Tanyike v. United States
| Decision Date | 13 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 3:21-cv-311 |
| Citation | 603 F.Supp.3d 572 |
| Parties | Henry TANYIKE, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Brian J. Hoffman, Brian J. Hoffman LLC, Wooster, OH, Jeremy Joseph Jong, Jeremy Jong, Pro Hac Vice, New Orleans, LA, for Plaintiff.
ENTRY AND ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO TRANSFER VENUE OR, IN THE ALTERNATIVE, TO DISMISS FOR IMPROPER VENUE
Henry Tanyike ("Tanyike") filed his Complaint (Doc. No. 1) in this Court against the United States of America ("Government"), alleging two causes of action related to his time in the custody of Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") in Louisiana. Presently before the Court is the Government's Motion to Transfer Venue or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss for Improper Venue (the "Motion"). (Doc. No. 10.) In the Motion, the Government argues that venue is improper in the Southern District of Ohio because Tanyike cannot establish that he resides in the district under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) given that he is not a permanent resident. (Id. at PageID 30-34.) In the alternative, the Government argues that a transfer to the Western District of Louisiana would be appropriate, in part, because most of the witnesses and relevant sources of proof are located in Louisiana. (Id. at PageID 37-42.)
For the reasons discussed below, the Court DENIES the Motion to Transfer Venue or, in the Alternative, to Dismiss for Improper Venue in its entirety.
On June 4, 2019, Tanyike arrived at the port of San Ysidro, California and made a request for asylum to United States Customs and Border Protection. (Doc. No. 1 at PageID 2.) Tanyike had fled his home country of Cameroon because he had been arrested twice by the military as a result of his political activities. (Id. ) After requesting asylum, Tanyike was transferred to ICE custody. (Id. ) On January 14, 2021, Tanyike was in ICE custody at the Winn Correctional Center ("WCC") in Winnfield, Louisiana. (Id. at PageID 1.) On that day, Tanyike alleges he was directed to a room where six ICE officers were waiting. (Id. at PageID 3.) Tanyike was allegedly told that he needed to sign a piece of paper and provide a fingerprint. (Id. ) Tanyike refused to sign or fingerprint the document without showing it to his lawyer. (Id. ) The officers allegedly threw Tanyike to the ground, as "[o]ne ICE officer pressed on Mr. Tanyike's neck, and other officers climbed on his back." (Doc. No. 1 at PageID 3.) The officer who pressed on Tanyike's neck did so for two minutes before the officers handcuffed Tanyike behind his back. (Id. )
On November 17, 2021, Tanyike filed his Complaint against the Government alleging claims for battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act ( 28 U.S.C. § 2679, et seq. ). (Id. at PageID 5-7.) The Complaint alleges that venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b) because Tanyike resides in Dayton, Ohio. (Id. at PageID 2.)
On February 28, 2022, the Government filed the present Motion. (Doc. No. 10.) Tanyike filed his response on March 28, 2022 (Doc. No. 12), and the Government filed its reply on April 11, 2021 (Doc. No. 13). The Motion is fully briefed and ripe for review.
When a party challenges venue under Rule 12(b)(3), the plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the current venue is proper. Ring v. Roto-Rooter Servs. Co. , No. 1:10-CV-179, 2010 WL 3825390, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108202, at *9 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 28, 2010) ; Contech Bridge Sols., Inc. v. Keaffaber , No. 1:11-cv-216, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 122875, at *33, 2011 WL 5037210, at *11 (S.D. Ohio Oct. 24, 2011). The district court has the discretion to decide the appropriate procedure for deciding a motion to dismiss for improper venue. Ring , 2010 WL 3825390, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108202, at *9 ; Centerville ALF, Inc. v. Balanced Care Corp. , 197 F. Supp. 2d 1039, 1046 (S.D. Ohio 2002). Where a motion is decided solely on the pleadings and attached affidavits, viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, plaintiff need only present a prima facie case that venue is proper. Ring , 2010 WL 3825390, at *3, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108202, at *9 ; Barton v. Florida , No. 2:06-cv-78, 2006 WL 2773238, at *2, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68815, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Sept. 25, 2006).
The Government argues that Tanyike cannot establish venue in the Southern District of Ohio because he cannot show that he "resides" in this district. (Doc. No. 10 at PageID 30-34.) The Government further argues that the balance of interests weigh in favor of transferring this matter to the Western District of Louisiana. (Id. at PageID 37-42.)
Chapter 87 of Title 28 to the United States Code ( 28 U.S.C. 1390, et seq. ) governs venue for federal district courts. Where a plaintiff seeks to pursue a tort claim against the United States, the action may be brought "in the judicial district where the plaintiff resides or wherein the act or omission complained of occurred." 28 U.S.C. § 1402(b). However, Section 1402 does not provide a definition for "resides," which means the Court looks to the definition of "residency" contained in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) to determine whether a suit has been properly brought in this district pursuant to Section 1402. See Petrovic v. United States , No. 16-418, 2016 WL 11619778, at *1, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 203242, at *2 (E.D. Ky. Nov. 15, 2016). Section 1391(c)(1) provides, "a natural person, including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States, shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1). Encapsulated within residence is the intent to remain as part of the concept of domicile or, "residence at a particular place accompanied with positive or presumptive proof of an intention to remain there for an unlimited time." Hefferan v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery Inc. , 828 F.3d 488, 494 (6 Cir. 2016) (citing Mitchell v. United States , 88 U.S. 350, 352, 21 Wall. 350, 22 L. Ed. 584 (1874) ).
The Government argues that a person who has not been lawfully admitted to the United States cannot form the intent to remain in this district under Section 1391(c)(1). (Doc. No. 10 at PageID 31.) The Government further argues that the 2011 amendments to Section 1391 show that those amendments were made to extend a venue defense only to the limited subset of natural persons known as legal permanent residents. (Id. at PageID 32-33.) In response, Tanyike argues that the term "including" prior to "an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" in Section 1391(c)(1) demonstrates the group is illustrative of "a natural persons" rather than limiting those persons to permanent residents. (Doc. No. 12 at PageID 50-52.) Tanyike further argues that he is lawfully present in the United States because he has a pending asylum application. (Id. at PageID 55-57.) Therefore, Tanyike argues he has the ability to form the lawful intent to remain in this district. (Id. )
The disputed language states, "a natural person, including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence in the United States , shall be deemed to reside in the judicial district in which that person is domiciled." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c)(1) (emphasis added). To be even more specific, part of the argument turns on the meaning and use of the word "including," in Section 1391(c)(1).
The term "include" is defined as, Include , BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019). Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "the term ‘including’ is not one of all-embracing definition, but connotes simply an illustrative application of the general principle." Fed. Land Bank v. Bismarck Lumber Co. , 314 U.S. 95, 100, 62 S. Ct. 1, 86 L.Ed. 65 (1941) (citing Phelps Dodge Corp. v. N.L.R.B. , 313 U.S. 177, 189, 61 S. Ct. 845, 85 L.Ed. 1271 (1941) ); see also Samantar v. Yousuf , 560 U.S. 305, 317, 130 S. Ct. 2278, 176 L.Ed.2d 1047 (2010) ().
Concerning whether an alien seeking asylum (like Tanyike) can establish venue in a forum where he or she is domiciled, some courts have ended the analysis by finding Section 1391 to be unambiguous because those courts have found that the language "including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" is an illustrative example or does not exclude aliens from being a "natural person" under the statute. Flores v. United States , 108 F. Supp. 3d 126, 130 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) ; Alvarado v. United States , No. 16-5028, 2017 WL 2303758, at *2-3, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80894, at *6 () (emphasis in original). This Court is not persuaded that the analysis should end with the statutory language. By the reasoning of these other courts "natural persons" under Section 1391(c)(1) would cover all human beings.1 It begs the question, why include the language "including an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence" if it serves no purpose? If every human being is included, why single out one specific group? In short, the Court finds the statute to be ambiguous with respect to this particular issue.
Where a statute is ambiguous, the Court may look to the legislative history to clarify the ambiguity. Brilliance Audio, Inc. v. Haights Cross Communs., Inc. , 474 F.3d 365, 371-72 (6th Cir. 2007) (citing Garcia v. United States , 469 U.S. 70, 76 n.3, 105 S. Ct. 479, 83 L.Ed.2d 472 (1984) ).
In this instance, the legislative history offers two salient points that clarify the purpose of the amendments to ...
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