If it was, there was no consideration for the discharge. If not, the authorities are in substantial accord that part payment of the claim may discharge the debt, if it is so received. Upon the undisputed facts, the claim of the plaintiff, as made, was not liquidated. It was not even admitted, but, on the contrary was denied, because the defendant claimed that it had been partially paid by a valid offset. While the controversy was over the offset, it is plain that the amount due the plaintiff was in dispute. If so, it is difficult to understand how it could be treated as a liquidated claim unless it is to be said that a claim may be liquidated piecemeal, and that, so far as the items are agreed upon, it is liquidated, and to that extent is not subject to adjustment on a basis of part payment. Cases are not numerous in which just this phase of the question appears. This would seem remarkable, unless we are to assume that, in calling a claim unliquidated, the courts have alluded to the whole claim, and considered that, where the amount is not agreed upon, the claim as a whole is unliquidated, and therefore subject to adjustment. If this is not true, no man can pay an amount that he admits to be due without being subject to action whenever and so often as his creditor may choose to claim that he was not fully paid, no matter how solemn may have been his acknowledgment of satisfaction, so long as it is not a release under seal. The general rule is a technical one, and there are many exceptions. It has been said that it "often fosters bad faith, and that the history of the judicial decisions will be found to show a constant effort to escape from its absurdity and injustice." Harper v. Graham, 20 Ohio, 105; Kellogg v. Richards, 14 Wend. 116; Brooks v. White, 2 Metc. (Mass.) 283. Again, it is said to be "rigid and unreasonable," and defeats the expressed intentions of the parties, and, therefore, "should not be extended to embrace cases not within the letter of it." Wescott v. Waller, 47 Ala. 492; Johnson v. Brannan, 5 Johns. 268; Simmons v. Almy, 103 Mass. 35. See Milliken v. Brown, 1 Rawle, 391, where the rule is vigorously denounced. It has no application in case...