Tanzer v. Huffines

Decision Date18 March 1969
Docket NumberNo. 17505.,17505.
Citation408 F.2d 42
PartiesDeborah TANZER v. Robert H. HUFFINES, Jr., Edward Krock, Victor Muscat, Defiance Industries, Inc., and B. S. F. Company. B. S. F. Company, Appellant.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Bruce M. Stargatt, Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, H. Albert Young, Jack B. Jacobs, Wilmington, Del., for appellant.

Paul L. Ross, Wolf, Popper, Ross, Wolf & Jones, New York City (Cohen, Morris & Rosenthal, Wilmington, Del., Howard L. Jacobs, New York City, Irving Morris, Wilmington, Del., on the brief), for appellee.

Theodore Sonde, Securities & Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C. (Philip A. Loomis, Jr., General Counsel, Walter P. North, Associate General Counsel, Brian M. Eisenberg, Atty., Securities and Exchange Commission, Washington, D. C., on the brief), amicus curiae.

Before VAN DUSEN, ALDISERT and STAHL, Circuit Judges.

OPINION OF THE COURT

PER CURIAM:

This is an appeal from the appointment of a receiver pendente lite in a stockholder's derivative action wherein the plaintiff alleges inter alia that the individual defendants, Robert Huffines, Victor Muscat and Edward Krock, by virtue of their control of Defiance Industries, Inc., which in turn controlled B.S.F. Company, infiltrated and were able to make themselves officers and directors of certain of B.S.F.'s portfolio companies; that the individual defendants improperly withdrew salaries, obtained bonuses and stock options from those portfolio companies; and that they caused B.S.F. (1) to suffer substantial damage in attempts to gain control of those portfolio companies by requiring large and improper expenditures in legal fees and proxy fights, and (2) to sustain heavy losses as a result of stock purchases and sales they compelled in their own interests without regard to the interests of B.S.F. or its shareholders.

It is clear that a District Court may appoint a receiver in a proper case. Burnrite Coal Briquette Co. v. Riggs, 274 U.S. 208, 212, 47 S.Ct. 578, 71 L.Ed. 1002 (1927). A receiver may be appointed to avert further loss of assets through waste and mismanagement. Savage v. United States District Court, etc., 144 F.2d 575 (9th Cir. 1944); Coskery v. Roberts & Mander Corporation, 97 F.Supp. 14 (E.D.Pa.), appeal dismissed, 189 F.2d 234 (3rd Cir. 1951). After a careful examination of the record, we have concluded that there was no abuse of discretion by the District Court in appointing the receiver pendente lite for B.S.F.

The District Court primarily relied on the following factors as justifying appointment of a receiver pendente lite Tanzer v. Huffines, 287 F.Supp. 273, 274 (D.Del.1968):

(1) The decision of Judge Mansfield in Norte & Company v. Huffines, 288 F.Supp. 855 (S.D.N.Y.1968), where the court pointed out that "Plaintiff has established a clear case of gross and deliberate fraud on the part of defendants Huffines and Muscat, knowingly participated in by Krock * * *";
(2) B.S.F.\'s non-compliance with the requirements of 15 U.S.C. § 80a-29 by failing to file the Annual Report, Form N-1R, with the Securities and Exchange Commission;
(3) omissions from material which the defendants submitted to the court; and
(4) misleading information in the 1967 Annual Report to Stockholders of B.S.F.

In Norte, supra, another District Court found that the individual defendants had violated the federal securities law in the operation of Defiance. The record is also clear that B.S.F. did not file Form N-1R as required. This failure is significant because that form elicits essential information such as an analysis of per share income and capital charges, a statement of remuneration paid to officers and directors, and a statement identifying those officers and directors.1 Added significance must be attached to the failure to mention the names of the officers and directors in the Annual Report to Stockholders, since the record shows that B.S.F. had been operating with only three of the five authorized directors. Not only did the report omit the directors' names, but also it was actively misleading in that (1) the net asset figures for 1966 and 1967 were reversed;2 (2) improper treatment was given to the gain on the sale of investments;3 and (3) in the notes attached to the Report, the obligation to Dallas Transit Trust No. 1 is discussed without indication that B.S.F., at cost less reserve, had pledged $1,941,729. of its portfolio securities to meet its obligation to Dallas.4

The last of the four bases upon which Judge Layton principally relies is a letter sent him by defendants' counsel which purportedly included biographical sketches of proposed directors of B.S.F. That letter was quite misleading. It stated "Of the five Directors proposed, two (Scholz and Keating) must be regarded as having a fixed relation to the present management." That statement was literally and figuratively a half truth. In fact, four of the proposed directors had a fixed relation to the existing management.5

Judge Layton also commented on Muscat's failure to responsively answer over 700 questions on deposition and Krock's failure to appear for deposition until threatened with a default judgment. See 287 F.Supp. at 276. The court also noted the decline in the value of a share of B.S.F. from the time the defendants acquired control of that company.6

We agree that collectively, at least, these reasons listed by the District Court are sufficient to require our holding that there was no abuse of discretion in the appointment of a receiver pendente lite. By our independent examination of the record,7 we find that the defendants' activities with relation to American Hardware Company, Republic Corporation, Mercantile National Bank of Chicago, Fifth Avenue Coach Lines, Gray Line Corporation, American Steel & Pump Corporation, and Wright Machine Corporation as a result of their control of B.S.F. lend additional support to the propriety of the appointment of a receiver.8

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the District Court appointing a receiver pendente lite for B.S.F. will be affirmed.

1 The complaint's allegations of violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the Investment Company Act (6A), as supported by the foregoing, together with the finding of gross and deliberate fraud by these individual defendants in Norte, supra, justified the District Court's noting that "* * * in cases where the Securities and Exchange Commission has sought injunctions against future violations of the securities laws, courts have found that illegal past conduct gives rise to the inference that there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations. S. E. C. v. Keller Corporation, 323 F.2d 397 (C.A. 7, 1963). The analogy to this case is particularly strong, where the suit brought by this private plaintiff is against an investment company, which the Congress has determined to be `affected with a national public interest' and the improper management of which adversely affects the `national public interest and the interest of investors.' 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1." (Page 275 of 287 F.Supp.)

2 As a result, the Report reflected an increase in net asset value from $6.08 in 1966 to $6.78 in 1967, when the net asset value had actually decreased 70 cents per share from 1966 to 1967.

3 Had B. S. F. followed the direction of 17 C.F.R. Chap. II, § 210.6, and reported net realized gain on investments in a statement separate from that which reports income and expenses, it would have shown a net loss of $300,000., rather than the net gain of $317,000. which was reported. Also, in 1966, when there was a net realized loss on the sale of investments totalling $1,473,622., the loss was omitted from the income statement and reported separately. No notation accompanied this highly significant change in the accounting...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • Securities and Exchange Commission v. Crofters, Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio
    • 10 Agosto 1972
    ...v. Culpepper, supra; Securities & Exchange Commission v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082 (C.A.2, 1972); Tanzer v. Huffiness, 408 F.2d 42, 43 n. 1 (C.A.3, 1969). Once the plaintiff Commission establishes, as they have here, that such violations have occurred, the burden of showing......
  • Case v. Morrisette
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit
    • 27 Febrero 1973
    ...supra note 34, 333 U.S. at 395-399, 68 S.Ct. 525; Feder v. Martin Marietta Corp., 406 F.2d 260, 264 (2d Cir. 1969); Tanzer v. Huffines, 408 F.2d 42, 45 n. 8 (3d Cir. 1969); Lentz v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 428 F.2d 36, 39 (5th Cir. 1970). 39 United States v. Mississippi Valley Generatin......
  • Lawson v. Baltimore Paint and Chemical Corporation
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 31 Mayo 1972
    ...Cir. 1970); Gillespie v. Gray Line Corp., 317 F.Supp. 942 (S.D. N.Y.1970); Tanzer v. Huffines, 287 F. Supp. 273 (D.Del.1968), aff'd 408 F.2d 42 (3 Cir. 1969); 412 F.2d 221 (3 Cir. 1969); 314 F.Supp. 189 (D.Del.1970); 315 F.Supp. 1140 16 "Article IX. Indemnification of Directors "The corpora......
  • S.E.C. v. Lawbaugh
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Maryland
    • 14 Marzo 2005
    ...is a reasonable likelihood that the defendant, if not enjoined, will again engage in the illegal conduct. See Tanzer v. Huffines, 408 F.2d 42, 43 n. 1 (3rd Cir.1969) (per curiam); see also SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334 (5th Cir.1978); SEC v. Commonwealth Chemical Securities, Inc., 574 F......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT