Tansey v. The Landmark Tr. (U.S.)
| Docket Number | 77-4-13 Oecv |
| Decision Date | 07 August 2018 |
| Citation | 2018 Vt Super 080702 |
| Parties | DAVID C. TANSEY Plaintiff v. THE LANDMARK TRUST (USA), Defendant |
| Court | Superior Court of Vermont |
The text of this Vermont trial court opinion is unofficial. It has been reformatted from the original. The accuracy of the text and the accompanying data included in the Vermont trial court opinion database is not guaranteed.
DECISION ON DEFENDANT'S SECOND MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGEMENT
Defendant The Landmark Trust (hereinafter “Defendant” or “the Trust”) moves for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiff David Tansey cannot establish the elements of his claim and that Plaintiff's workers' compensation settlement prevents him from bringing this action. The remaining claim in this case is for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED), based on Plaintiff's allegation that in 2012 members of the board of the Trust appeared at Plaintiff's house, ousted his wife in an “insidious attempt to eliminate a witness to their actions,” and “berated” Plaintiff for two hours. See Pl.'s Opposition to Def.'s Motion for Summary Judgment at 2. Defendant is represented by Kaveh Shahi, Esq. Plaintiff is represented by Norman Watts, Esq.
Defendant contends that the worker's compensation exclusivity bar prevents a civil action for this IIED claim based on work-related allegations of emotional distress. Defendant argues Plaintiff's receipt of a final workers compensation settlement award, covering some of the same injuries as claimed in this lawsuit, served as an election of remedy, to the extent Plaintiff had a choice between a workers compensation benefit claim and his intentional tort suit. Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has not established the extreme emotional distress or outrageous conduct necessary for an IIED claim.
Plaintiff asserts that the exclusivity bar does not apply here because the Workers Compensation Act (WCA) applies to personal injuries "at work" and "by accident." Plaintiff contends that the WCA, and the exclusivity bar only covers negligent acts, not intentional ones. Plaintiff also contends that the law of the case doctrine precludes Defendant from raising the sufficiency of the evidence argument for a second time, and in any event his facts show the basis for the jury to hear his IIED claim. Finally Plaintiff argues that he did not elect the WCA remedies in preclusion of a civil claim, arguing that the workers' compensation settlement was for negligence, whereas the civil suit is for intentional conduct.
Plaintiff's complaint alleges that in the summer and fall of 2012 he suffered emotional distress at work. Def.'s SUF ¶ 1. The Trust's "weak financial condition" and "harassment" by board members caused Plaintiff's anxiety and emotional distress. Id. ¶ 2. Additionally, two board members "forced Plaintiff into a non-noticed meeting in the kitchen of his residence." Id. ¶ 3. This is the so-called "kitchen meeting." He was "harassed and abused" during this meeting. Id. ¶ 4. The board members came to Plaintiff's house to discuss claims regarding Plaintiff's workplace behavior. Id. ¶ 8. According to Plaintiff, this meeting was "one bit of abuse." Id.
As claimed by Plaintiff, the board members "showed up in my kitchen, kicked my wife out of the house," and "said very serious charges have been leveled against me." Id. The overall story of events from this period was "extremely upsetting" to Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 11. Plaintiff asserts that the board members "aggressively harassed and abused" him, accusing him of policy infractions and creating a "hostile and intimidating workplace." Pl.'s SDF ¶ 24. Plaintiff alleges he was not provided specific details of the charges levied against him. Id. He was repeatedly "cut off," even as he tried to explain one of the accusatory employees had violated his job description and company policies. Plaintiff was told he had no right to discipline the employee and told he had no right to defend himself. Id. ¶¶ 25-27. The meeting and the board members' behavior was "hostile." Id. ¶¶ 32-33.
Plaintiff submitted a claim with the Trust's workers' compensation insurer for "[i]ntense stress" caused by work finances and an "abusive board of directors." Plaintiff stated that the time of emotional distress spanned from July 1, 2012 to November 20, 2012. Def.'s SUF ¶ 7. According to Plaintiff, the intense stress "developed over time," and that there was "no particular day" and "no particular week" when "all of these things happened." Id. Plaintiff settled his workers' compensation claim for injuries including "blood pressure, teeth, jaw, psychological component including stress, anxiety, depression and all natural sequelae." Id. ¶ 13.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party establishes there is no genuine dispute of material fact and the party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. V.R.C.P. 56(a). The Court considers the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Stone v. Town of Irasburg, 2014 VT 43, ¶ 25, 196 Vt. 356.
A trial court may consider a second motion for summary judgment even if a prior judge denied a similar summary judgment motion in order to avoid a "useless" trial. See Morrisseau v. Fayette, 164 Vt. 358, 363 (1995) ( ).
Plaintiff cites Morrisseau to support the proposition that the law of the case doctrine should preclude the Court from reconsidering the prior summary judgment decision. However, Morrisseau rejected the argument that the law of the case doctrine prevents reconsideration of a prior decision, explaining that the doctrine is a "rule of practice" from which the court may depart, and the Court retains the power to reopen what had been previously decided. Id. at 364. The Supreme Court explained that it will not apply a "useful rule of practice in a way that prevents efficient adjudication." Id. This Morrisseau holding has been recently restated with approval by the Vermont Supreme Court in Burgess v. Lamoille Housing Partnership, 016 VT 31, ¶ 19, 201 Vt. 450, where citing Morriseau, the Court stated:
Indeed, even if the previous judge had denied an earlier motion for summary judgment based on the same information, we have explicitly held that a second judge may grant a motion for summary judgment or judgment on the pleadings after denial of a similar motion by another judge.
This issue was discussed in the pre-trial conference, including the fact that the undersigned judge, who will conduct the three-day jury trial, will need to rule on a Rule 50(a) defense motion for judgment as a matter of law at the close of Plaintiff's case. Such motion will test the sufficiency of Plaintiff's evidence to prove an IIED claim, and legal issues as to the workers compensation exclusivity bar and election of remedy defenses asserted in the second motion. It will make for efficient proceedings for the court to test the sufficiency of the evidence, and the viability of the legal defenses, before commencing the three-day trial.
Accordingly, the Court considers the merits of Defendant's motion here.
Defendant argues that Plaintiff's IIED claim falls within the WCA's exclusivity provision. In general, workers' compensation is the exclusive remedy for work-related injuries. 21 V.S.A. § 622. "Under the law, employees gain an expeditious remedy without the burden of proving fault; in exchange, employers' liability is limited." Dunham v. Chase, 165 Vt. 543, 543 (1996) (citing Kittell v. Vermont Weatherboard, Inc., 138 Vt. 439, 441 (1980)). The Court has broadly construed the requirement that the injury occur "by accident." Gallipo v. City of Rutland, 173 Vt. 223, 236 (2001) (citing 21 V.S.A. § 618). Thus, "[i]ntentional acts are excluded from this requirement only if there is 'a specific intent to injure.'" Id. at 236-37 .
In Mead v. W. Slate, Inc., the Court explained:
Like most other jurisdictions, we have recognized an exception to the exclusivity rule for intentional injuries committed by the employer. We stressed in Kittell, however, that the policy trade-off underlying the workers' compensation law was best served by allowing the remedial system which the Legislature has created a broad sphere of operation. Hence, we held that nothing short of a specific intent to injure falls outside the scope of the Act. Under Kittell, even wilful and wanton conduct leading to a sudden but foreseeable injury is within the scope of the Act.
2004 VT 11, ¶ 12, 176 Vt. 274 (quotations and citations omitted). For example, the Court said in Gallipo: "We think it clear that an employer can take actions against an employee, producing mental injury and motivated in part by unlawful discrimination, without having the specific intent to injure the employee." Id. at 237.
In Stamp Tech, Inc. ex rel. Blair v. Ludall/Thermal Acoustical, Inc., however, the Court reversed a grant of summary judgment to an employer on the issue of whether the plaintiff met either the specific intent standard or the substantial certainty standard.[1] The Court held that the plaintiff was not given the benefit of all reasonable doubt on the intent issue, despite the trial court's conclusion that no facts established that the employer took actions with the specific intent of harming its employees. 2009 VT...
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