Tanner v. State

• Decision Date: 26 May 1970
• Docket Number: No. 356,356
• Citation: 9 Md.App. 462,265 A.2d 573
• Parties: James Dale TANNER v. STATE of Maryland.
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 462

9 Md.App. 462

265 A.2d 573

James Dale TANNER v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 356.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

May 26, 1970.

Certionari Denied Sept. 15, 1970.

Judson R. Wood, Rockville, with William O. E. Sterling, Leonardtown, on the brief, for appellant.

Henry R. Lord, Asst. Atty. Gen., with whom were Francis B. Burch, Atty. Gen., Joseph D. Weiner, State's Atty. for St. Mary's County; William A. Linthicum, Jr., State's Atty. for Montgomery County and William M. Cave, Asst. State's Atty. for Montgomery County, on the brief, for appellee.

Before MURPHY, C. J., and ANDERSON, MORTON, ORTH and THOMPSON, JJ.

ANDERSON, Judge.

Appellant, James Dale Tanner, was jointly indicted with Charles Eugene Snook in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County in a three count indictment charging rape, assault with intent to rape, and assault and battery. In addition to a plea of not guilty, appellant filed written pleas (1) that he was insane at the time of the commission of the crime and (2) that he is presently insane. As a result of the pleas, he was sent to The Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital for a pretrial mental evaluation. After his return from the hospital, he filed an affidavit of removal and the case was removed the the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County for trial. On May 5, 1969, appellant was tried in the Circuit Court for St. Mary's County by a jury, Judge Philip H. Dorsey, Jr., presiding, and was convicted of the crime of rape (first count). He was sentenced to a term of eight years under the jurisdiction of the Department of Correction, and the clerk was directed to send with the commitment a request that appellant be examined at the Patuxent Institution to determine whether he was a defective delinquent. The court further ordered the clerk to attach a notification that appellant be returned to The Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital where he was being treated, to be held under maximum security.

The sole contention on appeal is that the lower court erred in its finding that the testimony produced on behalf of the appellant at the preliminary hearing was not sufficient to rebut the presumption of sanity and to raise a doubt as to the sanity of the appellant, as defined in Article 59, § 9(a), Md.Code, in the minds of reasonable men.

After the jury was sworn and impanelled the court proceeded, out of the presence of the jury, to determine preliminarily whether appellant was competent to stand trial and, if so, whether there was sufficient proof to raise a doubt as to appellant's sanity at the time of the alleged offense in the minds of reasonable men, in accordance with the procedure laid down by this Court in Strawderman v. State, 4 Md.App. 689, 244 A.2d 888.

At the preliminary hearing, the appellant offered as a witness Dr. Ian MacKay, a specialist in Forensic psychiatry at The Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital. Dr. MacKay testified that he first saw appellant at Perkins in September of 1968 and again at a staff meeting on September 19th. Appellant was discharged on September 26, 1968, and later returned to the hospital on January 3, 1969, where he remained until April 18, 1969. On January 17, 1969, he was transferred to Dr. MacKay's ward (Ward #10) from the Admission Ward, where he remained until April 18, 1969, a total of 90 days. During that time Dr. MacKay saw the appellant at least fifty times, for a considerable length of time on each occasion. He also interviewed appellant prior to trial for a period of ten to fifteen minutes. He was then asked if he had an opinion as to whether appellant was competent to stand trial. He stated that he did, and when asked what that opinion was replied: 'I think he understands the nature and the object of the charges against him, and I think he's able to assist in his defense.'

Further in his testimony the following colloquy took place:

BY MR. WOOD:

'Q Now, Doctor, do you have an opinion as to whether Mr. Tanner, on April 19, 1968, ¹ is sane or insane?

A I have an opinion now Mr. Wood.

Q And what is that opinion, sir?

A My opinion is that it is almost certain that at that time he lacked substantial capacity by reason of disease or defect of the mind to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform that conduct to the requirements of the law.'

'THE COURT: Now, what disease of the mind was he suffering at that time?

THE WITNESS: Well, Your Honor, this is the thing that I have conjured up in my mind, because I can see no evidence of psychosis in this patient, but I have considered the possibility and perhaps the probability of what they call what is called a dissociated reaction, a state of affairs in which a patient is so overwhelmed by his-if I may quote. If I may quote from the official manual, Your Honor, the Diagnostic Manual for Mental Disorders of the American Psychiatric Association, and this is one of the sub-divisions (sic) of what is called a hysterical neurosis. This characterizes his character by an involuntary psychogenic loss or disorder of function: 'Symbols characteristically begin and end suddenly in emotionally charged situations and are symbolic of underlying conflicts. Often, they can be modified by suggestion alone'. And the sub-division (sic) to which I'm referring, Your Honor, is the hysterical neurosis dissociated type. 'And a dissociated type in all reactions may occur in the patient's state of consciousness, all in his identity to produce some symption as amnesic symbolism fugue and multiple personality."

BY MR. WOOD:

'Q Well, doctor, you are familiar with Article 59, Section 9, the test of responsibility at the time of the alleged offense?

A I am.

Q And you feel that he fits within the definition of an insane man on April 19, 1968?

A I do.'

'THE COURT: Now, doctor, on April 19th, do you feel that he lacked substantial capacity, either to appreciate the criminality of his conduct or to conform his conduct to the requirement of the law?

THE WITNESS: I do now, Your Honor. Yes.

THE COURT: You say you do now. When did you form that opinion?

THE WITNESS: I formed that opinion, Your Honor, since I came to know him much better than I did the first time he came to the hospital, because at that time I thought the reverse; although, of course, at that time, I didn't know him anything like as well as I know him now.

THE COURT: Well, through this acquaintanceship with him, what was his conduct that led you to change your original opinion?

THE WITNESS: Nothing specific, Your Honor. It was the whole panorama of his life situation as he presented it to me over the hours that he spent with me during those 90 days that he was in Ward 10; and, generally speaking, it's the answer to your question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Was he suffering with a mental disease?

THE WITNESS: I think he was, yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: How would you diagnose that?

THE WITNESS: Well, this diagnosis that I gave is really a diagnosis of exclusion, because as I said before, Your Honor, I don't believe he's psychotic and I don't believe any one believes he's psychotic. He certainly is sick, psychiatrically sick, emotionally sick.'

This was followed by a long cross-examination of the witness by the State. No further evidence was offered by the appellant and no evidence was offered by the State; nor was the staff report of The Clifton T. Perkins State Hospital offered in evidence. Based solely on the testimony of Dr. Ian MacKay the lower court found that the doctor's testimony, standing alone, was not sufficient proof of the insanity of the accused to raise a question in the minds of reasonable men as to whether he was or was not sane at the time of the commission of the offense.

The lower court determined that appellant was competent to stand trial according to the standards set forth in Article 459, § 7, Md.Code, namely, that he was able to...