Tanton v. McKenney

• Decision Date: 05 March 1924
• Docket Number: No. 66,Jan. Term.,66
• Citation: 197 N.W. 510,226 Mich. 245
• Parties: TANTON v. McKENNEY et al.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

226 Mich. 245

197 N.W. 510

TANTON

v.McKENNEY et al.

No. 66, Jan. Term.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

March 5, 1924.

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Washtenaw County; George W. Sample, Judge.

Mandamus by Alice Tanton, by Dorothy Tanton, her next friend, against Charles McKenney, President of the Michigan State Normal College, and another. Writ denied, and petitioner brings certiorari. Writ of certiorari dismissed, and judgment denying writ of mandamus affirmed.

Argued before CLARK, C. J., and McDONALD, BIRD, SHARPE, MOORE, STEERE, FELLOWS, and WIEST, JJ.Walter M. Nelson and Harry L. Diehl, both of Detroit (William E. Henze, John D. Lynch, and Frank Ruddy, all of Detroit, of counsel), for appellant.

Andrew B. Dougherty, Atty. Gen., and O. L. Smith, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellees.

FELLOWS, J.

The plaintiff, Alice Tanton, a young lady 18 years old, attended the Michigan State Normal College at Ypsilanti during the fall term, 1921, and the winter term, 1922. She was refused readmission for the spring term, 1922. The refusal was based on an investigation of plaintiff's conduct made by defendant Bessie Leach Priddy, dean of women of the institution, and was approved by the president, defendant Charles McKenney. Before taking such action Mrs. Priddy called plaintiff in, fully apprised her of the information which had come to her as dean of women, and gave her ample opportunity to explain her conduct. Shortly thereafter plaintiff instituted mandamus proceedings in the Washtenaw circuit court to compel her reinstatement. Issues were framed and a trial had at which considerable testimony was taken. The trial judge found the facts to be with the defendants; that plaintiff had become addicted to the smoking of cigarettes before coming to the institution and continued their use there; that she smoked cigarettes on the public streets of Ypsilanti; that she rode around the streets of Ypsilanti in an automobile seated on the lap of a young man, and was guilty of other acts of indiscretion; and that she aired her grievances and her defiance of disciplinary measures in the public press, which tended to prevent her return to the institution and the maintenance of discipline there. He found as matter of law that defendants had acted within their power, and that there had been no abuse of discretion, and denied the writ. This action is here reviewed on certiorari.

We may on certiorari examine the record to determine whether there is any testimony to support the findings but not to weigh such testimony. An examination of the record before us discloses an abundance of testimony to sustain the findings in the instant case. Indeed plaintiff's own testimony sustains them, although she seeks to minimize her acts.

Preliminary to the consideration of the main questions, plaintiff's counsel insists that there was error in the rejection of certain testimony offered by him. He apparently sought to show that some of the male students and professors at the University smoked. This testimony was rejected by the trial judge and correctly rejected. The rules of discipline at the University might be entirely inappropriate for an institution having as students over 1,400 girls of tender years. This brings us to the meritorious questions of whether defendants have the power here exercised, and whether there has been an abuse of such power.

As is well known the Michigan State Normal College is maintained at the expense of the taxpayers to prepare teachers for our public schools. The student body is made up almost entirely of young women who have chosen teaching as their profession. They are required to sign a ‘declaration of intention’ couched in the following language:

‘We, the subscribers, do hereby declare that it is our intention to devote ourselves to the business of teaching in the schools of this state, and that our sole object in resorting to this normal school is the better to prepare ourselves for the discharge of this important duty.’

Inherently the managing officers have the power to maintain such discipline as will effectuate the purposes of the institution. Their powers are somewhat analogous to the powers of school boards in our country schools and boards of education in our cities. In the consideration of their powers we must also bear in mind that the students at our normal schools are being fitted for a profession requiring the highest standard of personal conduct. The right to attend our public schools is beyond question. That such right is tempered by, and subject to, proper regulations in the furtherance of discipline is likewise beyond question. That, in the absence of an abuse of discretion, the school authorities and not the court shall prescribe proper disciplinary measures is, we think, settled by the text-writers and the adjudicated cases.

A few excerpts from the article on ‘Schools' in Ruling Case Law will be helpful in determining the rule to be adopted. We quote the following:

‘There is no necessity that all the rules, orders and regulations for the discipline, government and management of the schools shall be made a matter of record by the school board, or that every act, order or direction affecting the conduct of such schools shall be authorized or confirmed by a formal vote. It is recognized that no system of rules however carefully prepared can provide for every emergency, or meet every requirement. In consequence, much must necossarily be left to the individual members of the school boards, and to the superintendents of and the teachers in the several schools. It follows that any reasonable rule adopted by a superintendent, or a teacher merely, not inconsistent with some statute or some other rule prescribed by higher authority, is binding on the pupils.’ 24 R. C. L. p. 574.

‘ Control by Courts. The courts will not interfere with the exercise of discretion by school directors in matters confided by law to their judgment, unless there is a clear abuse of the discretion, or a violation of law. So the courts are usually disinclined to interfere with regulations adopted by school boards, and they will not consider whether the regulations are wise or expedient, but merely whether they are a reasonable exercise of the power and discretion of the board. Acting reasonably within the powers conferred, it is the province of the board of education to determine what things are detrimental to the successful management, good order, and discipline of the schools and the rules required to produce these conditions. The presumption is always in favor of the reasonableness and propriety of a rule or regulation duly made. The reasonableness of regulations is a question of law for the courts.’ 24 R. C. L. p. 575.

‘ Suspension or Expulsion by Directors. The enjoyment of the right of attending the public schools is necessarily conditioned on compliance by pupils with the reasonable rules, regulations, and requirements of the school authorities, breaches of which may be punished...